Taliano

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her claim for compensation following an alleged sexual assault.

The Board had rejected the appellant's direct evidence and the expert evidence of two sexual assault nurses, relying instead on hearsay evidence from a police officer who concluded the acts were consensual.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing, finding that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision, thereby breaching procedural fairness.

The Court also held that the Board's decision was unreasonable, as it relied heavily on flawed hearsay evidence while failing to explain its rejection of the appellant's and the medical experts' evidence.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding her $47,500 in damages and costs against her former husband for spousal abuse.

She sought a new trial or an increased award of $276,000, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing damages, rejecting expert psychiatric evidence, and denying her claims for lost income.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of damages or his conclusion that the appellant's inability to work was unrelated to the abuse.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that reduced her spousal support and ordered its termination, arguing the trial judge erred in finding she was able to work and had not been diligent in seeking employment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence, including the appellant's failure to provide objective medical evidence of her inability to work and her non-compliance with previous court orders to document her job search.

The court upheld the imputation of income and the spousal support order.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion for summary judgment.

They argued that s. 97(2) of the Employment Standards Act barred the respondent's civil action for wrongful dismissal because she had already commenced an ESA complaint.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's decision to decline ruling on the summary judgment motion, noting the respondent's serious allegations of intentional torts, including misrepresentation and fraud affecting the ESA process.

The court found that the evidence required for the tort claims would overlap with the wrongful dismissal claim, making summary judgment inefficient and inappropriate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondent leave to examine a hostile, out-of-jurisdiction witness before trial pursuant to Rule 36.01(2).

The motions judge had ordered the examination to be videotaped but denied further conditions.

The Divisional Court agreed the examination was warranted but allowed the appeal in part, ordering that a judge be present during the examination to resolve anticipated objections and privilege issues given the witness's hostility.

The appellant municipality appealed the dismissal of its motion for summary judgment.

The municipality argued the plaintiffs' action was statute-barred under s. 44(8)(b) of the Municipal Act, 2001, claiming the vehicle collided with a pole on an 'untravelled portion of a highway' (a median).

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that determining whether the median was an untravelled portion of the highway required a trial to fully appreciate the evidence regarding reasonably foreseeable vehicular and pedestrian use.

The appellant physician appealed the dismissal of his summary judgment motion in a defamation action brought by the respondent physician.

The action arose from an email sent by the appellant to the Minister of Health and the College of Physicians and Surgeons criticizing the respondent's medical practices regarding multiple sclerosis treatments.

The appellant argued the email was protected by absolute or qualified privilege.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the application of absolute and qualified privilege, as well as the presence of malice, raised genuine issues requiring a full factual record at trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The landlord appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board finding that he gave a notice of termination for personal use in bad faith, and a review order refusing to admit new evidence regarding the tenant's damages.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of bad faith, concluding there was a reasonable basis in the evidence for the Member's decision.

However, the Court found the Reviewing Member erred in excluding new evidence about the tenant vacating her new premises, as the evidence was not reasonably discoverable prior to the hearing.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the issue of damages was remitted to a differently constituted panel.

The tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board evicting him on the basis that the landlords required the basement unit for their daughter's use.

The tenant argued the Board erred in law by accepting an affidavit from the landlord on behalf of the 15-year-old daughter, failing to determine good faith, and ignoring the tenant's disabilities and the landlords' alleged breaches.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the affidavit acceptable given the daughter's age and concluding the Board had reasonably considered all other matters.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal upholding the denial of disability benefits under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act.

The appellant argued the Tribunal erred in its findings regarding his medication dosage for depression and misapplied the law by effectively requiring his impairment to be continuous rather than recurrent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's factual conclusions were supported by the appellant's own testimony and that it correctly applied the statutory definition of disability.

The corporate defendant appealed an order striking its statement of defence for failing to comply with an interlocutory order requiring it to retain new counsel or obtain leave to be represented by a non-lawyer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge made no error in concluding the defendant's recalcitrance and failure to comply with the clear terms of the order warranted the severe penalty of striking its pleadings.

The appellants appealed an order requiring the individual appellant to pay the respondent $22,253.23 pursuant to a consent judgment based on minutes of settlement.

The appellants argued the motion judge failed to consider the factual matrix surrounding the settlement and misapplied section 30 of the OBCA.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that section 30 was not contravened because the corporate defendant was not ordered to pay for the shares, and that the clear terms of the consent judgment did not require reference to the factual matrix.

The appellants appealed a judgment that awarded the respondents a declaration of trespass, general damages, punitive damages, and costs following a property line dispute over a fence.

The application judge had decided the matter under Rule 14.05(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure despite conflicting affidavit evidence.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that Rule 14.05(3) is not available for the resolution of general and punitive damage claims where material facts are in dispute.

The court set aside the damages and costs awards and directed a trial of an issue regarding the respondents' entitlement to damages.

The Crown sought costs for an initial pleadings motion, motions for leave to appeal, and the appeal, claiming success in having portions of the action struck and obtaining a stay.

The respondent argued for costs, asserting general success.

The Divisional Court found success on the appeal was divided and awarded no costs for the appeal or leave motions.

However, the court found the respondent achieved substantial success on the original motion and awarded the respondent costs of the motion fixed at $27,000, reduced by 25% to reflect partial success.

The plaintiff, a soldier, was assaulted by fellow soldiers in Afghanistan and later in Canada.

He was diagnosed with PTSD and awarded a disability pension under the Pension Act.

He subsequently sued the Crown for damages for intentional infliction of mental suffering, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence.

The Crown moved to strike the claim under ss. 8 and 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, or to stay it under s. 111(2) of the Pension Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that claims relating directly to the assault and the failure to prevent hazing were barred by s. 9 to prevent double recovery.

However, claims relating to post-assault conduct were not plainly barred.

The remaining action was stayed pending the exhaustion of the plaintiff's pension remedies.

The representative plaintiff in a proposed class proceeding sought to introduce a settlement agreement and reasons for decision from a prior Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) prosecution against the defendants.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's refusal to strike these documents from the plaintiff's affidavit, arguing they were protected by settlement privilege and inadmissible.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding the settlement agreement and reasons, finding that the defendants waived privilege by entering a public regulatory settlement, which was tantamount to a guilty plea.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to strike the statement of allegations, as mere allegations have no evidentiary value.