Veena Pohani

The appellant challenged summary judgment dismissing his claim.

The court rejected both appellate arguments, upheld the motion judge’s credibility and documentary-evidence assessments, and found no palpable and overriding error.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order regarding spousal support, life insurance, occupation rent, and the valuation of net family property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law, principle, or palpable and overriding error of fact in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

The court also declined to address the issue of pre- and post-judgment interest as it was not raised at trial.

Branko Skrak brought a motion for a stay of a spousal support order granted in a prior judgment, pending appeal.

The motion was brought under Rule 63.02(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing serious issues with the spousal support and equalization orders, irreparable harm due to inability to pay and non-recoverability, and balance of convenience.

The court applied the three-part test from RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General).

The motion was dismissed, primarily because Mr. Skrak failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as he provided no financial evidence of distress and offered to pay the retroactive support into court.

The court also noted the deference due to the trial judge's findings of fact regarding spousal support entitlement and quantum.

The appellant sought to overturn a trial judgment that dismissed her application for a declaration of trust over a residential property and damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings, particularly given the trial judge's finding that the appellant's evidence was "inherently improbable" and exaggerated.

No error of law was demonstrated.

The respondent father brought a motion to change child and spousal support terms from a 2011 order.

Spousal support had already been terminated.

The court found a material change in circumstances regarding the father's income but limited the retroactive reduction of child support to the date of formal notice (April 2022) due to the father's blameworthy conduct and lack of financial disclosure.

The court imputed an annual income of $52,000 to the father and ordered child support of $479 per month.

Outstanding arrears were to be paid at $150 per month, with a default clause for late payments.

The respondent father brought a contempt motion against the applicant mother for alleged breaches of a final order concerning shared parenting, non-disparagement, and polite communication.

The mother admitted to not facilitating the parenting schedule, citing the children's resistance due to the father's behaviour, and unilaterally ceased communication.

The court found the mother intentionally breached the parenting and communication terms of the order.

However, exercising its discretion, the court declined to make a formal finding of contempt, noting that contempt is a remedy of last resort.

Instead, given that a temporary consent order for a gradual increase in the father's parenting time had already been made, the court converted the contempt motion into an enforcement motion, emphasizing the mother's obligation to comply with court orders and apply parental authority.

This is a Hague Convention motion brought by the father for the immediate return of the child to her habitual residence in Redmond, Washington, USA.

The mother had removed the child to India without the father's consent and subsequently moved her to Canada.

The court found that the child's habitual residence was Redmond, Washington, and that the mother's removal and retention of the child were wrongful under Article 3 of the Hague Convention.

The court rejected the mother's arguments that the father had acquiesced or consented to the removal/retention, that there was a grave risk of harm to the child upon return, or that the child was settled in her new environment in Toronto.

The court ordered the immediate return of the child to Redmond, Washington, and dismissed the mother's application for jurisdiction in Ontario.

The applicant mother brought a motion to impute income of $75,000 to the respondent father and to determine her spousal support obligation, which she had been paying at $3,500 per month under a temporary agreement.

The father argued he was a stay-at-home parent during the marriage and had been out of the workforce for 18 years.

The court found a prima facie case for spousal support entitlement and imputed income to the father at minimum wage ($29,100), as he conceded he was intentionally unemployed but lacked recent experience to earn $75,000.

The court ordered the mother to continue paying $3,500 per month in interim spousal support and ordered the father to pay $500 per month in child support and a pro rata share of section 7 expenses for 2021.

A creditor sought to void a transfer of a matrimonial home to a spouse as a transfer at undervalue under section 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The debtor and his spouse purchased a home in joint names, with the spouse making non-monetary contributions through household management and childcare.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the creditor's application, finding that the effective date of the transfer was more than one year before the bankruptcy event, and the creditor failed to prove insolvency or fraudulent intent at the time of the disposition.

The parties attended a case conference to report on settlement status and establish a timetable for next steps in their family law dispute.

The court set a peremptory trial date and ordered a schedule for the exchange of formal Rule 18 offers to settle.

The court also directed the applicant to prepare to address the impact of his prior bankruptcy on his claim for a constructive trust interest in the respondent's property.

The applicant mother brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the respondent father's motion to change a final order for child and spousal support.

The father argued that his assignment in bankruptcy and subsequent status as an employee rather than a business owner constituted a material change in circumstances justifying a reduction in support.

The court granted the mother's motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court held that the father's voluntary assignment in bankruptcy did not affect his income or capacity to earn money, and therefore did not constitute a material change in circumstances.

