David Fine

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her claim for compensation following an alleged sexual assault.

The Board had rejected the appellant's direct evidence and the expert evidence of two sexual assault nurses, relying instead on hearsay evidence from a police officer who concluded the acts were consensual.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing, finding that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision, thereby breaching procedural fairness.

The Court also held that the Board's decision was unreasonable, as it relied heavily on flawed hearsay evidence while failing to explain its rejection of the appellant's and the medical experts' evidence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board awarding her $5,000 for loss of income and $1,200 for future therapy following assaults by her former husband.

She argued the Board erred in attributing her psychological condition and inability to work to factors other than the assaults, and in failing to apply the 'thin skull' rule.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded that pre-existing and subsequent stressors contributed to her inability to work, akin to the 'crumbling skull' doctrine, and that the award fell within a range of reasonable outcomes.

The applicant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying his claim for compensation for mental and nervous shock following the death of his estranged wife.

The wife died after falling from a vehicle while attempting to sell illicit drugs.

The Board denied the applicant's claim based entirely on the wife's illegal conduct.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board unreasonably failed to distinguish between the applicant's conduct and the wife's conduct, as the applicant was claiming as an independent victim.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted panel for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board awarding him $1,000 for injuries sustained in a bar fight.

The Board had reduced the compensation under s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act due to the appellant's criminal lifestyle, and under s. 17(2) for his failure to cooperate with police.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the Board erred in law by applying s. 17(1) without establishing a nexus between the appellant's conduct and his injuries.

The matter was remitted to the Board to reconsider the compensation amount based solely on the s. 17(2) finding.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying him compensation for injuries sustained in an assault.

The Board found the assault was directly related to his activities as a drug trafficker and his injury was a foreseeable consequence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Board's application of proportionality principles or its admission of hearsay evidence under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The mother, sister, and two brothers of a murder victim appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying them compensation for nervous shock.

The Board had denied compensation based on the deceased's contributory conduct and a finding that the claimants did not meet the criteria for nervous shock because they did not witness the murder.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal for three of the claimants, finding the Board erred in law by failing to conduct a proportionality analysis between the victim's conduct and the offenders' actions.

The Court also held the Board erred in its application of the nervous shock criteria, as the common law does not strictly require claimants to directly witness the event if they come upon the immediate aftermath.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board regarding the quantum of compensation awarded for sexual assaults he suffered as a child.

The appellant argued the Board erred in law by reducing his awards for income loss and pain and suffering due to other contributing factors, and by capping his future therapy costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's consideration of other contributing factors was an unreviewable finding of fact, the Board properly exercised its broad discretion in assessing pain and suffering, and the appellant could apply for a variation if future therapy costs exceeded the cap.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board terminating his payments.

After the appeal was set down, the Board reviewed its order and reinstated the payments retroactively, rendering the appeal moot except for costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as moot but awarded the appellant $4,000 in costs, noting the appeal had been necessary.

The applicant physician sought judicial review to prohibit the respondent tribunal from proceeding with a patient's claim of sexual assault filed 10 years prior.

The applicant had been exonerated by both the police and his professional college shortly after the allegations were made.

The tribunal had closed its file for over four years before reopening it, and the applicant presented evidence that key witnesses' memories had faded.

The Divisional Court granted the application and stayed the proceedings, finding that the extraordinary delay compromised the fairness of the hearing and amounted to a gross abuse of process.

The appellant was injured in a home invasion and awarded $7,000 by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, which rejected his claim of complete disability.

The appellant appealed, arguing the Board erred in law, failed to record the proceedings, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no statutory obligation to record the proceedings, rejecting the fresh evidence as mere argument, and concluding the Board's decision was supported by the medical evidence.