Jacqueline M. Mills

A motion to change a separation agreement dated August 31, 2003, wherein the applicant sought to reduce child support and terminate spousal support following his termination from employment.

The respondent sought retroactive child support from 2009 and prospective child and spousal support.

The court found a material change in circumstances warranting variation of support obligations.

The applicant was not found to be intentionally underemployed despite his termination for breach of company code of conduct.

The court dismissed the retroactive support claim, reduced prospective child support based on the applicant's actual income, and maintained spousal support at the original contractual amount.

Child support was calculated on a five-month basis reflecting the dependent child's university attendance away from home.

The appellant challenged a family law order setting aside a marriage contract, arguing the trial was unfair because of his hearing impairment.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge accommodated the self-represented appellant and that the record did not support any unfairness affecting the outcome.

The court further held it was open to the trial judge to conclude there had been inadequate financial disclosure and that the responding party did not understand the nature or consequences of the contract.

Fresh evidence was admitted for the limited purpose of understanding the hearing-impairment argument, but the appeal was dismissed.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking unsupervised interim access to the child in accordance with a prior court order, while the applicant mother brought a cross‑motion to suspend the access order and require supervised access at a centre along with interim sole custody.

The mother alleged physical abuse and safety concerns during access visits, relying on affidavits from relatives and friends, photographs of minor bruising, and statements attributed to the three‑year‑old child.

Investigations by the Children’s Aid Society and police found no protection concerns or evidence of excessive force by the father.

The court found the mother’s evidence largely hearsay and unsupported by objective evidence, and concluded she had repeatedly resisted and interfered with court‑ordered access.

The court reinstated the previously ordered schedule progressing from supervised access to unsupervised and overnight visits, and dismissed the mother’s cross‑motion.

The applicant sought to set aside a marriage contract under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act on the basis that the respondent failed to disclose significant assets and liabilities and that the applicant did not understand the nature and consequences of the agreement.

The court found that the respondent provided only incomplete oral disclosure and did not provide supporting financial documentation.

The applicant had limited English proficiency at the time of signing and did not receive meaningful independent legal advice, particularly given the lawyer’s prior relationship with the respondent and the brief consultation.

The agreement was found to be one‑sided and negotiated in circumstances involving a significant knowledge and power imbalance.

The court concluded that the statutory requirements for setting aside a domestic contract were met and declared the marriage contract invalid and unenforceable.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice in a family law matter involving the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The Court of Appeal issued an order in terms of the consent filed by the parties.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's disposition regarding custody and access of three young girls.

She argued the trial judge failed to address her alternative proposal for sole custody if she returned to Toronto from Ottawa, and erred in finding she would not facilitate the respondent father's access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant had not put forward a parenting plan predicated on foregoing a move to Ottawa, and that the trial judge's factual findings regarding her inability to facilitate access were well supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision regarding the interpretation of a divorce judgment and the applicable interest rate.

The divorce judgment entitled the respondent to a share of the appellant's pension benefits when he received them.

The appellant argued he did not receive the benefits until he began receiving monthly annuity payments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant received his benefits when he retired early and transferred the funds into a locked-in RRSP, as he had control over them at that time.

The Court also upheld the 10% interest rate specified in the divorce judgment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant husband was in substantial arrears of spousal and child support.

The motion judge granted an order vesting 100 per cent of the appellant's private pension in the respondent wife and ordering the garnishment of 100 per cent of his CPP and OAS benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 100 of the Courts of Justice Act does not provide stand-alone jurisdiction for a vesting order and that section 66(4) of the Pension Benefits Act restricts execution against a pension to 50 per cent.

The Court also held that garnishment of CPP and OAS benefits must be capped at 50 per cent in accordance with provincial garnishment law.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judgment interpreting the spousal support provisions of a marriage contract.

The contract required spousal support to be varied annually based on the greater of the proportional change in the husband's employment income or his total income from all sources.

The trial judge interpreted this to mean the greater proportional change, whether positive or negative, which could result in the wife receiving no support if the husband ceased employment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the variation provision must be interpreted in the context of the entire contract and the parties' intentions, meaning the variation should provide the wife with the greater amount of support.

The appeal regarding the minimum support provision was dismissed.

The parties signed Minutes of Settlement in 1996 providing for child and spousal support, which could be varied upon a material change in circumstances.

Shortly after signing, the appellant husband cashed in significant stock options and received a substantial salary increase, but failed to disclose this to the respondent wife.

The trial judge found these events constituted a material change in circumstances, implied a duty to disclose, and awarded retroactive child and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on the characterization of the stock options as income, the material change in circumstances, and the implied duty to disclose.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in awarding the Federal Child Support Guidelines table amount for the period prior to the Guidelines coming into force in May 1997.

The appellants appealed and the respondent cross-appealed a trial judgment regarding the equalization of net family properties.

The issues on appeal included the valuation of a property known as Block 108, the trial judge's finding of undisclosed assets, the deduction of notional income tax on the deemed disposition of shares, and the beneficial ownership of various properties.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact, assessments of credibility, or exercise of discretion.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The appellant husband appealed an order varying spousal support.

The parties separated in 1970 and spousal support was increased by consent in 1983 after the respondent wife was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis.

In 1991, the wife became totally disabled, and the motion judge found this constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Bracklow v. Bracklow, and held that the wife was entitled to support given the disadvantage imposed by the marriage breakdown, her need, and the husband's ability to pay.