Carlos Rippell

Following a jury trial, the sentencing court addressed convictions for human trafficking and procuring a complainant under 18, with acquittals on sexual interference and assault-with-a-weapon counts.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence required substantial penitentiary terms given the complainant's youth, vulnerability, coercive exploitation, and enduring harm, while also weighing mitigation including limited or absent records and subordinate roles in a joint enterprise.

The court rejected a 12-year Crown position and a conditional-sentence defence position, finding both inconsistent with proportionality and parity.

The court imposed six-year custodial sentences on each offender, less pre-sentence custody credit, and granted ancillary non-communication, DNA, weapons prohibition, and 20-year SOIRA orders, while declining requested s. 161 orders.

The applicant, a young Black man, brought a Charter application to exclude a loaded handgun found in his satchel during a search incident to an investigative detention in an apartment.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable grounds for the search, concluding that one officer's testimony about the applicant attempting to conceal the satchel was untruthful.

The court permitted cross-examination of the officer on prior judicial findings of untruthfulness and concluded that racial profiling played a substantial role in the police conduct.

Finding a serious breach of section 8 of the Charter, the court excluded the firearm under section 24(2).

Following a finding that sections 286.2, 286.3(1), and 286.4 of the Criminal Code violated section 7 of the Charter, the court determined the appropriate remedy under section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

Applying the framework from Ontario (Attorney General) v. G, the court rejected the Crown's request for tailored remedies (reading in, reading down, or severance), finding that such modifications would significantly alter Parliament's legislative scheme.

The court also declined to suspend the declaration of invalidity, concluding the Crown failed to demonstrate a compelling public interest justifying a suspension.

The impugned provisions were declared immediately of no force and effect.

The applicant was pulled over for a traffic infraction and subsequently arrested for breaching a recognizance.

After finding a small amount of marijuana on the applicant's person, police conducted a full search of the vehicle, discovering a firearm.

The applicant brought a Charter application arguing the stop was racially motivated and the search and questioning violated his rights.

The court found no arbitrary detention but concluded the police violated the applicant's s. 10(b) rights through improper questioning and his s. 8 rights by conducting an unreasonable search that exceeded their authority under the Cannabis Control Act.

The firearm was excluded from evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant, charged with possessing a loaded restricted firearm and failing to comply with a recognizance, sought a bail review under ss. 520 and 525 of the Criminal Code.

He argued that a new release plan involving electronic monitoring, a formal Charter application regarding the search of his vehicle, and the Covid-19 pandemic constituted material changes in circumstances.

The court found that the pandemic was not a material change warranting release, but the strength of the s. 8 Charter argument and the addition of electronic monitoring to the release plan sufficiently mitigated the secondary ground risks.

The application was granted, and the applicant was released on strict conditions including house arrest and GPS monitoring.

The accused, a transport truck driver, was charged with four counts of dangerous driving causing death and nine counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after colliding with multiple vehicles in a construction zone on Highway 401.

The Crown proved the actus reus, showing the accused failed to slow down despite clear signage and stopped traffic.

The defence argued the accused experienced a 'micro-sleep' due to undiagnosed sleep apnea and chronic renal disease, negating the mens rea.

The court rejected the expert evidence of a micro-sleep, finding the accused's prolonged inattention and failure to brake constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The defendant, charged with sexual assault, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of subsections 278.3(5) and 278.4(2) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant argued that requiring notice to a witness of an application for third party records (specifically, police occurrence reports regarding the complainant's boyfriend) would undermine cross-examination and violate sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Supreme Court of Canada had already upheld the constitutionality of the Mills regime, which includes the impugned notice provisions, and that this regime applies to extrinsic police occurrence reports.

The applicants, charged with bookmaking and criminal organization offences, brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutional validity of the gaming and criminal organization provisions of the Criminal Code and related regulations.

They argued that the gaming provisions were ultra vires Parliament's criminal law power, that the regulation deeming gaming offences as 'serious offences' violated section 7 of the Charter due to overbreadth and gross disproportionality, and that the bookmaking prohibition violated freedom of expression and association under section 2 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the provisions were a valid exercise of the criminal law power, did not violate the Charter, and in any event, would be saved under section 1.

Pre‑trial Charter motions considered the admissibility of evidence arising from a police detention and search conducted in connection with a firearm investigation and search warrant.

The court found the Information to Obtain contained inaccurate, misleading, and incomplete information, and that police exceeded the lawful scope of investigative detention by questioning the accused and conducting searches for evidentiary purposes.

Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter and the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held that the seriousness of the Charter breaches and their impact on the accused’s liberty and privacy interests favoured exclusion of evidence obtained from the accused in the parking lot.

However, the accused failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment searched under the warrant.

As a result, the firearm and ammunition recovered from the apartment were admissible, while the key, drugs, cash, and related utterances obtained from the detention were excluded.

The applicant applied for certiorari to quash his committal for trial on charges of attempted murder and aggravated assault, arguing there was no admissible evidence identifying him as the shooter.

The victim had identified the applicant in a photo line-up but testified at the preliminary inquiry that the applicant was not the shooter, though he acknowledged his memory was better at the time of the line-up.

The reviewing court held that a trier of fact could disbelieve the victim's in-court denial and conclude he had adopted his prior statement, meaning there was 'some evidence' of identification.

The application was dismissed.