3 total
The Court of Appeal upheld a spousal support award that included a substantial interest-free mortgage benefit.
The appellant, Elaine Nairne, appealed a trial judge's order regarding spousal support quantum and duration, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the significant income disparity and differing marital contributions.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's holistic assessment of the spousal support award, which included a substantial interest-free mortgage benefit to the appellant on the matrimonial home.
The court affirmed the principle of significant deference to trial judges in spousal support decisions, while noting that the trial judge's approach to assessing compensatory and needs-based entitlement was arguably narrow.
A minor modification was made to the order regarding the specific employer reference for the respondent's retirement.
Early retirement due to physical limitations constituted a material change in circumstances warranting reduced spousal support.
The moving party husband brought a motion to change a final spousal support order, seeking to terminate his support obligation after retiring early at age 55.
He claimed his retirement was involuntary due to physical limitations from his physically demanding job, though he provided no corroborating medical evidence.
The responding party wife opposed the motion, arguing the retirement was voluntary.
The court found the husband's testimony credible and held that his involuntary retirement constituted a material change in circumstances.
The court ordered a reduction in spousal support effective the date of his retirement, based on his reduced pension income.
Child protection appeal dismissed; trial judge's finding of risk of emotional harm without expert evidence upheld.
The appellant appealed a decision ordering her two children to remain in the permanent care of their stepfather/father.
The appellant argued the trial judge erred by finding a risk of emotional harm without expert evidence, and by failing to adequately consider her improved circumstances and the respondent's criminal history.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the need for protection had already been established on consent, and the trial judge's finding regarding the risk of emotional harm was well-supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.
