Paul Calarco

The appellant pleaded guilty to unprovoked aggravated assault against a fellow NCR resident, causing severe life-threatening injuries and permanent serious brain damage.

He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, less credit for presentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in failing to further reduce his sentence to reflect the harsh presentence custody conditions he experienced due to his mental illness.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, holding that the sentencing judge expressly considered and gave credit for the appellant's mental health difficulties in custody and imposed a sentence at the lower end of the appropriate range.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a home invasion at a university residence and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in jury selection, misdirected the jury on reasonable doubt, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended an expert opinion on his likelihood of re-offending.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury screening or instructions, and upheld the sentence as eminently fit given the gravity of the offence and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter for acting as the getaway driver in a premeditated murder-for-hire plot.

He was sentenced to nine and a half years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in finding he was aware the shooter had a gun and that the sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's factual conclusions were supported by the evidence and consistent with the jury's verdict.

The sentence was held to be fit given the appellant's significant moral culpability and the premeditated nature of the offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in law regarding the burden of proof.

The trial judge had stated that in the absence of contradiction of the complainant's evidence, he 'must accept it'.

The Superior Court of Justice found this to be an error of law that shifted the burden of proof and failed to consider the third branch of the W.(D.) analysis.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the accused on two counts of first-degree murder and committing him only on second-degree murder.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction by impermissibly weighing evidence, assessing pieces of evidence in isolation, and selecting between competing inferences rather than accepting the inferences most favourable to the Crown.

The application was granted, the discharge was quashed, and the matter was remitted to commit the accused on two counts of first-degree murder.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol.

At trial, the Crown relied on a certificate of a qualified technician, which required proving the breath sample was taken within two hours of the offence.

The trial judge inferred the time of the accident based on the location, traffic volume, and prompt emergency response.

The Superior Court of Justice held that this inference amounted to speculation rather than a rational conclusion, as probabilities are insufficient to establish the statutory condition precedent.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed after pleading guilty mid-trial to assaulting his spouse with a weapon by forcing her onto a heated stove element.

At sentencing the trial judge refused the appellant’s request for a conditional discharge and instead entered a conviction, suspended the passing of sentence, and imposed one year of probation.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly consider mitigating factors including pre-sentence custody, rehabilitation efforts, and the severe immigration consequences of conviction.

The court held that even considering the matter afresh, a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest given the seriousness of the domestic violence offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal against sentence was dismissed.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial for manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death.

The applicant struck a pedestrian with his vehicle and fled the scene, leaving the victim helpless on the ground.

Shortly after, a reversing tractor-trailer ran over the victim, causing his death.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge erred in applying the test for causation, asserting the tractor-trailer was an intervening act.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's failure to remain was inherently dangerous and carried a reasonably foreseeable risk of immediate and substantial harm, establishing a legal basis for causation.