Jacqueline M. Mills

The appellant, Elaine Nairne, appealed a trial judge's order regarding spousal support quantum and duration, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the significant income disparity and differing marital contributions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's holistic assessment of the spousal support award, which included a substantial interest-free mortgage benefit to the appellant on the matrimonial home.

The court affirmed the principle of significant deference to trial judges in spousal support decisions, while noting that the trial judge's approach to assessing compensatory and needs-based entitlement was arguably narrow.

A minor modification was made to the order regarding the specific employer reference for the respondent's retirement.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a previous parenting order, seeking primary residence and decision-making for the parties' two children.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the mother's illicit drug use, undisclosed Children's Aid Society involvement, and failure to communicate or comply with the right of first refusal.

Applying the best interests of the child factors under section 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act, the court issued a temporary order granting primary residence and final decision-making authority to the father, while ordering supervised parenting time for the mother pending an Office of the Children's Lawyer investigation.

The Applicant brought a motion to change, seeking a declaration of the Respondent's 2018 income for the purpose of calculating and enforcing child and spousal support for 2019, based on a prior consent order.

The Respondent cross-moved, opposing the declaration, arguing that capital gains from a share sale should be excluded as non-recurring income to avoid "double-dipping," and seeking to terminate child support for all three children.

The court found jurisdiction to make the income declaration, ruled that the Respondent's full Line 150 income (including taxable capital gains) should be used for support calculations as per the consent order, and terminated child support for the second child who had graduated and was independent, but continued it for the third child.

The respondent brought a motion to change a 2014 final order, seeking to terminate spousal support and vary child support, alleging a material change in circumstances due to reduced income and health issues.

The applicant opposed the motion and sought orders for sole decision-making authority for their child, dispensation of travel consents, and reimbursement for reunification therapy costs.

The court found that the respondent failed to establish a material change in circumstances regarding his income or health, maintaining his imputed income at $100,000 per year.

Child support was increased from $577 to $910 per month due to the child residing exclusively with the applicant.

The motion to vary spousal support was dismissed, and the applicant's imputed income remained at $35,000.

The court granted the applicant sole decision-making authority for the child, dispensed with the respondent's consent for travel and government documents, and ordered the respondent to pay $1,190 for his share of reunification therapy.

The existing joint custody order was not varied.

This case addresses the duration of spousal support in a 17-year traditional marriage where the Applicant sacrificed her career for child-rearing while the Respondent advanced his.

The parties had settled most issues, including equalization and the quantum of spousal support, but disagreed on whether support should have a fixed termination date, be indefinite, or be subject to a review.

The court found the Applicant had a strong entitlement to both compensatory and non-compensatory support due to economic disadvantages from the marriage and ongoing uncertainty in her employment.

Applying the Divorce Act and relevant jurisprudence, the court ordered indefinite spousal support, subject to variation upon a material change in circumstances, declining to impose an automatic termination or review date.

The applicant brought a motion to change a court-ordered schedule for questioning and a settlement conference, citing commitments to a national project and a diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant had not provided sufficient specific details for her commitments, had previously managed her project and litigation simultaneously, and that the application was time-sensitive due to the respondent's unemployment and the applicant's history of delaying proceedings.

The court emphasized the importance of adhering to court-ordered timetables to ensure the just and timely resolution of cases under the Family Law Rules.

The respondent husband brought a motion for interim costs of $125,000 under Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules to defend against the applicant wife's claim for an annulment and to advance his own claim to enforce their marriage agreement.

The applicant, who has a very high net worth, conceded the merit of the respondent's case and the reasonableness of the fees, but argued he could fund his own litigation.

The court found the respondent was unemployed, had significant debts, and could not afford his legal fees.

The motion was granted, and the applicant was ordered to pay $125,000 as an advance on costs, plus $10,000 for the costs of the motion.

The applicant brought a motion for further financial disclosure and leave to question the respondent in advance of the respondent's scheduled motion for interim disbursements under Family Law Rule 24(12).

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was contrary to a prior case management order that set a strict timetable and directed that disclosure disputes be handled at the hearing of the main motion.

Furthermore, the court held that the requested disclosure was excessive, unnecessary, and disproportionate to the issues raised on an interim costs motion, and the applicant failed to meet the test for questioning under Rule 20(5).

The Applicant sought to disqualify the Respondent's counsel, Harold Niman and Niman Gelgoot & Associates, citing a conflict of interest due to Niman's prior representation against the Applicant and her family in other family law disputes, and alleging Niman possessed confidential information.

The Applicant also argued the Respondent's retention of Niman was tactical and intended to intimidate her.

Niman brought a cross-motion to strike certain evidence from the Applicant's affidavits, including settlement-privileged communications and documents related to a complaint against Dr. Douglas Weir to the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

The court dismissed the Applicant's motion to disqualify, finding no "sufficient relationship" between the prior retainers and the current proceeding, and no evidence that Niman actually possessed relevant confidential information.

The court granted Niman's motion to strike, upholding settlement privilege and the statutory prohibition against admitting professional regulatory proceedings in civil matters.

The father appealed a final order of the Ontario Court of Justice granting the mother sole custody of a young child and permitting relocation to England, with specified access to the father.

The father alleged legal error in the relocation analysis, trial unfairness arising from late-produced evidence, misapprehension of facts, and deficiencies in the wording and enforceability of the final order.

The court held the trial judge correctly applied the best interests of the child test and made no palpable and overriding errors in assessing evidence regarding relocation, parental cooperation, and family connections.

However, the appellate court found that when settling the wording of the final order the trial judge should have considered proposed clarifications and additions rather than limiting changes to those consented to by both parties.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part, affirming the custody, relocation, and access determinations but remitting the final order to the trial judge to address wording, completeness, and enforceability issues, and determining that a July 2014 access visit satisfied the Toronto access requirement subject to travel reimbursement.

A motion to change a separation agreement dated August 31, 2003, wherein the applicant sought to reduce child support and terminate spousal support following his termination from employment.

The respondent sought retroactive child support from 2009 and prospective child and spousal support.

The court found a material change in circumstances warranting variation of support obligations.

The applicant was not found to be intentionally underemployed despite his termination for breach of company code of conduct.

The court dismissed the retroactive support claim, reduced prospective child support based on the applicant's actual income, and maintained spousal support at the original contractual amount.

Child support was calculated on a five-month basis reflecting the dependent child's university attendance away from home.

The applicant sought to set aside a marriage contract under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act on the basis that the respondent failed to disclose significant assets and liabilities and that the applicant did not understand the nature and consequences of the agreement.

The court found that the respondent provided only incomplete oral disclosure and did not provide supporting financial documentation.

The applicant had limited English proficiency at the time of signing and did not receive meaningful independent legal advice, particularly given the lawyer’s prior relationship with the respondent and the brief consultation.

The agreement was found to be one‑sided and negotiated in circumstances involving a significant knowledge and power imbalance.

The court concluded that the statutory requirements for setting aside a domestic contract were met and declared the marriage contract invalid and unenforceable.