Harvison Young

The appellant, who speaks Taishanese and has no English language capability, was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, he argued that his right to an interpreter under section 14 of the Charter was breached because the interpreter provided for the first half of his trial interpreted in Cantonese rather than Taishanese.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence confirming the linguistic differences between the two languages and the interpreter's use of Cantonese.

The Court found that the interpretation fell below the constitutionally guaranteed standard, creating a real possibility that the appellant did not understand the proceedings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant tenant operated a duty-free store that suffered a material adverse effect due to COVID-19 border closures.

The tenant invoked a lease provision requiring the landlord to consult and discuss the impact of regulatory changes.

After negotiations failed, the tenant sought a judicially imposed rent abatement.

The motion judge dismissed the request, finding the provision was an agreement to agree, and the landlord had negotiated in good faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that pre-contractual subjective intentions were inadmissible, the court could not impose a rent adjustment without a contractual mechanism, and the landlord was entitled to pursue its economic self-interest during negotiations.

The appellant, who was designated a dangerous offender and given an indeterminate sentence in 1988, appealed the dismissal of his application for habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the original sentencing judge lacked jurisdiction to order a psychiatric remand under the Criminal Code and failed to invoke the Mental Health Act.

Furthermore, the sentencing judge erred by fettering his discretion when he concluded he had no choice but to impose the dangerous offender designation if statutory criteria were met.

The habeas corpus application was granted, the dangerous offender designation was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a fresh sentencing hearing.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder based primarily on the testimony of a co-operating witness who was present during the shooting.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three cumulative errors that rendered the trial unfair: providing an inadequate answer to a jury question about the absence of corroborative evidence, failing to correct improper statements made by the Crown during closing submissions, and improperly excluding a hearsay statement made by the key witness to his lawyer.

The Court ordered new trials for two of the appellants.

For the third appellant, the Court found the verdict unreasonable due to deeply flawed stranger identification evidence and entered an acquittal.

The appellant, a real estate agent, was convicted of fraud in relation to three real estate transactions.

She appealed her convictions on the sole ground that the trial judge impermissibly intervened during her cross-examination, creating a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions were primarily questions seeking clarification of confusing evidence and did not compromise the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder after shooting his wife in a parking lot.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, made errors of law, and that he was prejudiced by self-representing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict was reasonable and supported by ample evidence, including the appellant's own statements and eyewitness testimony.

The court also noted the appellant chose to self-represent and had the assistance of amicus curiae.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant sought costs for the appeal and the proceeding below.

The respondent disputed the amount claimed for disbursements, specifically the fees of the appellant's experts.

The Court of Appeal held that expert fees are subject to a reasonableness test and reduced the claimed disbursements, noting the experts were not called to testify and their fees were significantly higher than those of the respondent's experts.

The court awarded the appellant fixed costs for both the appeal and the proceeding below.

The appellants, a fertility doctor and her professional corporation, appealed the dismissal of their action against a former colleague for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment regarding a government funding application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings.

The court upheld the trial judge's conclusions that no fiduciary duty existed due to the absence of an undertaking to act in the beneficiary's best interests, and that there was a juristic reason for any enrichment because the funding application was made honestly and in accordance with the parties' agreement at the time.

The appellant obtained a British Columbia judgment against the respondent, which was registered in Ontario.

The appellant delayed enforcing the judgment for over six years because he believed there was little equity in the respondent's properties.

When the appellant sought leave to issue a writ of seizure and sale, the motion judge dismissed the motion, inferring that the appellant had waived his rights and that the respondent had detrimentally relied on the delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors.

The appellant's explanation for the delay was plausible, and the respondent could not have reasonably believed the appellant waived his right to enforce the $333,717.50 judgment, nor did she detrimentally rely on such a belief.

The appellant appealed a decision finding it in breach of its commercial lease for leaving the building vacant for almost two years and denying it relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the lease or her discretionary decision to deny relief from forfeiture due to a pattern of non-compliance.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to grant an adjournment to retain new counsel after he discharged his trial lawyer mid-trial, and that the Crown's cross-examination and closing address rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion to refuse a lengthy adjournment, as the discharge was an attempt to derail the trial, and the appointment of amicus curiae ensured trial fairness.

The Court also held that while some of the Crown's conduct was improper, the trial judge's corrective instructions neutralized any prejudice.

