Ron Shulman

The applicant father brought a motion seeking a parenting order and the immediate return of the child to Ontario from Jordan, arguing Ontario was the child's habitual residence.

The respondent mother opposed, asserting that the father had consented to her remaining in Jordan and that Jordan was the more appropriate forum, also raising concerns about family violence.

The court found that Ontario remained the child's habitual residence, as the father had not consented or acquiesced to the child's retention in Jordan.

The court affirmed its power to issue a "chasing order" for the child's return, emphasizing that denying such power would encourage wrongful removals and undermine the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court declined to cede jurisdiction to Jordan, concluding that the child had a closer connection to Ontario.

The court ordered the child's return to Ontario within 30 days and issued a temporary restraining order against the father for the mother's safety.

The applicant mother and respondent father, a common-law couple with one child, separated in 2015.

This trial addressed remaining issues after nine years of litigation, including income imputation for the applicant, child support, division of section 7 expenses, and therapy for the child and family.

The court imputed an income of $72,072 to the applicant, determined child support based on a set-off method, ordered section 7 expenses to be shared proportionate to individual incomes, and mandated family therapy to improve co-parenting and support the child.

The applicant's abandoned relocation claim was formally dismissed.

This decision concerns the quantum of costs following a successful motion by the applicant to compel the sale of a home.

The applicant sought approximately $27,000 in costs.

The court found this amount disproportionate given the relative simplicity of the motion and the value of the property in a non-urban area.

While acknowledging the applicant's full success and the respondent's lack of meaningful participation, which warranted a higher sanction, the court reduced the award to $10,000, emphasizing the principle of proportionality in costs awards.

The respondent husband brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the applicant wife's application to set aside their separation agreement.

The wife brought a cross-motion for financial disclosure.

The wife argued the agreement should be set aside due to financial non-disclosure, duress, undue influence, and unconscionability, alleging the husband dictated the terms and threatened her.

The court found genuine issues for trial regarding the validity of the agreement, noting the husband's failure to provide financial disclosure and evasiveness during cross-examination.

The court dismissed the husband's motion for summary judgment, granted the wife's motion for financial disclosure, and ordered the husband to pay costs on a full recovery basis.

The Respondent (father) sought full recovery of costs for a Hague Convention trial concerning the return of the parties' child, which he won.

The court found the Applicant (mother) acted in bad faith by orchestrating the child's removal and misleading the father and court.

Despite the mother's financial circumstances, the court awarded the father $75,000 in costs, reducing the requested amount due to excessive hourly rates and duplication of work by the father's counsel, emphasizing proportionality and the deterrent purpose of costs in abduction cases.

This is a Hague Convention motion brought by the father for the immediate return of the child to her habitual residence in Redmond, Washington, USA.

The mother had removed the child to India without the father's consent and subsequently moved her to Canada.

The court found that the child's habitual residence was Redmond, Washington, and that the mother's removal and retention of the child were wrongful under Article 3 of the Hague Convention.

The court rejected the mother's arguments that the father had acquiesced or consented to the removal/retention, that there was a grave risk of harm to the child upon return, or that the child was settled in her new environment in Toronto.

The court ordered the immediate return of the child to Redmond, Washington, and dismissed the mother's application for jurisdiction in Ontario.

The respondent husband brought a motion seeking the production of the applicant wife's former counsel's file.

The wife opposed, claiming solicitor-client privilege.

The court found that the wife had implicitly waived privilege by relying on her state of mind and legal advice to seek to set aside the separation agreement, and by disclosing details of her discussions with her lawyer during cross-examination.

The court ordered the wife to authorize the release of the file.

Following a successful motion regarding a summer parenting schedule, the applicant sought full indemnity costs of $9,850.93.

The respondent did not file costs submissions and had previously stated she would not comply with court orders.

The court found the respondent acted in bad faith under Rule 24(8) of the Family Law Rules by overtly deciding not to comply with court orders.

The court awarded the applicant costs of $7,500, reducing the requested amount slightly for proportionality.

The moving parties (two fathers) sought full indemnity costs of approximately $75,000 following a successful motion that changed the respondent mother's parenting time to supervised access.

The court found that while the fathers were successful and presumptively entitled to costs, their claim was unreasonable and disproportionate for a one-hour motion.

The court also criticized the unnecessary and ill-conceived contempt motion brought by one of the fathers, which unnecessarily complicated the proceedings.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $20,000, apportioned equally between the fathers.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following two successful motions for child support brought by fathers N. and R. against mother A. The fathers sought full indemnity costs, while the mother argued for no costs due to alleged divided success and her own offers to settle.

The court rejected both extreme positions, finding no merit in full indemnity or no costs.