The father's motion to change was dismissed.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment in a matrimonial property dispute.

The trial judge found that a declaration of trust and a $300,000 second mortgage were sham documents designed to defeat the respondent wife's interest in the matrimonial condominium.

The trial judge awarded the respondent an equalization payment of $100,500 and rejected an unequal division of property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, finding no basis to interfere with the credibility assessments or the detailed reasons for finding the documents to be shams.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicant sought a declaration that a bankrupt's notional gift of 50% equity in a matrimonial home to his spouse was a transfer at undervalue and void under s. 96(1)(b)(i) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court found that even if the transfer was at undervalue, it would exercise its equitable discretion not to declare it void.

The court considered factors such as the spouses' good faith, the lack of intention to defeat creditors, the spouse's non-monetary contributions to the family, and her need for the funds to support herself and her children.

Mother brought a motion to change a 2007 Separation Agreement to increase child support retroactively to 2007, enforce special expenses for post-secondary education, and extend spousal support beyond the agreed termination date of December 31, 2017.

Father opposed the motion.

The court found material changes in circumstances, including father's income increase from $138,546 to over $152,000, mother's inability to obtain full-time employment due to medical conditions, and the children's post-secondary education expenses.

The court granted the motion in substantial part, ordering retroactive child support from January 1, 2013, ongoing child support at $2,044 per month, proportionate contributions to post-secondary expenses at 69.6% for father and 30.4% for mother, and indefinite spousal support at $2,200 per month commencing March 1, 2016.

The applicant wife sought full indemnity costs following her success in the main judgment.

The court found the respondent's conduct, including entering a trust declaration and registering a second mortgage to defeat the applicant's claims, constituted bad faith under Rule 24(9) of the Family Law Rules.

Applying the factors under Rule 24(11), the court determined that full recovery costs were warranted.

Considering the importance and complexity of the application, the parties' reasonable and unreasonable behaviours, counsel rates, time spent, and disbursements, the court awarded the applicant $60,000 in costs, deeming it reasonable and proportionate.

The applicant father and respondent mother both sought costs following a motion where success was divided.

The father was unsuccessful on temporary custody and venue but successful on parenting schedule terms.

The mother served two offers to settle, both containing parenting terms more favourable to the father than the final order.

The court found the mother was entitled to costs due to her early and severable offers, and her success on key issues.

The father was ordered to pay the mother $9,000 in costs, payable in instalments, despite his argument regarding ability to pay.

The applicant father commenced a family law proceeding in Newmarket.

The respondent mother, who primarily cared for their infant daughter in London, sought to transfer the venue and requested temporary sole custody.

The court found the child ordinarily resided in London and transferred the proceeding there pursuant to Rule 5(1)(b) of the Family Law Rules.

Given the parties' lack of historical cooperation and the child's young age, the court awarded temporary sole custody to the mother while implementing a progressive parenting schedule for the father, including overnights.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change the primary residence of the parties' nine-year-old child from Grimsby to Ajax, Ontario, following her relocation to live with her common-law partner.

The parties previously shared joint custody with the child primarily residing with the mother.

The court applied the Gordon v. Goertz framework and found that the proposed move would significantly disrupt the child's life, particularly her close relationship with her father, stepmother, half-sibling, and extended family in Grimsby.

The court concluded that the relocation was not in the child's best interests and ordered that primary residence remain with the father in Grimsby, with the mother having liberal access.

The appellant mother appealed an Ontario Court of Justice order making the child a Crown ward without access.

She argued the children’s aid society failed to fulfill its statutory duty under the Child and Family Services Act to provide guidance, counselling, and other services to assist the family, and that the trial judge erred in declining to extend the period of society wardship.

The court held there was ample evidence supporting the trial judge’s findings that the mother’s repeated involvement in violent domestic relationships and inability to regulate anger posed ongoing risks to the child.

Although the society could have communicated better in some respects, the record showed that many attempts to provide services were refused or frustrated by the mother’s conduct.

The appellate court found no palpable and overriding error and concluded an extension of society wardship would not have been appropriate in any event.

This was a costs endorsement following a family law trial in which success was divided.

The court held that neither side should recover costs, citing the mixed outcome on support issues, the applicant's failure to beat an offer to settle, the dismissal of the constructive trust claim, and litigation conduct by both parties.

The court also noted that the respondent made no offer on spousal support and that the applicant had previously been required to bring a motion for a certificate of pending litigation.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.