No appearance

The appellant mother, M.H., brought a motion for state-funded counsel for her appeal of a child protection order that placed her child in extended care.

The court applied the five-part test for funding, finding that the mother's s. 7 Charter rights were engaged, she could not have a fair hearing without counsel due to the complexity of the proceedings and her limited capacity, she had exhausted all legal aid avenues, and she was unable to afford a lawyer.

Crucially, the court determined that her appeal had the requisite minimum threshold of merit, particularly concerning arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel and the significant imbalance of evidence at the original summary judgment motion.

The motion was granted, and the Attorney General of Ontario was ordered to provide state-funded counsel and reasonable disbursements for both the appeal and the present motion.

The applicant sought leave to enforce an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board against the respondent, despite a province-wide moratorium on residential evictions due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

The court balanced the risks to the landlord and other tenants from the respondent's violent behaviour against the risks to the respondent and public health if evicted during the pandemic.

Leave was granted on the condition that the applicant contact a social services agency to seek aid for the respondent prior to the eviction.

The defendant, Prudential Select Realty Inc., brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim against it.

The plaintiff alleged that Prudential Select was responsible for the wrongful conduct of its agent, Mr. Singh, who sold a property to the plaintiff in his personal capacity before completing his own purchase of the property.

The court found that Mr. Singh acted as a principal in the transaction, without the involvement or knowledge of Prudential Select, and that Prudential Select did not receive any commission.

Applying principles of vicarious liability, the court determined there was no genuine issue for trial against Prudential Select, as Mr. Singh's actions were not connected to his authorized employment with the brokerage.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the claim against Prudential Select was dismissed with costs.

This decision addresses the determination of costs for the second of two related actions, following an appeal that dismissed both actions in their entirety.

The Court of Appeal remitted the costs determination to the Superior Court.

The plaintiffs, who were unsuccessful in both actions, did not participate in the costs submissions.

The court awarded the defendant, St. Paul’s Fire and Marine Insurance Company, $75,588 in costs on a partial indemnity scale, after adjusting the claimed amount to account for costs from a preceding action.

The court affirmed that partial indemnity costs are not strictly limited to a percentage of actual fees if a favourable rate was negotiated, and considered factors such as the substantial damages claimed, the defendant's long-term costs, the plaintiffs' non-participation, and the defendant's appropriate conduct in managing litigation.

The applicant, Nadire Atas, sought to interfere with a prior order of MacPherson J.A. The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed her motion, finding no basis to intervene with the previous order.

However, the court granted her an extension of time to perfect her appeal, with the extension expiring 60 days after her release from custody.

The court also clarified its lack of authority to refer the matter to the Supreme Court of Canada and noted that interventions are governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, Marie Bagoo, sued the City of Toronto for negligence after a slip and fall on an unrepaired sidewalk on Centre Island.

The City failed to defend the action and was noted in default.

The plaintiff moved for default judgment under Rule 19.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the City liable for failing to maintain the sidewalk and prevent the trip hazard, which caused the plaintiff's injuries.

Judgment was granted to the plaintiff for special and general damages, along with costs.

The plaintiff sought default judgment against the defendants for misappropriation of partnership funds and improper diversion of business.

The court granted default judgment against the individual defendant for breach of fiduciary duty, awarding compensatory, aggravated, and punitive damages totaling $317,720.35.

The claim for intentional infliction of mental distress was dismissed.

The claim against the corporate defendant for an accounting and disgorgement of profits was also dismissed, as the plaintiff failed to establish that the competing business operated concurrently with the partnership.

Costs were awarded on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff, Randy Brown, sued the defendants for damages after a slip and fall on ice at their property.

The matter proceeded as an undefended trial.

The court found the defendants liable for failing to maintain safe premises, despite prior warnings.

However, the plaintiff was found contributorily negligent due to his awareness of the hazard.

Damages for general injury, past and future loss of income, and future costs of care and housekeeping were assessed, with reductions for a pre-existing condition and contributory negligence.

OHIP's subrogated claim and the plaintiff's costs were also awarded.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario sought a permanent injunction against Alan Canon and his associated corporations to prevent them from performing controlled acts and using prohibited professional titles without proper licensing.

