David E. Fine

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying him compensation for alleged injuries from an assault by his building superintendent.

The Board had found the appellant's version of events lacked credibility and reliability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's credibility findings were factual and did not raise a question of law.

The court also rejected the appellant's arguments regarding reasonable apprehension of bias and section 7 Charter infringements.

The appellant, an Aboriginal man who suffered abuse at a training school as a youth, appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying him compensation.

The Board had weighed the abuse he suffered against his extensive subsequent criminal record and concluded compensation was not reasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board made no error of law in considering his criminal record under s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, and that Gladue principles do not strictly apply to civil compensation determinations.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board and brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence, including police reports, that were not before the Board.

The appellant argued he did not file the reports due to post-traumatic stress and fear for his safety.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, applying the Palmer test, and finding that the reports were available or could have been obtained prior to the hearing.

The Court noted that admitting the evidence would undermine the finality of the Board's proceedings under section 23 of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board awarding her $3,000 for two incidents of violence but denying her other claims.

The appellant argued the Board erred in failing to compensate her for other incidents, awarding insufficient damages for pain and suffering, and failing to compensate for increased rent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the Board proceeding in the appellant's absence after she failed to attend the hearing.

The Court held that the Board's factual findings were reasonable based on the record before it, and noted that the appellant's attempt to introduce new evidence should be directed to the Board under its statutory power to vary decisions.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.

Both parties agreed the appeal should be allowed because the hearing panel improperly determined the appellant was not a victim of crime and failed to conduct the requisite analysis under s. 17(1) of the Act.

The appellant requested the court substitute its opinion for the Board's regarding compensation, citing distrust of the Board.

The Divisional Court held it is not equipped to make the necessary factual findings and remitted the matter to the Board for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board awarding compensation to her former son-in-law for injuries she caused him.

The appellant argued she was denied procedural fairness because the Board did not notify her of the hearing, despite her having returned a form explicitly checking a box to indicate she did not want notice.

She claimed the Board should have warned her of the potential impact of the hearing on a related civil action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant clearly waived her right to notice and the Board had no duty to provide legal advice regarding collateral civil proceedings.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, arguing the Board erred in law by accepting hearsay evidence over his direct evidence without explanation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's reasons clearly demonstrated the appellant's version was rejected due to major discrepancies and his minimization of his criminal record.

The hearsay evidence, indicating the appellant was injured during a drug transaction, was cogent and properly accepted by the Board.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying his claim for compensation following two assaults by another resident in his apartment building.

The Board denied the claim based on the appellant's credibility, reliability, reckless behaviour, and extensive criminal record, finding he had put himself in harm's way.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's consideration of the appellant's criminal record and behaviour under section 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her claim for compensation following an alleged sexual assault.

The Board had rejected the appellant's direct evidence and the expert evidence of two sexual assault nurses, relying instead on hearsay evidence from a police officer who concluded the acts were consensual.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing, finding that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision, thereby breaching procedural fairness.

The Court also held that the Board's decision was unreasonable, as it relied heavily on flawed hearsay evidence while failing to explain its rejection of the appellant's and the medical experts' evidence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board awarding her $5,000 for loss of income and $1,200 for future therapy following assaults by her former husband.

She argued the Board erred in attributing her psychological condition and inability to work to factors other than the assaults, and in failing to apply the 'thin skull' rule.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded that pre-existing and subsequent stressors contributed to her inability to work, akin to the 'crumbling skull' doctrine, and that the award fell within a range of reasonable outcomes.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying his claim for compensation after his housemate set fires in their residence and uttered death threats.

The Divisional Court found that the Board erred in law by requiring the appellant to prove the alleged offender intended to injure him through the arson, contrary to established case law.

The court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the Board for a re-hearing before a newly constituted panel.

The respondent Board brought a motion for directions in advance of an appeal, seeking to redact personal and confidential information concerning the victim from both its Reasons and the Hearing Brief.

The appellant, who was found by the Board to have sexually assaulted the victim, opposed the redactions.

The Divisional Court held that the Board must provide an unredacted copy of its Reasons to ensure transparency and procedural fairness, but upheld the majority of the redactions in the Hearing Brief to protect the victim's privacy interests.

The applicant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying his claim for compensation for mental and nervous shock following the death of his estranged wife.

The wife died after falling from a vehicle while attempting to sell illicit drugs.

The Board denied the applicant's claim based entirely on the wife's illegal conduct.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board unreasonably failed to distinguish between the applicant's conduct and the wife's conduct, as the applicant was claiming as an independent victim.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted panel for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board awarding him $1,000 for injuries sustained in a bar fight.

The Board had reduced the compensation under s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act due to the appellant's criminal lifestyle, and under s. 17(2) for his failure to cooperate with police.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the Board erred in law by applying s. 17(1) without establishing a nexus between the appellant's conduct and his injuries.

The matter was remitted to the Board to reconsider the compensation amount based solely on the s. 17(2) finding.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying him compensation for injuries sustained in an assault.

The Board found the assault was directly related to his activities as a drug trafficker and his injury was a foreseeable consequence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Board's application of proportionality principles or its admission of hearsay evidence under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her application for compensation for alleged sexual assaults.

The Board found her evidence vague and unreliable, concluding she did not establish she was a victim of a crime.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the Board's findings were factual and not subject to appeal, which is limited to questions of law.

The Court also rejected the appellant's argument that the Board breached procedural fairness by failing to provide a therapy report form or by not adjourning the hearing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The mother, sister, and two brothers of a murder victim appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying them compensation for nervous shock.

The Board had denied compensation based on the deceased's contributory conduct and a finding that the claimants did not meet the criteria for nervous shock because they did not witness the murder.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal for three of the claimants, finding the Board erred in law by failing to conduct a proportionality analysis between the victim's conduct and the offenders' actions.

The Court also held the Board erred in its application of the nervous shock criteria, as the common law does not strictly require claimants to directly witness the event if they come upon the immediate aftermath.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board regarding the quantum of compensation awarded for sexual assaults he suffered as a child.

The appellant argued the Board erred in law by reducing his awards for income loss and pain and suffering due to other contributing factors, and by capping his future therapy costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's consideration of other contributing factors was an unreviewable finding of fact, the Board properly exercised its broad discretion in assessing pain and suffering, and the appellant could apply for a variation if future therapy costs exceeded the cap.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board that reduced and ultimately terminated his periodic monthly payments.

The appellant had been receiving compensation for injuries sustained when he intervened in a motor vehicle accident involving an intoxicated driver.

The Board terminated the payments after 14 years, noting the appellant's receipt of other income replacement benefits, lack of retraining efforts, and the impact of a pre-existing injury.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Board's exercise of its discretion to vary the compensation order under section 25 of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act.

The appellant, a victim of domestic abuse, appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her compensation for physical therapies and loss of income.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's denial of compensation for physical therapies, finding no error in its conclusion that the assaults did not cause the physical injuries.

However, the Court found the Board may have fettered its discretion by applying a rigid policy that restricted loss of income claims to applicants who were actively employed or had confirmed offers at the time of the injury.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the loss of income issue was remitted to the Board for reconsideration.