Cory Deyarmond

The Society sought extended care for H.M., who was found in need of protection.

The mother, B.T., sought H.M.'s return.

The court found that while H.M. continued to need protection, the risk was low and B.T.'s parenting was adequate.

The court critically examined the Society's restrictive access policies and communication, which contributed to the strained relationship.

The final order placed H.M. in the mother's care under Society supervision for six months, with specific terms for communication and support, and no access for the father.

The appellant father appealed a protection order concerning his twin sons, which had been dismissed by the Divisional Court.

His appeal to the Court of Appeal repeated allegations against various judges, social workers, and lawyers, and included claims of obstruction of justice.

Following a notice under Rule 2.1.01, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting the appellant's pattern of accusations, litigation of already decided issues, and failure to pay costs.

The mother sought to relocate with the child from Prince Edward County to Burlington, seeking sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence.

The father opposed the relocation and sought shared parenting time, later requesting primary residence for himself.

The court, applying the best interests of the child test under the Divorce Act, granted the mother sole decision-making authority and primary residence, finding her plan more child-focused and noting the father's poor communication and uncooperative behaviour.

The relocation was authorized, and a detailed parenting schedule was established.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order finding his two children in need of protection and placing them in the sole custody of the mother.

The father, who had not seen the children in over four years, alleged widespread misconduct by judges, lawyers, and social workers, but failed to file responding evidence on the summary judgment motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact in the motion judge's decision, and upheld the refusal to grant an adjournment.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision affirming a trial judge's order that denied him access to a child placed in extended society care.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the appellant had standing to appeal under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and concluded that determining the appeal on the merits was in the child's best interests.

The Court admitted fresh evidence regarding the child's wishes to be adopted without ongoing access by the appellant.

Finding no error in the courts below and prioritizing the child's best interests, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The appellants, the mother and a family friend, appealed a disposition order placing a 10-year-old child in the extended care of the Society for the purpose of adoption.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in relying on a court-ordered parenting assessment, making different access orders for siblings, and failing to recognize their remedial efforts.

The appeal court admitted some fresh evidence but ultimately dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors and properly prioritized the child's best interests.

The respondent father brought a motion to change interim custody of the parties' three children from the applicant mother to himself.

Following separation, the mother unilaterally relocated with the children multiple times, changing their schools and living arrangements without the father's consent or a court order.

The court found that the mother's actions disrupted the children's stability and placed her own needs ahead of theirs.

Concluding that there were compelling reasons to change the status quo, the court granted interim custody to the father, ordered access for the mother, and terminated the father's child support obligations.

The mother applied to relocate with the parties' child from Toronto to Kingston.

The trial judge granted the application, focusing heavily on the mother's reasons for moving and her relationship with the paternal family.

The father appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in applying the Gordon v. Goertz factors.

Specifically, the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the maximum contact principle and inappropriately treated the mother's reasons for moving as the primary factor, despite this not being an exceptional case where such reasons were relevant to her ability to meet the child's needs.

The order allowing the relocation was set aside.

The applicants filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the actions of the Hastings Children's Aid Society following the apprehension of their children.

The applicants alleged that the Society ignored their complaints, failed to provide reasons for decisions regarding access visits and the children's care, and did not give them an opportunity to be heard.

The Board found that while the Society had provided some explanations, it failed to adequately address all of the applicants' concerns or provide written reasons.

The Board ordered the Society to meet with the applicants to address their concerns and to provide written reasons and responses to all complaints within thirty days.

The mother appealed a trial judge's decision granting Crown wardship without access of her child to the Children's Aid Society.

The child was apprehended at birth due to concerns about the mother's cognitive delays and lack of parenting ability.

The mother argued she was not given adequate opportunity to learn to parent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the evidence, including psychological assessments, and correctly concluded that the mother lacked the ability to acquire and convert parenting information practically, even with assistance.