Then

During a murder trial, the accused sought to exclude an utterance made to a police officer at the scene and a videotaped statement made at the police station.

The court held that the utterance at the scene was voluntary and not the product of a detention, as the officer's question was a general inquiry.

However, the court excluded the videotaped statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police breached the accused's s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights by deliberately failing to advise him that his jeopardy had increased to manslaughter following the victim's death.

The Crown appealed a 5.5-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for the sexual assault of an intoxicated, sleeping complainant.

The trial judge had imposed the conditional sentence largely to avoid collateral immigration consequences that would trigger the respondent's deportation.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by failing to properly weigh deterrence and denunciation, and by using immigration consequences to impose a sentence outside the appropriate range.

The sentence was varied to 5.5 months of incarceration, though the respondent was not required to serve further time as the conditional sentence had already been completed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol.

At trial, the Crown relied on a certificate of a qualified technician, which required proving the breath sample was taken within two hours of the offence.

The trial judge inferred the time of the accident based on the location, traffic volume, and prompt emergency response.

The Superior Court of Justice held that this inference amounted to speculation rather than a rational conclusion, as probabilities are insufficient to establish the statutory condition precedent.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The applicant, who had been found unfit to stand trial, sought a writ of certiorari to quash an Ontario Court of Justice order.

The lower court had found that the Crown established a prima facie case of assault causing bodily harm under s. 672.33 of the Criminal Code and granted an extension of time for the hearing under s. 672.33(1.1).

The applicant argued that the evidence relied upon was inadmissible hearsay and that the judge erred in extending the time.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error.

The court held that the evidence was admissible under s. 540(7) and s. 672.33(5), and that the judge appropriately exercised her discretion to extend the time despite a minor error in considering one factor.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing there was no evidence of planning and deliberation.

The preliminary inquiry judge had committed the applicant based on circumstantial evidence, including the applicant bringing a knife to collect a debt from the deceased.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge engaged in impermissible speculation and conjecture, as there was no evidence of how the fatal altercation began or that the killing was planned.

The application was granted, the committal for first-degree murder was quashed, and the matter was remitted for committal on second-degree murder.

The applicant, a police officer, was convicted of attempted murder after shooting a person on a streetcar.

He brought a constitutional challenge against the five-year mandatory minimum sentence for attempted murder with a restricted firearm under s. 239(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate given the high moral blameworthiness of the applicant's conduct, nor was it overbroad in its application to police officers.

The court issued a costs endorsement following a 2002 order that stayed the plaintiffs' first action and awarded costs to the defendants.

The costs submissions were misplaced and only brought to the court's attention years later by a Master.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the court found the amounts claimed by the defendants to be excessive.

The court fixed costs at $6,800 for one defendant and $2,500 for the remaining defendants, payable by the plaintiffs.

The applicant sought to quash a common law peace bond imposed by a provincial court judge during a preliminary inquiry.

After the complainant recanted her allegations, the Crown conceded there was insufficient evidence for committal.

The judge, on his own motion, initiated a peace bond hearing based on the complainant's testimony regarding a history of domestic violence.

The applicant consented to the peace bond and was subsequently discharged on the criminal charges.

On review, the Superior Court held that a provincial court judge, acting in their capacity as a justice of the peace, retains the inherent common law jurisdiction to impose a peace bond in a separate proceeding, regardless of the statutory limitations of a preliminary inquiry.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant real estate brokerage sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment.

The underlying motion argued that the plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claims regarding suspected mortgage frauds were statute-barred.

The motion judge had found a genuine issue for trial regarding when the plaintiff reasonably discovered the claims against the listing agent.

The Superior Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and concluding that the discoverability issue required a trial.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the respondent on charges of attempted murder and overcoming resistance to the commission of an offence.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, particularly regarding the specific intent to kill, such as the nature of the weapon, the vital area of the stab wound, and the respondent's actions after the stabbing.

The application was granted, and the preliminary inquiry judge was directed to commit the respondent for trial on those charges.