Howard Cohen

In an action for fraud and breach of contract arising from a relationship between the plaintiff and a former escort, the parties brought motions to resolve various discovery disputes.

The court ordered the plaintiff to produce notes used as an aide memoire during his examination for discovery.

The court also ordered the plaintiff to disclose documents relating to his separation agreement, finding that he had waived solicitor-client privilege by putting his state of mind regarding the transfer of funds in issue.

The defendant's request to examine the plaintiff's wife as a non-party witness was dismissed as unnecessary for the pending motion.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting breathalyzer results despite alleged Charter breaches.

The appellant contended that the change in wording from 'forthwith' to 'immediately' in the Criminal Code created a stricter timeline for roadside screening demands, and that the delay in obtaining an approved screening device violated her rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that 'forthwith' and 'immediately' are synonymous, and upholding the trial judge's conclusion that the brief delay was reasonable given officer safety concerns and the lack of a realistic opportunity to contact counsel at the roadside.

The appellant appealed her conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in finding no Charter breaches regarding the delay in administering an Approved Screening Device (ASD) and the failure to provide an opportunity to contact counsel at the roadside.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's finding that 'immediately' in the amended Criminal Code means the same as 'forthwith', and that there was no unreasonable delay or breach of the right to counsel.

The court also agreed that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed.

In a case management motion regarding pre-discovery production, the defendant sought various financial, communication, and personal records from the plaintiff.

The underlying action involved allegations of fraud and breach of contract arising from a relationship that began with the defendant providing sexual services to the plaintiff.

The court ordered the plaintiff to produce bank statements, credit card statements, communications records, and tax notices of assessment from 2014 to 2019, finding them relevant to the disputed timeline of the relationship.

Requests for broader financial records and documents relating to the plaintiff's separation from his wife were narrowed or deferred.

The offender, a lawyer and real estate developer, was convicted of two counts of theft over $5000 for misappropriating approximately $1.8 million in mortgage proceeds from two jointly-owned corporate projects.

The court found the offender abused her position of trust as a corporate director and engaged in a sophisticated pattern of collateral dishonesty to cover up the thefts.

Applying the principles of general deterrence and denunciation for large-scale commercial frauds, the court sentenced the offender to three years' imprisonment and imposed a fine of $220,286 in lieu of forfeiture.

The accused, charged with fraud and theft relating to real estate investments, brought an application to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process and subpoenaed Crown counsel and civil litigators.

The Crown brought a motion to summarily dismiss the abuse of process application on the basis that it had no reasonable prospect of success, and applications were brought to quash the subpoenas.

The court analyzed the six grounds of alleged abuse of process, including claims of compelled self-incrimination, improper coordination between civil and criminal proceedings, and lack of independent police investigation.

The court found all grounds to be speculative, factually misconceived, or legally unfounded.

Applying the Cody and Babos tests, the court summarily dismissed the abuse of process application and quashed the subpoenas.

The accused was charged with trafficking cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

Following a police surveillance operation, the accused was observed meeting with a known drug purchaser at a mall, exchanging a bag containing drugs for a bag containing over $42,000 in cash.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts, concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that he had knowledge of the drugs and the proceeds of crime, and alternatively was willfully blind.

The court also admitted intercepted communications under the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

Addendum to a previously released judgment addressing a limitations defence raised by the defendant.

The defendant argued that the action was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the combined effect of s. 24(5) of the Limitations Act, 2002 and ss. 45(1) and 50(1) of the predecessor Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990 meant the action was not statute barred.

The court relied on appellate authority interpreting the interaction of the two statutes.

The plaintiff commenced a civil action seeking repayment of an alleged unsecured loan dating back to the mid‑1990s, together with interest.

The defendant denied any personal indebtedness and asserted that certain payments referenced by the plaintiff were donations or related to third‑party obligations.

The court considered documentary evidence including cheques, correspondence, and a handwritten acknowledgment dated April 9, 1997, as well as witness testimony regarding the parties’ financial dealings.

The court accepted independent witness evidence that the defendant acknowledged a personal debt in 1997 but rejected certain amounts claimed as personal loans where the payments appeared to be donations to a third‑party organization.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiff in the reduced amount of $17,724 with interest at 21% from September 9, 1997.

The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of possession of firearms while subject to a lifetime weapons prohibition order contrary to s. 117.01(1) of the Criminal Code.

The defence sought a conditional sentence based on rehabilitation efforts and compliance with bail conditions over several years.

The Crown argued that denunciation and deterrence required a custodial sentence given the deliberate breach of a lifetime prohibition order and the presence of stolen firearms and ammunition.

The court held that imposing a conditional sentence would constitute an error in principle because it would inadequately address denunciation and deterrence for breaches of weapons prohibition orders.

A custodial sentence was imposed together with probation and a forfeiture order.