Darren Hogan

The applicant, charged with manslaughter, brought a pre-trial motion for a stay of proceedings alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 48 months.

After deducting defence delay and delay caused by the co-accused's counsel's unavailability, the net delay was approximately 34.38 months, slightly above the presumptive ceiling.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Crown successfully rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness due to exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the unexpected illness of a key Crown witness and assigned Crown counsel, and the complexity of the joint trial.

The applicant, charged with manslaughter, applied for bail.

The Crown opposed release on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that while the secondary ground concerns were substantial, they could be adequately mitigated by a strict release plan involving two sureties, house arrest conditions, and random drug testing.

The court also concluded that detention was not necessary on the tertiary ground.

The application for release was granted.

During a murder trial, the accused sought to exclude an utterance made to a police officer at the scene and a videotaped statement made at the police station.

The court held that the utterance at the scene was voluntary and not the product of a detention, as the officer's question was a general inquiry.

However, the court excluded the videotaped statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police breached the accused's s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights by deliberately failing to advise him that his jeopardy had increased to manslaughter following the victim's death.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired care and control and refusing to provide a breath sample.

He argued the trial judge misdirected herself on care and control, improperly used his right to silence against him, erred in finding his refusal was unequivocal, and that his trial counsel was ineffective.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no reversible errors and that trial counsel's strategic decisions were reasonable and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol.

At trial, the Crown relied on a certificate of a qualified technician, which required proving the breath sample was taken within two hours of the offence.

The trial judge inferred the time of the accident based on the location, traffic volume, and prompt emergency response.

The Superior Court of Justice held that this inference amounted to speculation rather than a rational conclusion, as probabilities are insufficient to establish the statutory condition precedent.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for conveying a threat to cause death to a judge via email.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on the contents of the email to establish his identity as the sender and in finding the words constituted a threat.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's use of circumstantial evidence and self-identification to prove identity, nor in the objective conclusion that the email's contents constituted a threat to cause death.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for assaulting and disarming a peace officer.

The charges arose after the appellant grabbed the barrel of an officer's machine gun during a dynamic entry execution of a search warrant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying an objective mens rea standard and provided inadequate reasons for rejecting his testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge applied the correct subjective standard when reading the reasons as a whole.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 60-day conditional sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the statutory emphasis on denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for driving 'over 80', alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

She argued that trial counsel failed to request maintenance and calibration records for the approved instrument and that his failings caused adjudicative unfairness.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel provided reasonable professional assistance by retaining an expert, considering defences, and holding the Crown to its burden of proof, and that no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code, alleging the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, erred in applying the law of consent, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The prosecution theory at trial was that the complainant was unconscious due to intoxication and therefore incapable of consenting.

The appellate judge held that the trial judge was entitled to assess the complainant’s credibility, draw common‑sense inferences about intoxication and unconsciousness without expert evidence, and conclude that the Crown had not proven lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also held that the Crown cannot appeal an acquittal solely on the ground that it is unreasonable absent another error of law.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal on a charge of dangerous driving arising from a high-speed police stop on the Don Valley Parkway.

The trial judge had found that audio and video recordings from a police in-car camera contradicted key aspects of the arresting officer’s testimony regarding aggressive driving and road conditions, leading to concerns about the reliability of the officers’ evidence.

The trial judge concluded that the evidence did not establish a marked departure from the standard of care required for dangerous driving and that the Crown had not proven the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

On appeal, the Crown argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by comparing testimony with recordings that did not capture the entire driving sequence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge understood the limited scope of the recording and committed no palpable and overriding error in assessing credibility and reliability.

Deference to the trial judge’s factual findings required dismissal of the appeal.

Summary conviction appeals from conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The accused argued the trial judge erred in accepting the complainant’s evidence and rejecting his testimony.

The court found the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) credibility framework and that the guilty verdict was reasonable on the record.

However, the Crown’s sentence appeal succeeded because the trial judge erred in principle by failing to give adequate weight to denunciation and by overemphasizing rehabilitation when imposing a conditional sentence.

The conditional sentence was set aside and replaced with a custodial sentence followed by probation.

The appellant was convicted of disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code after violating an injunction protecting an abortion clinic.

She appealed, arguing that the injunction was unenforceable against her because she was not a named party to the original proceedings, and that she should have been charged with criminal contempt instead of a s. 127 offence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the injunction expressly applied to non-parties and that her argument constituted an impermissible collateral attack.

The court further held that s. 127 of the Criminal Code is a valid mechanism for enforcing court orders against non-parties, alongside the common law power of criminal contempt.