B. P. O’Marra

During a retrial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of two unidentified cell phone calls made to the victim moments before he stepped outside and was shot.

The Crown argued the calls supported the theory that the victim was lured to an ambush.

The Superior Court of Justice ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding no direct or indirect evidence connecting the calls to the accused.

The court held that inferring the calls lured the victim outside, contrary to family testimony that he went to buy juice, would be based on impermissible speculation and conjecture.

The offender was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury after shooting the victim three times following an altercation.

The court determined the factual basis for sentencing, finding that provocation played a significant role but rejecting self-defence.

Considering the offender's prior youth record for firearms offences, the use of a firearm, and the profound impact on the victim's family, the court sentenced the offender to 15 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody.

The applicant, charged with conspiracy to import and traffic firearms after 25 handguns were found in her vehicle's gas tank at a border crossing, sought a review of her detention order under ss. 520 and 525 of the Criminal Code.

She argued there were errors of law at the original bail hearing, a material change in circumstances including health issues, and presented a plan for house arrest.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Crown's case formidable and concluding that detention remained justified on the tertiary grounds to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity of the firearms offences.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion seeking to admit circumstantial evidence to challenge the accused's narrative of how he came into possession of the handgun used in the Eaton Centre shooting.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence linking a third party to a prior shooting where the same gun was used, and letters suggesting the accused knew the third party.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the suggested links were too speculative and that admitting the evidence to challenge the accused's credibility on a critical issue would be unfair and unreasonable.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The central issue was whether the 29-month period between the swearing of the Information and the accused's arrest should be attributed to the Crown.

The court found that the police took reasonable and diligent steps to locate the accused, characterizing the pre-arrest delay as an exceptional circumstance and discrete event.

After subtracting this period, the remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

During a trial for two counts of first degree murder, the Crown sought to cross-examine the accused on text messages and a video clip suggesting he possessed a firearm prior to the homicides.

The court ruled that the Crown could not suggest inferences from the text messages, as it would operate unfairly.

However, the court allowed the jury to consider the video clip showing the accused allegedly pointing a firearm, finding it admissible as evidence of access to means and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The accused, charged with two counts of first degree murder, applied for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance, cell phone records, and expert evidence on the 'code of silence' to establish motive and opportunity.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict, assessing whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict based on the available evidence and reasonable inferences.

The court found that the totality of the direct and circumstantial evidence provided a sufficient basis for a jury to find the essential elements of the offences proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The application was dismissed.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown applied to admit a photograph of the deceased victim in the vehicle.

The defence objected on the basis that the photograph was inflammatory and lacked probative value.

The court ruled the photograph was of little to no probative value and excluded it, instead permitting the Crown to use leading questions to establish the non-contentious facts regarding the victim's position and gunshot wounds.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of sexual interference, sexual assault, and threatening bodily harm against his younger sister.

The offences occurred over several years, beginning when the victim was nine years old, and escalated to include digital penetration and forced fellatio.

The sentencing judge applied the framework for determining disputed facts on sentence following a jury's general verdict.

After weighing the aggravating factors, including the victim's young age and the protracted nature of the abuse, against the offender's intellectual disability and mental health issues, the court imposed a total sentence of 36 months' imprisonment.

The accused and a co-accused were jointly charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder following a drive-by shooting.

During a pretrial motion, the Crown sought to admit a photograph of a handgun found on the accused's cell phone.

The court ruled the photograph admissible as circumstantial evidence of the accused's access to the type of weapon used in the shooting.

The court also addressed the admissibility of bad character evidence elicited by the co-accused in a cut-throat defence, noting it was admissible but required careful limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused, charged with first degree murder and attempted murder, brought a Corbett application to excise portions of his criminal record before testifying in his own defence.

The Crown agreed to exclude a prior sexual assault conviction but opposed excluding youth convictions for weapons offences.

The court allowed the application in part, permitting the Crown to cross-examine the accused on two of the four weapons-related convictions, finding that willful breaches of prior court orders are highly relevant to assessing credibility.

