Robert Wright

The accused, Tanade Mohamed, shot and killed two men in a nightclub parking lot following a minor altercation.

He claimed self-defence and provocation for the first victim, and accident for the second.

The co-accused, Abdirisaq Ali, drove the getaway vehicle and was charged as a party to the offences.

The court rejected Mohamed's claims of self-defence and provocation, finding him guilty of second-degree murder for the first victim.

However, the court found a reasonable doubt regarding his intent to kill the second victim, resulting in a manslaughter conviction.

The co-accused was acquitted of all charges, as the court found a reasonable doubt regarding his prior knowledge of the shooter's intentions.

The Crown applied under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code for an order permitting a forensic biologist to testify by video conference at a second-degree murder trial.

The application was brought in light of the COVID-19 pandemic to reduce the risk of virus transmission.

The defence opposed the application, citing concerns about opening the floodgates for remote testimony.

The court allowed the application, finding that remote testimony was appropriate given the pandemic, the non-contentious nature of the expert's credibility, and the benefits to the administration of justice.

During a homicide proceeding, the Crown sought to admit text messages sent from the deceased's phone to her father shortly before her death.

The Crown argued the messages were admissible to show the deceased's state of mind and to help establish the date of death.

The court applied the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, finding the messages admissible to show the deceased's intention that the accused move out of their shared apartment, and relevant to the date of death.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, applied to be seated outside the prisoner's dock during jury selection and trial.

He argued that sitting in the dock would reflect negatively on the presumption of innocence and impede interaction with counsel.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the seating of the accused is within the trial judge's discretion and that the customary position in the dock does not violate Charter rights or undermine the presumption of innocence.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought a jury instruction that text messages sent from the victim's phone and handwritten notes left by the accused constituted fabricated evidence.

The court ruled that there was circumstantial evidence allowing the jury to infer the accused sent the text messages after the victim's death to deflect responsibility, which would constitute fabrication.

However, the court found the accused's handwritten denial of involvement did not rise to the level of fabrication and should be assessed under the W.(D.) principles without an adverse inference of fabrication.

The offenders participated in a group assault on the victim following an altercation at a rave.

Triolo stabbed the victim in the chest, committing second-degree murder.

Lozada and Ramos participated in the group assault, making the victim vulnerable to the stabbing, and were convicted of manslaughter.

Triolo was sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 12 years.

Lozada and Ramos were each sentenced to three years imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody.

During a trial for second-degree murder and manslaughter, the Crown sought to introduce twenty-two post-mortem photographs of the deceased through a forensic pathologist.

The defence objected, arguing the photographs were highly prejudicial and of limited probative value.

The court balanced the probative value against the risk of reasoning prejudice, finding the photographs were relevant to the nature of the injuries and corroboration of eyewitnesses.

The court admitted twenty-one of the photographs, directing that three be presented in black and white to minimize any potential prejudice.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing there was no evidence of planning and deliberation.

The preliminary inquiry judge had committed the applicant based on circumstantial evidence, including the applicant bringing a knife to collect a debt from the deceased.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge engaged in impermissible speculation and conjecture, as there was no evidence of how the fatal altercation began or that the killing was planned.

The application was granted, the committal for first-degree murder was quashed, and the matter was remitted for committal on second-degree murder.

The appellant appealed his convictions for intimidation, assault, and sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended defence evidence and rendered inconsistent verdicts by acquitting him on one count of sexual assault while convicting on others.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's assessment of the defence witness's credibility was justified and did not misapprehend the evidence.

The court also held that the verdicts were not inconsistent, as each sexual assault count related to a distinct event and had to be evaluated individually based on the evidence of consent at the time.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge and refusal to make a DNA order imposed on the respondent for breaching a no-contact bail condition.

The respondent had met his wife for coffee while on bail for domestic assault charges.

The summary conviction appeal judge found no error in principle in the trial judge's reasoning and held that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The refusal to order a DNA sample was also upheld, as a sample had already been ordered for the underlying assault conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, and the judge erred in finding his version of events did not afford a defence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and rejection of the appellant's exculpatory statement were logical and supported by the evidence.

The court held that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and did not misapprehend the evidence regarding the appellant's involvement in the swarming.

