Warkentin

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal from a finding of professional misconduct by the Discipline Committee, the respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $50,000.

The appellant argued for no costs or a maximum of $5,000, claiming the appeal raised an issue of public importance.

The Divisional Court rejected the no-costs argument, noting the appellant re-litigated factual issues, attacked the integrity of the discipline process, and constantly evolved his grounds of appeal, which increased the respondent's costs.

The court awarded the respondent costs of $35,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellant, a licensed professional engineer, appealed a Discipline Committee decision finding him guilty of professional misconduct for providing engineering services to the public without a certificate of authorization and for breaching an agreement not to provide outside services while employed by the respondent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Discipline Committee made no palpable and overriding errors in its factual findings.

The Court also confirmed that under the Professional Engineers Act, all licensed professional engineers require a certificate of authorization to offer or provide services to the public.

Finally, the Court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding procedural unfairness, bias, and abuse of process.

The applicants sought judicial review of an interim decision by the Ontario Labour Relations Board regarding whether certain bargaining proposals were central or local issues under the School Boards Collective Bargaining Act.

Following the Board's decision, the parties reached an agreement that the disputed issues were central, resolving the underlying conflict.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications for judicial review as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the matter because the Board's procedural decision did not set a dangerous precedent requiring appellate intervention.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of an arbitration award that upheld a union grievance regarding a teacher laid off out of seniority order.

The board argued it retained a junior teacher because she possessed specific skills (ASL and PECS) necessary for a special education course, fulfilling its statutory duty to provide the 'best possible program.' The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's conclusion reasonable that the collective agreement's seniority provisions and the statutory requirements were complementary, and that the junior teacher did not possess recognized qualifications superior to the senior teachers.

The applicants, including the Elementary Teachers' Federation of Ontario and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, brought applications for judicial review challenging the Ontario government's decision to withdraw the 2015 sex education curriculum and replace it with the 2010 curriculum.

They argued the directive infringed teachers' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, and students' rights under ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Divisional Court granted the applicants public interest standing but dismissed the applications on the merits.

The court found no infringement of s. 2(b) because teachers remained free to address topics from the 2015 curriculum, and no infringement of ss. 7 or 15(1) because the 2010 curriculum did not inherently deprive students of security of the person or substantively discriminate against protected groups.

The applicant media organization sought judicial review of a decision to hold an in camera hearing for an extension of time application under s. 83(17) of the Police Services Act regarding police misconduct allegations.

The applicant argued the decision-maker erred by failing to apply the Dagenais/Mentuck test for open court proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Dagenais/Mentuck test does not apply to administrative or procedural functions under the Police Services Act, which contains its own statutory framework for determining when hearings may be closed to the public.