Applying the presumption that successful parties are entitled to some costs, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to each father, reducing their requested amounts due to some overlap between their original motions.

The respondent mother brought a 14B motion to determine who should conduct her court-ordered psychiatric assessment and what documents should be provided to the assessor.

The mother, applicant father, and respondent father each proposed a different psychiatrist.

The court selected the respondent father's proposed assessor, finding him to be the most qualified for adult psychiatric diagnoses.

The court also ordered that all prior orders, including those made without prejudice, be provided to the assessor.

Two fathers brought separate motions seeking temporary child support and section 7 expenses from the mother for their respective children.

The mother admitted her obligation to pay but disputed the amounts, the retroactive date, and claimed undue hardship.

The court ordered the mother to pay Table child support based on an agreed income of $117,360 and 50% of section 7 expenses for both children, retroactive to September 1, 2020, when the demands were first made.

The court dismissed the mother's undue hardship claim at this stage, encouraging her to reduce her supervised access costs first.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion to temporarily suspend a scheduled expansion of the respondent father's parenting time, pending a trial on her Motion to Change.

The mother argued that the father's relocation 55 km away would result in an unreasonable commute for the child.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no material change in circumstances, as the final order explicitly permitted relocation within the Greater Toronto Area and there was no expert evidence showing the commute would harm the child.

The applicant father sought an urgent motion to stay a custody and parenting order pending an appeal to the Divisional Court.

The preliminary issue was whether the Superior Court of Justice retained jurisdiction to hear the stay motion after an appeal had been launched.

The court found that Rule 63.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, grants concurrent jurisdiction to both the trial court and the appeal court for such motions.

The respondent mother failed to demonstrate why the Superior Court should not exercise its concurrent jurisdiction.

Consequently, the court asserted jurisdiction and scheduled the applicant's motion for a stay.

The applicant moved to remove the respondent's lawyer and his firm as counsel of record, arguing she intended to call the lawyer as a witness at trial regarding the negotiation of a separation agreement she sought to set aside for duress.

The court applied the nine-factor test from Essa (Township) v. Guergis and found that the lawyer's evidence would largely be protected by solicitor-client privilege, other sources of evidence were available, and removing counsel would severely prejudice the respondent.

The motion to remove counsel was dismissed.

The parties separated after a seven-year marriage during which the applicant stayed home to care for their two children while the respondent worked as a police officer.

At trial, the court determined the applicant's entitlement to retroactive and ongoing spousal support, as well as retroactive child support.

The court found a strong compensatory claim for spousal support and ordered the respondent to pay $1,550 per month, subject to a review in five years to assess the applicant's progress toward self-sufficiency.

The court also calculated retroactive support arrears, crediting the respondent for certain expenses paid post-separation, resulting in a net retroactive payment of $9,764.70.

This is an addendum to the Court of Appeal's decision on an appeal from a Superior Court order regarding family law matters, specifically concerning support.

The appellant sought relief regarding costs awarded to the respondent on the motion below.

Although this relief was requested in the Notice of Appeal, it was not addressed in the original submissions or reasons.

Following written submissions from both parties, the Court of Appeal quashed the cost order from the motion below and remitted the costs issue back to the motion judge for discretionary determination.

The moving party brought a motion to change a consent order governing child and spousal support after losing employment and experiencing a substantial reduction in income.

The responding party argued that the original order reflected imputed income and that the payor continued to conceal income, relying on pleadings from unrelated litigation and alleged disclosure deficiencies.

The court held that the pleadings were not evidence and that there was no proof of hidden income.

Applying the definition of "true income" in the consent order and the test for variation established in Willick v. Willick and G.(L.) v. B.(G.), the court found a material change in circumstances due to the payor’s reduced income.

The court therefore varied the child support and spousal support provisions retroactively but declined to delete the arrears provision.

Following the breakdown of a marriage, the parties had entered into a separation agreement under which the respondent would transfer his half of the matrimonial condominium to the applicant in exchange for a release of spousal and child support.

The agreement was drafted by a jointly retained paralegal without independent legal advice and was never fully implemented.

The court found that the respondent repudiated the agreement by demanding new terms before transferring title, but both parties ultimately treated the agreement as terminated during litigation.

The court dismissed claims to rescind or enforce the agreement and instead determined custody, retroactive and ongoing child support, section 7 expenses, and equalization of net family property under the Family Law Act.

The respondent was ordered to pay retroactive support for two children from January 1, 2010 and ongoing table support, while many claimed extraordinary expenses were rejected due to lack of proof.

The matrimonial home was ordered sold with proceeds applied first to support arrears, equalization, and costs before being divided equally.