C.W. Hourigan

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the court issued a costs endorsement.

The successful respondent was awarded its costs of the appeal.

The court ordered the appellant to pay the respondent costs in the all-inclusive amount of $10,000.

The appellant municipality appealed a Divisional Court order that quashed an Ontario Land Tribunal decision assuming jurisdiction over a dispute regarding a municipal servicing agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that the Tribunal's decision was interlocutory, as it only assumed jurisdiction on a prima facie basis and deferred the final determination of forum to the Superior Court.

Because the Ontario Land Tribunal Act only permits appeals of final decisions, the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The appeal was allowed and the Tribunal's order was restored.

Following a successful appeal against the respondent Samir Chhina, the self-represented appellants sought costs of $35,000 for the appeal and the motion below.

The respondent argued the appellants failed to establish they had forgone remunerative activity to justify a fee allowance.

The Court of Appeal agreed the appellants did not meet their evidentiary onus but awarded a lump sum of $10,000 all-inclusive for costs of the motion and the appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims for adverse possession or a prescriptive easement over parts of the respondents' neighbouring cottage property, which he had historically used to access Lake Erie.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant's use of the lands was with tacit permission as an act of good neighbourliness, rather than acquiescence, and that the easement was not reasonably necessary given alternative access routes.

The court also affirmed the dismissal of the adverse possession claim, as the appellant failed to establish an intention to exclude the true owners.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granting the respondents $605,000 in damages for the anticipatory breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in accepting the respondents' expert appraisal of the property's value and in not sending the matter to trial due to competing expert opinions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's preference for the respondents' expert, who followed accepted methodologies, nor in the determination that the respondents reasonably mitigated their damages by purchasing a comparable property on the assessment date.

The appellant, a former client of the respondent lawyer, posted unflattering comments about him on an online platform.

The respondent sued for defamation and other torts.

The appellant brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the action, arguing her comments were a matter of public interest and that the action was statute-barred under the Libel and Slander Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the comments related to a private dispute and did not constitute a broadcast.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the contextual inquiry showed no public aspect to the communication and that the appellant failed to prove the platform was a broadcast.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that dismissed their claims for repayment of alleged loans and instead awarded the respondents unpaid wages, punitive damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

The trial judge found that the appellants had 'banked' the respondents' earnings and that the individual appellant acted as a common employer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the banked wages or the common employer doctrine.

The Court also upheld the punitive damages and costs awards, noting the appellant's harsh, offensive, and reprehensible conduct.

The appellant's license to practice law was revoked by the Law Society Tribunal in 2020.

After exhausting all appeals up to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant brought an application in the Superior Court of Justice seeking Charter declarations and reinstatement of his license.

The motion judge dismissed the application as an impermissible collateral attack on the revocation decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant could not use section 24(1) of the Charter to seek a fresh hearing after exhausting statutory remedies, and that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to order reinstatement.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences, including robbery with a firearm, arising from a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's DNA on a pry bar left at the scene and his subsequent arrest in a stolen vehicle containing items taken during the robbery.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended identification evidence, failed to consider alternative explanations for the DNA evidence, and erred in finding a real firearm was used.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's assessment of the circumstantial evidence was reasonable and the alternative explanations were speculative.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claims against a mortgage brokerage and a lawyer under Rule 21.01.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the brokerage, finding no factual connection pleaded.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the lawyer, holding that the motion judge erred in finding the lawyer immune from liability for allegedly participating in a fraud while acting on client instructions, and erred in concluding the claim was barred by res judicata without sufficient evidence that the same cause of action was previously argued.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter for acting as the getaway driver in a premeditated murder-for-hire plot.

He was sentenced to nine and a half years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in finding he was aware the shooter had a gun and that the sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's factual conclusions were supported by the evidence and consistent with the jury's verdict.

The sentence was held to be fit given the appellant's significant moral culpability and the premeditated nature of the offence.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of assault and sexual assault against his former romantic partner and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by admitting a screenshot of a text message exchange without independent authentication and by failing to give adequate limiting instructions to the jury regarding its reliability.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to Gladue and Morris factors relating to his Black and Indigenous ancestry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the complainant's testimony was sufficient to authenticate the screenshot and the jury instructions were adequate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle in weighing the mitigating factors against the gravity of the offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction and three-year sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge found that the complainant was extremely intoxicated and incapable of consenting, relying on circumstantial evidence including the complainant's state when awoken and the presence of the appellant's DNA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the trial judge's use of common sense inferences appropriate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year sentence fell within the established range for sexual assault involving forced penetration, regardless of whether the victim was awake or sleeping.

The appellant landlord sought to expand a shopping centre to accommodate a new LCBO store, which required reconfiguring 36 parking spaces.

The respondent grocery store tenant successfully applied for a permanent injunction, with the application judge finding the tenant had a leasehold proprietary interest in the common parking area.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in law, as the tenant lacked exclusive possession of the parking area.

Assuming the tenant held an easement, the Court found no substantial interference with the tenant's rights, as the reconfiguration did not significantly reduce available spaces and the tenant had no contractual right to specific spots.

The appeal was allowed and the injunction set aside.

The respondents were successful in resisting appeals by the Varma/Madra Appellants and the Palihapitiya Appellants, and succeeded on their cross-appeal.

They sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Court of Appeal found no justification for a higher scale and awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $300,000, payable equally by the two groups of appellants.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder after shooting his wife in a parking lot.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, made errors of law, and that he was prejudiced by self-representing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict was reasonable and supported by ample evidence, including the appellant's own statements and eyewitness testimony.

The court also noted the appellant chose to self-represent and had the assistance of amicus curiae.

The moving party sought to appeal an order dismissing her motion to add new causes of action and parties, which had been dismissed as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01.

After the Divisional Court dismissed her motion for leave to appeal, she applied to the Court of Appeal.

A single judge adjourned the matter to a full panel to determine whether the underlying order was final or interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal held that an order refusing leave to amend pleadings to plead a new cause of action, or to add a party, is a final order.

Consequently, leave to appeal was not required, and the appeal could proceed as of right to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple offences including assault, dangerous driving, and driving while disqualified.

At sentencing, the trial judge imposed a global sentence of three years' incarceration, agreeing with the Crown's position that the sentence should be in addition to 63 days of pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not crediting the pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the reduced three-year sentence already accounted for the guilty plea, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the pre-sentence custody.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing her appeal from convictions for sexual assault, assault, and mischief to property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the appellant failed to raise a question of law alone as required by section 839(1) of the Criminal Code.

However, with the consent of the Crown, the court vacated the $300 victim fine surcharge.

Ten days after the Court of Appeal granted summary judgment authorizing the responding party to enforce its mortgage, the moving parties brought a motion seeking to declare the enforcement proceedings null and void.

The moving parties argued they were commercial farmers and had not received the required notice under s. 21 of the Farm Debt Mediation Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the moving parties were barred from raising the issue at this late stage since mortgage enforceability was squarely at issue on the appeal.

The court found no credible evidence that the moving party was a commercial farmer and deemed the motion an abuse of process intended to delay creditors.