Emily Marrocco

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter after shooting two men outside a nightclub.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred by admitting evidence obtained in breach of his s. 8 Charter rights, misapprehending eyewitness testimony, improperly assessing the provocation defence, and refusing to grant a mistrial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or assessment of the evidence.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the 18-year parole ineligibility period as proportionate.

The applicant, convicted of sexual offences against a minor and sentenced to seven years, sought bail pending his appeal.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and there were no flight or public safety risks, but argued detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's failure to address material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence regarding her post-offence contact with the applicant raised significant reviewability concerns.

Balancing enforceability and reviewability, the court concluded that the reviewability interest overshadowed the enforceability interest, and granted bail pending appeal.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a home invasion at a university residence and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in jury selection, misdirected the jury on reasonable doubt, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended an expert opinion on his likelihood of re-offending.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury screening or instructions, and upheld the sentence as eminently fit given the gravity of the offence and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, and unlawful confinement against his former domestic partner.

He argued the trial judge erred by dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application, failing to screen a juror for bias under s. 632 of the Criminal Code, refusing a mistrial after the complainant mentioned he had been in jail, and inadequately instructing the jury on discreditable conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly deducted pandemic-related delay, the jury selection process did not result in prejudice, the mid-trial instruction cured any prejudice from the jail reference, and the jury instructions on discreditable conduct were adequate.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction for a shooting in a bar, arguing the trial judge erred in finding he was the shooter.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including security video footage and a lay witness who identified an encounter with the appellant on the video.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in admitting the lay witness's testimony identifying the event and the appellant in the video, as it fell within exceptions to the lay opinion evidence rule.

The Court also found the trial judge adequately addressed evidentiary deficiencies and that the verdict was reasonable based on a meticulous video tracing exercise.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment, sought a panel review of a decision denying him bail pending appeal under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

He argued the bail judge erred in assessing his medical evidence, misunderstanding his release plan, and undervaluing the strength of his appeal.

The motions judge found no arguable material errors of fact or law in the bail judge's decision, concluding that the applicant remained a flight risk and that his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The application for a panel review was dismissed.

The applicant, an 83-year-old man convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending his appeal.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous due to an arguable ground regarding the admission of expert evidence, the applicant failed to establish that he would surrender into custody.

The court noted the applicant's significant resources, history of non-compliance with court orders, and the unsuitability of his proposed surety.

Furthermore, the court held that the applicant's detention was necessary in the public interest to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, given the gravity of the offences and the weakness of the remaining grounds of appeal.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The offender pled guilty to two counts of knowingly transferring a firearm after using his Possession and Acquisition Licence to purchase and sell handguns for profit.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the offender sought a conditional sentence, arguing the mandatory minimum was unconstitutional.

The court found that a conditional sentence would not adequately address the principles of denunciation and deterrence given the gravity of firearms trafficking.

After weighing the offender's lack of a criminal record, guilty plea, and systemic factors against the seriousness of the offence, the court imposed a sentence of four years in custody.

The accused applied for judicial interim release on a bail review after previously consenting to detention on charges including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and breach of a lifetime firearms prohibition order.

The accused proposed a release plan involving two sureties, including his mother and a former employer, with supervision and potential electronic monitoring.

The court found the Crown’s case to be strong and concluded that the proposed supervision plan contained significant gaps that created a substantial risk of reoffending.

Given the accused’s prior firearms convictions and repeated breaches of prohibition orders, detention remained necessary for public safety.

The court also found detention justified on the tertiary ground to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.