Robert A. Watson

The applicant sought to be appointed as litigation guardian for her 89-year-old grandfather, who suffers from dementia, in order to pursue an application against his former attorney for property for alleged misappropriation of funds.

The respondent opposed the appointment, arguing there was insufficient medical evidence of incapacity.

The court reviewed the uncontroverted evidence, including letters from the attending physician and observations from the care team, and found the grandfather incapable of managing property.

The applicant was appointed as litigation guardian.

The applicant, claiming to be the common law spouse of the deceased, sought dependant support from the deceased's estate after the six-month limitation period had expired.

The estate trustees opposed the extension.

The court found that the bulk of the estate remained undistributed and there was no prejudice to the estate by the delay.

Applying the principles for extending the limitation period under section 61(2) of the Succession Law Reform Act, the court granted the extension, finding it proper to allow the application to proceed to trial to determine if adequate provision was made for the applicant.

The plaintiff, Frances Wedlake, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, James Jeffrey Richey (a solicitor) and Tracey Ann Richey, concerning two loans made by Wedlake to Richey.

One loan was secured by a mortgage on the Richeys' home, and the other by a promissory note.

Richey had borrowed money from his client, Wedlake, in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Richey claimed the loans were defrayed by unbilled legal services and that Wedlake authorized the mortgage discharge.

The court found no evidence to support Richey's claims, deemed the alleged mortgage discharge authorization not genuine or improperly obtained without independent legal advice, and granted summary judgment in favour of Wedlake for the outstanding amounts on both the mortgage and promissory note, and ordered the mortgage reinstated.

This case involves a dispute among seven siblings over the equal distribution of their deceased parents' assets, held in part through an estate freeze vehicle, 1280584 Ontario Inc. The applicants sought an order for production of additional financial records or the appointment of an inspector under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, arguing that the respondent's accounting was inaccurate and incomplete.

The court found deep distrust and obstruction from the respondents, warranting independent review.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' applications regarding holdback funds from a commercial transaction, the respondent sought costs.

The respondent had made an offer to settle that was better than the result obtained by the applicants.

The applicants objected to the costs claimed, arguing the matter was over-lawyered and the costs were disproportionate.

The court agreed there was some over-lawyering but found the applicants' unproven allegations of dishonesty against the respondent justified an elevated costs award.

The court awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, fixed at $73,036 inclusive of disbursements.

Two related vendor companies applied for payment of holdback funds following the sale of land, building, and an industrial gas business to the purchaser.

The agreements required the vendors to obtain a zoning compliance letter satisfactory to the purchaser and permitted indemnity holdbacks for breaches relating to the property.

The purchaser refused to release the funds after concluding the business did not comply with municipal zoning restrictions and incurred relocation costs.

The court held the purchaser acted reasonably and in good faith in relying on professional advice and exercising contractual discretion under the holdback provisions.

Both applications were dismissed and the holdback funds were ordered released to the purchaser.

The court issued a costs endorsement following a 2002 order that stayed the plaintiffs' first action and awarded costs to the defendants.

The costs submissions were misplaced and only brought to the court's attention years later by a Master.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the court found the amounts claimed by the defendants to be excessive.

The court fixed costs at $6,800 for one defendant and $2,500 for the remaining defendants, payable by the plaintiffs.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision finding that a requirement to maintain eight doctors as tenants and a corresponding rent abatement provision in a 1990 commercial lease were not eliminated by a subsequent renewal agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation of the commercial context and language of the agreements.

Applying Sattva, the Court held that deference was owed to the application judge's interpretation.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment seeking the return of a $50,000 deposit after refusing to close a real estate transaction, alleging a misrepresentation regarding the maturity date of an assumed mortgage.

The defendant argued the motion was premature because the action proceeded under Rule 76 (simplified procedure) and discovery steps had not yet occurred, preventing the defendant from obtaining documents and evidence potentially showing the plaintiff affirmed the contract after learning of the misrepresentation.

The court held that, particularly under the simplified procedure where cross‑examination on affidavits is restricted, fairness requires that parties have a meaningful opportunity to obtain documentary and discovery evidence before responding to a summary judgment motion.