The applicant, charged with attempting to communicate safeguarded information and preparatory acts under the Security of Information Act, brought a motion challenging the constitutionality of s. 22(1)(c) of the Act.

He argued that the provision violates s. 7 of the Charter by being unconstitutionally overbroad unless interpreted to require an objectively reasonable possibility of committing the underlying offence.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the provision does not cast an unconstitutionally wide net, as the Attorney General's consent is required for prosecution and the de minimis threshold would insulate an accused from guilt based on mere criminal ideation.

The Crown applied to have the respondent declared a Dangerous Offender following his convictions for criminal harassment, mischief, and breach of a Long-Term Supervision Order.

The respondent had a lengthy history of stalking and harassing former intimate partners.

The court found that the criminal harassment convictions constituted serious personal injury offences, as they caused severe psychological damage to the victim.

The court declared the respondent a Dangerous Offender, imposing a determinate global sentence of 6 years (reduced to 2.5 years after pre-trial custody credit) and a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order.

The accused was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder of his six-year-old daughter and attempted murder of his seven-year-old son.

The offences occurred when the accused, motivated by a desire to spite his estranged wife, administered sleep medication to the children in a hotel room.

The court considered the egregious breach of parental trust, the vulnerability of the victims, and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The accused was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility set at 18 years for the murder, and a concurrent 10-year sentence for the attempted murder.

The accused was tried for the first-degree murder of his daughter and the attempted murder of his son after giving them sleep medication and alcohol during a suicide attempt.

During the pre-charge conference, defence counsel requested that criminal negligence causing death be left with the jury as a discrete included offence to first-degree murder.

The trial judge declined the request, ruling that in the circumstances of the case, criminal negligence causing death is manslaughter by another name and leaving both would unnecessarily complicate jury deliberations.

During a trial for offences related to a stabbing outside a bar, a miscommunication arose between the Crown, defence counsel, and the trial judge regarding whether the accused had admitted identity and presence at the scene.

After the Crown closed its case without calling identification evidence, the misunderstanding became apparent.

The Crown brought an application to enforce pre-trial admissions made by defence counsel.

The court allowed the Crown to re-open its case, held one accused to his pre-trial admission of presence, but released the other accused from an admission regarding the voluntariness of a statement because the Crown had changed its position on how the statement would be used.

The accused, an on-duty police officer, was tried before a jury for dangerous driving causing death after striking a pedestrian while driving an unmarked police vehicle at 115 km/h.

At the pre-charge conference, the Crown requested that the included offence of dangerous operation simpliciter be left with the jury, arguing they might find the driving dangerous but have a reasonable doubt about causation due to the pedestrian jaywalking.

The trial judge ruled there was no air of reality to the included offence, finding that even if the pedestrian's actions were an intervening act, the dangerous driving remained a significant contributing cause of death.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving an 11-year-old complainant.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework, misapprehended evidence, rendered an unreasonable verdict, provided insufficient reasons, and imposed a harsh sentence.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of legal principles.

The consecutive sentences totaling ten months were upheld as fit, considering the totality principle and the aggravating factor of the victim's age.

The accused was charged with offences related to a stabbing and a firearm found in his vehicle.

A civilian witness, fearing for his safety, broke into the accused's car and exposed an AK-47 to police.

The accused brought Charter applications arguing the witness acted as a state agent encouraged by police to bypass a search warrant, and that police failed to preserve video evidence of the break-in.

The court found the witness was not a state agent, as police did not encourage the break-in.

While police failed to take reasonable steps to preserve the video evidence, the prejudice was not significant enough to warrant a stay of proceedings.

The applications were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for assaulting and disarming a peace officer.

The charges arose after the appellant grabbed the barrel of an officer's machine gun during a dynamic entry execution of a search warrant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying an objective mens rea standard and provided inadequate reasons for rejecting his testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge applied the correct subjective standard when reading the reasons as a whole.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 60-day conditional sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the statutory emphasis on denunciation and deterrence.