Julie-Ann Marie Kirkpatrick

At a case conference, the court scheduled the plaintiff's motion to convert a proposed class action into an individual action for May 10, 2021.

The court also explicitly endorsed the plaintiff's right to attend any motion or case conference, whether virtually or in person, at the request of plaintiff's counsel.

In a group of six child protection appeals, the appellant J.B. brought a motion to reconstitute the panel, seeking to replace one of the judges due to her involvement in a prior unanimous decision that had reinstated a no-access order against J.B. The appellant argued for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal denied the motion, reaffirming the strong presumption of judicial impartiality and the high burden on the party alleging bias.

The court held that a judge's prior ruling against a party on a legal issue in a different case does not create a reasonable apprehension of bias for a new case involving different legal issues, even if the parties are the same.

This appeal concerned the liability of Children's Aid Societies (CAS) and the Ontario government for damages arising from flawed hair follicle drug and alcohol test results from the Motherisk Drug Testing Laboratory (MDTL) used in child protection proceedings.

Family members (parents and siblings) of children apprehended by CASs sued for negligence, negligent investigation/supervision, intentional infliction of mental distress, bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, misfeasance in public office, and Charter breaches.

The motions judge dismissed these claims, finding that CASs and Ontario did not owe a private law duty of care to parents or family members, as their primary duty is to the child's best interests, creating an untenable conflict of interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision, affirming that the CAS's duty is solely to the child, and Ontario's duties are general public duties, not private law duties to individuals in child protection matters or related to laboratory oversight.

The court also rejected claims of bad faith and Charter breaches as being disguised negligence claims, and dismissed claims for breach of fiduciary duty and s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, finding these duties are owed to the Indigenous child, not the Indigenous parent.

The court heard multiple motions to strike claims against Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (HMQ), various Children's Aid Societies (CAS), and an expert witness (Julia Klein).

These claims arose from the use of unreliable hair follicle drug testing by the Motherisk Drug Testing Laboratory in child welfare investigations and proceedings, leading to children's apprehension and, in some cases, Crown wardship.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence, breach of Charter rights, bad faith, and other torts against the defendants.

The court granted all motions to strike, finding that HMQ and the CAS did not owe a private law duty of care to the parents or children in their supervisory or investigative roles, as their paramount duty was to the child's best interests.

Many claims were also deemed impermissible collateral attacks on existing court orders.

The claim against the expert witness, Julia Klein, was struck due to witness immunity and a lack of causal connection between her testimony and the alleged damages.

This is a second appeal in a child protection matter involving a 10-year-old child made a Crown ward with no access for adoption purposes.

The biological parents appealed the no access order.

The first appeal judge, while finding no error with the trial judge's determination, nonetheless ordered access followed by an openness hearing, made findings of ineffective assistance of counsel against trial counsel, and ordered personal costs against her.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Society's appeal, restored the trial judge's no access order, dismissed the parents' cross-appeal seeking declarations of Charter violations and miscarriage of justice, and allowed trial counsel's cross-appeal on the ineffective assistance findings and costs order.

In a child protection proceeding, the mother's former lawyer brought a motion to set aside the court's previous findings of incompetence and ineffective counsel.

The mother brought a cross-motion for costs against the former lawyer personally under Rule 24(9) of the Family Law Rules.

The court set aside the finding of incompetence, deferring that issue to the Law Society, but upheld the finding that the lawyer provided inadequate and ineffective counsel by failing to order trial transcripts and failing to bring a motion for access pending appeal.

The court found the lawyer's inaction caused a miscarriage of justice and wasted significant costs.

The lawyer was ordered to personally pay $50,000 to Legal Aid and $50,000 to the mother's new counsel.

This appeal addressed systemic failures in the child welfare system, including trial counsel incompetence, judicial bias, and inordinate procedural delay, which led to a child remaining in legal limbo for over four years.

The court found the parents' trial counsel incompetent and the trial process unfair.

While the Crown wardship order was not challenged on appeal, the court overturned the "no access" order, replacing it with a contact order for the parents and the child.

It also established a "Pathway Plan" for an Openness Order Hearing, acknowledging a legislative conflict between a child's right to contact with parents and the requirement that such contact not impair adoption opportunities.

Three mothers sought judicial review of decisions made by the Motherisk Commission regarding their child protection cases.

The court first ruled that the mandatory publication ban under s. 45(8) of the Child and Family Services Act prevented the media from publishing the mothers' names, even with their consent.

The court then dismissed one application as moot because the applicant had already received a favourable ruling from the Commissioner.

The remaining two applications were dismissed as premature because the applicants had not yet exhausted the internal reconsideration processes available before the Commission.

The defendants, a children's aid society and its employee, brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the plaintiff mother's personal claims arising from a child protection investigation that led to criminal charges against her husband.

The court declined to strike the negligent investigation claim, finding that the law regarding a society's duty of care to parents at the investigative stage remains unsettled.

However, the court struck the plaintiff's claims for bad faith, misfeasance, abuse of process, defamation, and Charter breaches due to insufficient pleading, while granting leave to amend.

The Kawartha-Haliburton Children's Aid Society sought Crown Wardship for three children due to ongoing child protection concerns, including exposure to domestic violence, parental substance abuse, and chaotic lifestyles.

The two older children had significant special needs requiring intensive therapy.

The mother sought the return of the children, while the fathers sought access or placement with extended family.

The court found all three children in need of protection and concluded that none of the parents' plans could provide the necessary stability and permanency.

The court ordered Crown Wardship for all three children.

The court denied the parents' requests for access, finding that the relationships were not beneficial and meaningful to the children and that access would impair their future opportunities for adoption.

The orders for the two older boys were silent as to access to allow for clinically managed contact if recommended by their therapists, while the order for the youngest child specified no access.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her claim for compensation following an alleged sexual assault.

The Board had rejected the appellant's direct evidence and the expert evidence of two sexual assault nurses, relying instead on hearsay evidence from a police officer who concluded the acts were consensual.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing, finding that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision, thereby breaching procedural fairness.

The Court also held that the Board's decision was unreasonable, as it relied heavily on flawed hearsay evidence while failing to explain its rejection of the appellant's and the medical experts' evidence.