The court found that the defendant had not yet been able to put its best foot forward and that there remained a genuine issue requiring trial regarding potential affirmation of the contract.

The summary judgment motion was therefore dismissed without prejudice.

Beneficiaries of an estate brought a contempt motion against the estate trustee for failing to comply with a prior court order requiring disclosure of the nature and value of estate assets at the date of death.

Despite repeated requests and a formal order directing production of a statement of assets, the estate trustee failed to provide the required information and instead relied on counsel’s narrative letter that did not meet the order’s requirements.

Applying the three-part test for civil contempt, the court found the order was clear, the trustee deliberately failed to comply, and contempt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court ordered the trustee to purge the contempt by filing a proper statement of assets, preparing full estate accounts, producing supporting vouchers and legal accounts, and providing a statement of compensation.

Costs were ordered personally against the estate trustee.

The 86-year-old appellant appealed a Master's order refusing to set aside a noting in default in an action for specific performance of a real estate transaction.

The appellant had entered into an unsolicited agreement to sell her home but immediately retained counsel to contest its validity.

Due to her counsel's inadvertence, a statement of defence was not filed.

The respondent's counsel noted her in default without warning, waiting six months to notify her counsel.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master made palpable and overriding errors by ignoring the overriding principle of resolving disputes on their merits and by failing to consider the sharp practice of the respondent's counsel.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The respondent sought to maintain only its claim for damages.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the claim for damages was not foreclosed by res judicata and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant appealed an order dissolving a constructive trust imposed on the shares of a joint venture vehicle.

The constructive trust had been imposed to secure the repayment of a loan and the payment of the appellant's share of the joint venture profits.

After the respondents paid the amounts owing, they moved to discharge the trust to utilize accumulated tax losses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the constructive trust had served its purpose and the trial judge properly exercised his equitable discretion to dissolve it once the appellant had elected to pursue an accounting and received payment.

The appellant appealed an order striking its statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the claim as framed could not proceed, but varied the order to allow the appellant leave to issue a new claim.

The appeal was allowed to that extent, with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, a former owner of a Toronto property, retained an interest in the property's surplus density through a Density Agreement registered on title.

The property was subsequently sold to a company that later sought creditor protection under the CCAA.

A court-approved Settlement Order vested the property in the respondent 'free and clear' of claims.

The respondent successfully applied to the Superior Court to discharge the Density Agreement from title.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Settlement Order only applied to assets the debtor company actually owned, which did not include the surplus density.

The appeal was allowed and the Density Agreement remained on title.

The respondents brought a motion to quash several paragraphs of the appellant's notice of appeal.

The appellant argued that the time for appealing the judgment in the second proceedings did not begin to run until the constructive trust issue was disposed of.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that the order terminating the constructive trust was a post-judgment order and the time for appealing the earlier orders had expired.

The court also declined to extend the time for appealing, noting the appellant's consistent prior position that he had no intention to appeal.

The motion to quash was allowed and the specified paragraphs of the notice of appeal were struck.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him jointly and severally liable for over $325,000 wrongfully obtained from an elderly relative's estate.

The trial judge found the appellant knowingly assisted other family members in breaching their fiduciary duties by preparing a power of attorney and commissioning a land transfer tax affidavit while knowing the relative was incompetent.

On appeal, the appellant argued the respondents lacked standing under the Trustee Act and that his actions did not cause the loss.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, refusing to entertain the standing and limitation arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and upholding the finding of knowing assistance.

A cross-appeal seeking occupation rent from the appellant was also dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a brief endorsement in this appeal, directing the parties to see the endorsement in companion file C37669 for the disposition.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding liability for occupation rent.

The trial judge had found the respondent's parents liable for occupation rent due to their participation in a conspiracy to acquire assets, but found the respondent daughter was not part of the conspiracy and was merely living with her parents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the parents, not the daughter, were liable for the occupation rent until the delivery of possession.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The respondents on appeal submitted a bill of costs following the appeal.

They sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on the trial judge's award of solicitor-client costs.

The Court of Appeal declined to award substantial indemnity costs but recognized the complexity of the matter.

The court fixed the costs payable by the appellants to the respondents at $25,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.