M.F. Brown

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay in a historical sexual assault case.

The application judge had calculated a net delay of 33 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the application judge made palpable and overriding errors by failing to attribute three distinct periods of delay to the defence: delay in setting a preliminary inquiry, delay due to defence unavailability for a judicial pre-trial, and delay caused by the defence being unprepared for the first judicial pre-trial.

Deducting these periods reduced the net delay to 29.4 months, below the ceiling.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and the matter remitted for trial.

The accused, charged with the first-degree murder of his spouse, applied for judicial interim release.

The court found that the accused met his burden on the primary and secondary grounds, as he was not a flight risk and his proposed release plan mitigated safety and interference concerns.

However, the court denied bail on the tertiary ground.

Given the brutal nature of the domestic homicide, the very strong circumstantial case for the Crown, and the gravity of the offence, the court concluded that releasing the accused would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicants, charged with bookmaking and criminal organization offences, brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutional validity of the gaming and criminal organization provisions of the Criminal Code and related regulations.

They argued that the gaming provisions were ultra vires Parliament's criminal law power, that the regulation deeming gaming offences as 'serious offences' violated section 7 of the Charter due to overbreadth and gross disproportionality, and that the bookmaking prohibition violated freedom of expression and association under section 2 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the provisions were a valid exercise of the criminal law power, did not violate the Charter, and in any event, would be saved under section 1.

The self-represented appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault and his sentence of a conditional discharge with six months' probation.

The assault occurred during a parking dispute with a condominium security guard.

The appellant argued the trial judge's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, that the trial judge's credibility findings and verdict were supported by the evidence, and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

Following a jury verdict finding the plaintiff 100% liable for injuries arising from a motor vehicle collision, the successful defendants sought substantial costs.

The court applied the reasonableness and proportionality principles governing costs awards under the Rules of Civil Procedure and appellate guidance.

While the defendants were entitled to partial indemnity costs because they succeeded at trial, the court reduced the quantum significantly due to excessive and duplicative claims, unnecessary prolongation of the proceedings by the defendants, and improper inclusion of certain items such as voluntary mediation costs.

Arguments by the plaintiff that costs should be denied due to hardship, alleged disclosure failures, or Rule 49 offer acceptance were rejected.

The court fixed a reduced costs award reflecting fairness and proportionality.

The accused was charged with arson with disregard for human life and arson for a fraudulent purpose following an explosion and fire that destroyed a restaurant.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an unsavoury witness who claimed the accused confessed to setting the fire, as well as expert evidence regarding the fire's origin.

The court applied a Vetrovec warning to the witness's testimony and found it unreliable without sufficient corroboration.

The expert evidence was deemed equivocal.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused caused the fire, resulting in acquittals on both counts.

The plaintiffs sought specific performance of an alleged oral right of first refusal for a 123-acre property, or alternatively, specific performance of a written agreement of purchase and sale for a 10-15 acre severed parcel.

The court found no oral agreement existed for the right of first refusal, and even if it did, it was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds as the plaintiff's property maintenance did not constitute part performance.

The court also declined to order specific performance of the written agreement because expert evidence established that obtaining the necessary land severance was highly improbable.

The plaintiffs' claims were dismissed and the defendant's counterclaim to validate the transfer and remove certificates of pending litigation was granted.

The applicant subtenant sought a permanent or interlocutory injunction to enforce an exclusivity clause in its commercial sublease, which granted it the exclusive right to operate a karaoke club.

The respondent sublandlord had leased another unit to a co-respondent for a restaurant with karaoke.

Finding material facts in dispute, the court ordered the application to proceed to trial.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the co-respondent from providing karaoke services pending trial, finding a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the applicant's business, and the balance of convenience favouring the applicant.