Canon, who had a history of breaching undertakings and disciplinary actions from another college, failed to appear or file evidence.

The court granted the statutory injunction, finding clear breaches of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 and the Medicine Act, 1991, and awarded costs to the College.

Cricket Canada applied under the Arbitration Act, 1991, to set aside severable parts of an arbitration award issued by the Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada (SDRCC).

The arbitration stemmed from allegations by Bilal Syed, an unsuccessful election candidate, concerning fraud, discrimination, bias, and by-law non-compliance in Cricket Canada's internal election process.

While the arbitrator ordered a new election, he also directed Cricket Canada to amend its by-laws and implement specific internal governance measures and prospective policy changes.

The court found these latter portions of the award to be outside the scope of the arbitration agreement and ultra vires the arbitrator's mandate, applying a correctness standard of review.

Consequently, these impugned decisions were set aside, while the remainder of the award, including the order for a new election, was allowed to stand.

The plaintiff, Karen Braley operating as Blackburn Residential Services, brought a motion for production of third-party documents from Family and Children’s Services of Lanark, Leeds and Grenville.

This motion was in the context of a defamation action against the defendant, Christine Harriet Johnston, concerning a complaint she allegedly made to the Society.

The Society had investigated the complaint and found no reasonable grounds.

The court granted the motion, finding the documents relevant and necessary for the defamation action, and that the defendant likely acted maliciously or without reasonable grounds, thereby losing the qualified privilege under the Child and Family Services Act.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their Statement of Claim to include claims for punitive and aggravated damages, and costs under the Victims' Bill of Rights, 1995, arising from a motor vehicle accident involving an impaired driver.

The defendants opposed, arguing the amendments constituted a new cause of action and would cause prejudice.

The court granted leave to claim punitive and aggravated damages and to plead impaired driving, finding these were not new causes of action and any prejudice could be remedied by costs or adjournment.

However, leave to claim costs under the Victims' Bill of Rights was denied, as impaired driving is not a prescribed offence under the relevant section of the Act.

The applicants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to consolidate three separate actions.

The court denied leave, finding that the alleged "conflicting decision" was from a lower-level judicial officer (Master) and did not represent a conflict on a matter of principle, but rather an application of the same principles to different facts.

The court emphasized that a conflicting decision for the purpose of leave to appeal must be on a matter of principle and not merely a different factual outcome.

The motion judge's discretionary decision to deny consolidation was found to be amply supported by the evidence, considering the insufficient connection among the transactions and the different stages of the proceedings.

The plaintiffs moved for default judgment against John Vella, a director of Dual-Temp Insulation Incorporated, seeking $196,836.89 in unpaid wages, vacation pay, and trust fund contributions.

The defendants were noted in default.

The court found Vella personally liable under section 131 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act and for breach of trust under sections 8 and 13 of the Construction Lien Act, based on the deemed admission of facts in the statement of claim.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against her husband, the defendant, for damages arising from his attempted murder of her.

The defendant had previously pled guilty to attempted murder and was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment.

The court awarded the plaintiff damages for pain and suffering, past and future care costs, past and future loss of income, aggravated damages, and punitive damages, totaling $1,127,730.83 plus costs.

The respondent was charged with speeding 104 km/h in a 60 km/h zone contrary to s. 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

At trial, the respondent entered a guilty plea to the lesser charge of disobeying a sign contrary to s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted for a $100 fine.

The trial judge rejected the joint submission and imposed an $85 fine instead, citing concerns about inconsistent sentencing submissions by prosecutors in the region.

The trial judge also made adverse comments toward the Crown prosecutor when he attempted to cite binding provincial offence appeal authority.

The Regional Municipality of York appealed.

The respondent brought a motion to change seeking termination of child support and rescission of arrears.

The child support obligation was established in 1989 at $200 per month and was to terminate when the child was no longer in school.

The respondent claimed he paid child support directly to the applicant from 1990 to 1998 after the applicant withdrew from the Family Responsibility Office, and that he was unaware of her subsequent reinstatement with the enforcement program.

The court found that the respondent reasonably believed the applicant had removed herself from the enforcement program and was entitled to pay directly.

The court terminated child support as of August 1, 2006, and rescinded all arrears claimed by the Ministry.