Eleanor Schnall

The accused pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL causing death.

The accused, aged 24, consumed alcohol at a bar and then drove his father's vehicle through the Western University campus at excessive speed, striking and killing an 18-year-old first-year student.

The accused's blood alcohol concentration was 171 mg/100 mL, more than twice the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment and a ten-year driving prohibition, emphasizing general deterrence as the paramount sentencing principle in impaired driving causing death cases.

The court considered five sentencing cases involving offences committed after October 24, 2013, when amendments to section 737 of the Criminal Code came into effect.

These amendments made the victim fine surcharge (VFS) mandatory, removed judicial discretion in its imposition, increased the percentage calculation from 15% to 30% of any fine imposed, and increased the quantum where no fine was imposed.

The court held that the mandatory VFS provisions constitute a breach of section 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (cruel and unusual punishment) and potentially section 7, rendering them unconstitutional.

The court declined to impose the mandatory VFS in all five cases and waived it entirely.

The court found that the mandatory provisions, when applied to impoverished offenders receiving social assistance benefits, result in sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the offences and offenders' circumstances, forcing individuals to choose between purchasing food and paying the surcharge.

Three defendants appealed their convictions and sentences for breaching the County of Elgin Woodlands Conservation Bylaw 05-03 by cutting down trees in a right of way without complying with the bylaw's provisions.

The County of Elgin cross-appealed seeking increased sentences and lifting of a stay on one count.

The appellate court found that the Kienapple principle against multiple convictions did not apply, as the seven counts contained sufficient distinct elements.

The court set aside findings of guilt on two counts relating to signage and notice requirements, finding the bylaw language ambiguous as applied to the defendants.

The court increased the fines imposed, finding the original sentences inadequate to satisfy principles of general and specific deterrence in regulatory offences.