D.D. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 2012 ONSC 3341
CITATION: D.D. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 2012 ONSC 3341
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 515/11
DATE: 2012/06/15
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Aston, Swinton and Herman JJ.
BETWEEN:
D.D.
Appellant
– and –
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board
Respondent
D.D., representing himself
David Fine, for the Respondent
HEARD at Toronto: May 16, 2012
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Herman J.
[1] The appellant challenges the amount of compensation awarded by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (“the Board”), pursuant to the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 24 (“the Act”).
[2] The appellant was the victim of several sexual assaults when he was six years old. The Board concluded that he was a victim within the meaning of s. 5 (1) of the Act. The Board awarded the appellant $20,000 for income loss, $10,000 for pain and suffering, $11,200 for past therapy costs and up to a maximum of $3,120 for future therapy costs.
[3] The decision of the Board was upheld on internal review.
[4] The appellant appeals the Board’s award for income loss, pain and suffering and future therapy costs.
[5] An appeal lies to this Court only on a question of law (see s. 23). The standard of review is correctness.
[6] The appellant’s general position is that the purpose of an award under the Act is to make him whole for the losses he has suffered. He submits that the Board made the following errors of law:
The Board did not award full compensation of $72,300 for the appellant’s income loss. Instead, it reduced the award for income loss on the basis that there were other factors, including the breakdown of his marriage and the assault on his son, that contributed to his difficulties. However, the appellant asserts that his inability to work is due solely to the sexual assaults.
The Board erred when it reduced the award for pain and suffering on the basis of these other factors, that is, the breakdown of the appellant’s marriage and the assault on his son. The award of $10,000 for pain and suffering is inadequate given the years of pain and suffering he has endured.
The Board erred when it limited the award for future therapy costs. The appellant says his therapy costs have already exceeded the maximum ordered by the Board.
[7] The Board has a very broad discretion when it determines its awards (see Leung v. Ontario (Criminal Injuries Compensation Board), [1995] O.J. No. 1464 (Div. Ct.) at para. 5). The Act does not provide a victim with the entitlement to full compensation for his or her loss. The Board is required to have regard to all relevant circumstances in determining the amount of compensation (see s. 17 (1)). The Act places several limits on recovery (see s. 19 (1) and (2)).
[8] The Board’s determination of compensation is not reviewable by this court unless it involves a question of law. When the Board found that other factors had contributed to the appellant’s emotional difficulties and need for treatment, it made a finding of fact, which is not reviewable by this Court.
[9] The Board exercised its discretion when it determined the amount of compensation for pain and suffering. The Board did not state in its reasons that the amount of compensation for pain and suffering was reduced because of the appellant’s marriage breakdown and the assault on his son. Rather, the Board indicated that, in arriving at its global assessment of $10,000, it had considered the appellant’s age at the time of the incidents, the position of authority the alleged offender had, the physically invasive nature of the assaults and the enduring emotional injuries. While I appreciate that the appellant does not feel that $10,000 is adequate compensation for what he has endured, the Board had a broad discretion to make the determination, subject to a maximum amount of $25,000 (see s. 19 (1)(a)).
[10] Finally, when the Board placed a cap on future therapy costs, it did so on the basis of a set number of individual and group therapy sessions. If the appellant’s therapy costs exceed the maximum amount awarded by the Board, the appellant may apply to the Board for a variation of its order pursuant to s. 25 (1) of the Act.
[11] The errors that the appellant submits the Board made do not involve questions of law and are therefore not reviewable by this court. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
[12] No costs were sought by the Board. No costs are awarded.
Herman J.
Aston J.
Swinton J.
Released: June 15, 2012
CITATION: D.D. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 2012 ONSC 3341
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 515/11
DATE: 2012/06/15
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Aston, Swinton and Herman JJ.
BETWEEN:
D.D.
Appellant
– and –
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Herman J.
Released: June 15, 2012