Amanda Ross

The Crown appealed a summary conviction sentence where the trial judge granted a conditional discharge for impaired driving, finding the mandatory minimum sentence violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The Crown also sought to introduce fresh evidence of the respondent's subsequent impaired driving conviction.

The Superior Court dismissed the fresh evidence application but allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge made several errors in principle, including failing to prioritize deterrence and denunciation, mischaracterizing the circumstances as mitigating, and ignoring statutory aggravating factors.

The court varied the sentence to the mandatory minimum of a $1,000 fine and a 12-month driving prohibition, declining to rule on the s. 12 Charter issue.

The accused was convicted of sexual interference for touching his step-daughter's buttocks.

The court found the accused ineligible for a conditional discharge as the offence could not be proven to have occurred before the maximum penalty was increased.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children by persons in a position of trust, the court imposed a 60-day intermittent custodial sentence, reduced to 11 days after credit for pre-trial custody and strict bail conditions, followed by two years' probation.

Following a jury verdict finding the accused guilty of sexual interference and sexual assault against his stepdaughter, the defence requested a bifurcated hearing to determine the proven facts for sentencing.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Ferguson to determine the factual implications of the ambiguous jury verdict.

Due to significant credibility and reliability issues with the complainant's evidence regarding hundreds of alleged incidents, the court found only the minimum consistent facts proven.

The court concluded that only one incident of touching the complainant's buttocks was proven beyond a reasonable doubt for the purpose of sentencing.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to comply with a bail condition requiring him to remain at his residence except for limited specified purposes.

He argued the trial judge shifted the burden of proof contrary to the principles in R. v. W.(D.), improperly relied on his failure to provide a detailed explanation to police, misapprehended the evidence, and improperly took judicial notice regarding evening traffic conditions.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the presumption of innocence and the W.(D.) framework, permissibly assessed the credibility of competing testimony, and did not infringe the appellant’s right to silence.

The court also found no material misapprehension of evidence and concluded that the limited judicial notice regarding reduced evening traffic congestion was permissible.

The conviction was upheld.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and raised a constitutional challenge during sentencing concerning the denial of enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody where bail had been cancelled under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered whether the statutory limitation violated s. 7 of the Charter by infringing the principle of proportionality in sentencing.

Relying on appellate authority recognizing proportionality as a principle of fundamental justice, the court found that the provision could produce disparate custodial outcomes unrelated to the gravity of the offence or the offender’s responsibility, particularly where detention depended on the ability to obtain bail.

The court held that the deprivation of liberty was not in accordance with fundamental justice and that the provision was arbitrary and not minimally impairing.

The infringement could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Property Standards Committee confirming a municipal Order to Comply issued under the Toronto Municipal Code in relation to a residential property.

The order required remediation of unsanitary and hazardous conditions including accumulation of waste, structural disrepair, and obstruction of passageways associated with hoarding and animal contamination.

After a trial de novo with viva voce evidence, the court accepted the evidence of municipal officials regarding the property's unsafe and unsanitary condition and rejected the appellant’s allegations of municipal conspiracy and improper inspection.

The court held that the amended order sufficiently particularized the required remedial work and was justified under property standards enforcement.

The decision confirming the order was upheld, though the City was directed not to commence remedial work until after December 1, 2015 to allow the appellant time to preserve items he claimed were evidentiary for potential litigation.

The offender pleaded guilty to an unprovoked assault causing bodily harm against a stranger while on parole for manslaughter.

The Crown sought a sentence of 3 years and a long-term offender designation.

The court sentenced the offender to 3.5 years (reduced to 6 months with enhanced pre-sentence credit) and 3 years of probation.

The court dismissed the long-term offender application, finding that while the offender posed a risk, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a substantial risk of violent reoffending as required by the legislation.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Property Standards Committee confirming an Order to Comply issued by the City.

The court found the Order to Comply was vague and lacked necessary particulars to inform the appellant of the required remedial steps.

The court stayed the enforcement of the decision and ordered the City to provide a revised Order to Comply containing additional particulars before proceeding with the balance of the appeal.

The Crown applied under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code for an order directing an assessment to determine whether the offender should be designated a dangerous offender or long‑term offender following a guilty plea to assault causing bodily harm.

The offender previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter arising from an earlier violent assault and committed the new offence while on parole and under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

The court considered the low threshold applicable to ordering an assessment and whether there were reasonable grounds to believe the offender might meet the criteria under s. 753 or s. 753.1.

Finding evidence of a pattern of unprovoked violent behaviour associated with substance abuse and a failure to restrain conduct, the court concluded the statutory threshold was met.

An assessment order was therefore granted.

A property owner brought a motion to dismiss a municipal appeal concerning a property standards order requiring stairwell guard and handrail modifications.

The moving party argued the matter had already been adjudicated in earlier litigation involving the same property and substantially identical compliance issues.

The court held that strict issue estoppel did not apply because the municipality had amended the relevant by-law after the earlier judgment, creating a technically new legislative framework.

However, the court found that allowing the appeal to proceed would constitute an abuse of process because the factual and evidentiary issues were identical to those previously tried and would result in duplicative litigation and wasted judicial resources.

The motion was granted and the municipality’s appeal was dismissed.