The respondent, representing a class of seriously mentally ill inmates and inmates held in prolonged administrative segregation, brought a class action against Ontario for Charter breaches and systemic negligence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding that Ontario's use of administrative segregation violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter, and awarded $30 million in aggregate Charter damages.

Ontario appealed, arguing that the Charter breaches were not established for all seriously mentally ill inmates, that Charter damages were inappropriate due to good governance concerns, and that the negligence claim was barred by statute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the findings that administrative segregation of seriously mentally ill inmates constitutes cruel and unusual treatment, that Ontario's clear disregard for inmates' rights justified Charter damages, and that the operational implementation of segregation policies grounded a valid systemic negligence claim.

The applicant husband brought an equalization claim and sought to set aside the transfer of his wife's home to her adopted son, alleging undue influence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The wife, who suffered from cognitive decline and was represented by the Public Guardian and Trustee, had granted the son a power of attorney and added him to her bank accounts following her sister's death.

The court found the son stood in a fiduciary relationship with his vulnerable mother and failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence regarding the property transfer.

The transfer was set aside, and the son was ordered to repay $322,319.81 for unaccounted cash withdrawals, a line of credit, and a mortgage he placed on the property.

The respondent husband sought costs following a trial on equalization where the applicant wife did not appear.

The husband claimed over $140,000 on a full indemnity basis, arguing the wife's conduct amounted to bad faith due to repeated delays, late adjournments, and failure to provide contact information.

The court agreed the wife's conduct was unreasonable and in bad faith, justifying full indemnity costs.

However, noting concerns about proportionality given the husband's share of the house proceeds was only approximately $115,000, the court fixed costs at $55,000 payable forthwith.

The mother sought to claim retroactive section 7 expenses dating back to 2002 for the parties' two adult children.

The father opposed the claim, noting that section 7 expenses were neither pleaded nor awarded in a 2002 child support order.

Applying the D.B.S. factors, the court found that the mother had no reasonable excuse for the delay, the father's conduct was not blameworthy, the circumstances of the adult children did not justify the order, and a retroactive award would cause hardship to the father.

The court ruled that the mother could not seek retroactive section 7 expenses and awarded costs to the father.

Postmedia Network Inc. brought a motion to set aside a sealing order and publication ban granted on consent in a high-conflict family law proceeding.

The respondent opposed the motion, citing privacy, commercial interests, and the best interests of the children.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test and found that the respondent failed to establish a serious risk to the administration of justice that would justify a complete sealing order.

The court vacated the sealing order but imposed a limited publication ban to protect the identities and privacy of the children, as well as personal identifiers to prevent identity theft.

The applicant mother brought a motion for summary judgment to declare a separation agreement valid and enforceable, and to compel the respondent father to pay his share of disputed section 7 expenses.

The father conceded the agreement's validity but argued he was not obligated to pay the expenses because he had not consented to them.

The court interpreted the agreement and found that consent was only required for expenses outside the enumerated categories or budgetary envelopes.

The court further held that even if consent was required, the father had unreasonably withheld it.

The father was ordered to pay $15,501.00 for his share of the expenses.

The parties appeared for a trial regarding access and child support, which were resolved on consent.

The applicant mother sought costs of $14,653.61, and the respondent father sought disbursements of $1,150.

The court declined to award costs to either party, noting that the mother had been unreasonable regarding access and her position on child support was unrealistic given the father's prior contributions to her housing expenses.

No order as to costs was made.

The applicant wife brought a motion to strike the respondent husband's pleadings for failure to make financial disclosure, which was dismissed as the disclosure orders had been largely fulfilled by the hearing date.

Both parties subsequently sought costs of the motion on a full indemnity basis.

The court noted the wife's argument that the husband's repeated inadequate disclosure necessitated the motion, while the husband argued he was successful on the motion.

Given the lengthy history of the case and the triable issues regarding the adequacy of disclosure, the court reserved the costs of the motion to the trial judge to ensure fairness.

Following an uncontested trial where the applicant was awarded quantum meruit damages and spousal support, the applicant sought costs on a full recovery basis, arguing the respondent's failure to participate constituted bad faith.

The court found that while the respondent acted unreasonably, his behavior did not rise to the level of bad faith given his physical and mental health issues.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixing them at $13,283.50, to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the respondent's property.