The self-represented appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault and his sentence of a conditional discharge with six months' probation.

The assault occurred during a parking dispute with a condominium security guard.

The appellant argued the trial judge's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, that the trial judge's credibility findings and verdict were supported by the evidence, and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

On a summary conviction appeal alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, new Crown counsel sought an adjournment in order to cross‑examine the appellant on his fresh evidence affidavit, reversing the position taken by prior Crown counsel who had indicated cross‑examination would not occur.

The appellant opposed the adjournment and argued that the Crown had given an undertaking not to cross‑examine, and that costs should be awarded if an adjournment were granted.

The court held that the earlier Crown communication did not amount to a solicitor’s undertaking and that prosecutors retain discretion to revisit tactical decisions unless doing so constitutes abuse of process or causes real prejudice.

The court further held that an adjournment did not create substantial prejudice and that the circumstances did not justify the rare remedy of costs against the Crown.

The adjournment was granted and costs were refused.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving 'over 80' on the ground that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

At trial, the appellant and the arresting officer provided conflicting testimony regarding the appellant's driving and signs of impairment, which formed the basis of a Charter application challenging the breath demand.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application and convicted the appellant without explaining how he resolved the contradictory evidence or why he preferred the officer's testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons manifestly insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to comply with a bail condition requiring him to remain at his residence except for limited specified purposes.

He argued the trial judge shifted the burden of proof contrary to the principles in R. v. W.(D.), improperly relied on his failure to provide a detailed explanation to police, misapprehended the evidence, and improperly took judicial notice regarding evening traffic conditions.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the presumption of innocence and the W.(D.) framework, permissibly assessed the credibility of competing testimony, and did not infringe the appellant’s right to silence.

The court also found no material misapprehension of evidence and concluded that the limited judicial notice regarding reduced evening traffic congestion was permissible.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a summary conviction trial.

The sole ground of appeal alleged ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis that trial counsel decided the accused would not testify without advising that the decision ultimately belonged to the accused.

Fresh evidence on appeal demonstrated that counsel made the decision unilaterally and never discussed the option of testifying with the accused.

The court held that the right to decide whether to testify is a fundamental component of an accused’s control over their defence and counsel’s conduct constituted professional incompetence resulting in procedural unfairness.

Because the accused established that he would have testified had the decision been left to him, a miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault, arguing his guilty plea was not voluntary or informed.

He suffered from Ankylosing Spondylitis and was denied his necessary medication while in custody, causing extreme pain.

He was also threatened and assaulted by another inmate.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the combination of lack of medical care, extreme pain, and threats deprived the appellant of the ability to make a conscious volitional decision to plead guilty.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for refusing to comply with a demand to provide breath samples contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the police officer failed to make the approved instrument demand "as soon as practicable" as required by s. 254(3) due to an approximately 11‑minute delay after arrest.

The court held that the governing standard requires a reasonably prompt demand assessed in light of the entire chain of events and whether police acted reasonably.

Reviewing the audio‑video evidence and the trial judge’s findings, the court concluded the officer’s actions during the delay—including search incident to arrest, managing the scene, and advising the accused of rights—were reasonable.

The trial judge committed no error in concluding the demand was made as soon as practicable.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code following a roadside demand during a RIDE program.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.) and improperly relied on demeanour evidence when rejecting her explanation that nervousness prevented her from providing an adequate breath sample.

The appellate court held that the trial judge correctly applied the W.(D.) principles and reasonably preferred the officer’s testimony that the appellant repeatedly provided inadequate breath samples despite clear instructions and numerous opportunities.

The reasons demonstrated that the credibility assessment was based on the totality of the evidence, not solely on demeanour.

No error in law or misapprehension of evidence was established.

The applicant sought an order under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code assigning counsel to represent him on appeal from convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats.

Although the court accepted that several proposed grounds of appeal were arguable, it found that the appeal was relatively straightforward, based on a short trial record with limited evidence and uncomplicated legal issues.

The court concluded that the applicant was capable of presenting the appeal himself and that the appellate court would be able to properly determine the matter without the assistance of assigned counsel.

The application was therefore dismissed.