Joshua Levy

This decision concerns the sentencing of Corey Cunningham, who was convicted of attempted murder and theft under $5000.00.

The attempted murder involved a planned attack on his former intimate partner, Christina Elgin, who was pregnant, by stabbing her in the neck.

The Crown sought a life sentence, emphasizing the cold-blooded nature and domestic context.

The defence proposed a sentence of 6 to 11 years, highlighting the offender's lack of prior record, strong family support, and rehabilitative prospects.

The court imposed a sentence of 7 years imprisonment, finding that while the crime was horrific and required denunciation and deterrence, it was out of character for the offender, and his rehabilitative prospects placed the case at the lower end of the sentencing range for attempted murder.

Credit was given for pre-sentence custody, including an additional 12 months for harsh conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The accused, Corey Cunningham, was charged with attempted murder and armed robbery.

The Crown alleged he stabbed Christina Elgin and robbed her.

The court found Mr. Cunningham's testimony not credible due to contradictions with surveillance, medical, and text message evidence.

The court found Mr. Cunningham guilty of attempted murder, rejecting his self-defence claim.

He was found not guilty of robbery but guilty of the lesser included offence of theft of the phone, with reasonable doubt regarding the cash.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle after deliberately driving his car at two pedestrians, striking one and causing a compound fracture.

The court weighed the gravity of the offence, the offender's prior record, and the severe injuries against mitigating factors including strong community support and stringent house arrest conditions.

The offender was sentenced to three years in custody for aggravated assault and a concurrent twelve-month sentence for dangerous driving, along with a three-year driving prohibition and a ten-year weapons prohibition.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, possession of a weapon (a motor vehicle), and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle after striking a pedestrian with his car during a parking lot altercation.

The incident was captured on video surveillance, showing the accused repeatedly driving his vehicle aggressively towards the unarmed victim, resulting in a compound fracture to the victim's leg.

The court rejected the accused's claims of accident and self-defence, finding the driving was deliberate and a marked departure from the standard of care.

The accused was found guilty of dangerous driving, possession of a weapon, and aggravated assault, but acquitted of attempted murder as the Crown failed to prove a specific intent to kill.

During a retrial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of two unidentified cell phone calls made to the victim moments before he stepped outside and was shot.

The Crown argued the calls supported the theory that the victim was lured to an ambush.

The Superior Court of Justice ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding no direct or indirect evidence connecting the calls to the accused.

The court held that inferring the calls lured the victim outside, contrary to family testimony that he went to buy juice, would be based on impermissible speculation and conjecture.

The applicants, jointly charged with first degree murder, applied for directed verdicts of acquittal on first and second degree murder at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including gunshot residue and the applicants' presence near the scene, to prove identity and intent.

The court found sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to infer that both applicants were involved in an intentional killing as either principal or aider/abettor.

However, the court concluded there was no evidence upon which a jury could reasonably infer that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The applications were allowed in part, with the court directing verdicts of acquittal on first degree murder and ordering the trial to proceed on second degree murder.

The offender was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury after shooting the victim three times following an altercation.

The court determined the factual basis for sentencing, finding that provocation played a significant role but rejecting self-defence.

Considering the offender's prior youth record for firearms offences, the use of a firearm, and the profound impact on the victim's family, the court sentenced the offender to 15 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, forcible confinement, and breach of recognizance against his former intimate partner.

The parties initially presented a joint submission structured to minimize the accused's immigration consequences, proposing two consecutive sentences of six months less a day.

The accused later sought to strike his guilty pleas but failed to file the necessary motion materials after multiple adjournments.

The court denied a further adjournment and proceeded to sentencing.

Applying the Cerasuolo test, the court accepted the joint submission, finding it fell within the appropriate range given the mix of aggravating and mitigating factors, and strongly recommended that immigration officials exercise discretion against removing the accused from Canada.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after striking the victim over the head with a beer bottle outside a bar.

The Crown sought a penitentiary term, arguing the offender was a party to a subsequent, more severe assault by another individual.

The court found the offender was not a party to the second assault.

Considering the offender's status as a permanent resident and the collateral immigration consequences of a sentence of six months or more, the court imposed a sentence of six months less one day to preserve his right to appeal a deportation order, followed by two years of probation.

Marek Adam pleaded guilty to eight charges related to four armed robberies and four wearing a disguise charges.

The robberies involved the use of a pellet gun and an axe, with victims confined.

The Crown sought a 7-year global prison term, while the defence sought 5 years.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating and mitigating factors, including the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and guilty plea, balanced against the seriousness and number of offences, and the impact on victims.

The court also addressed the parity principle with a co-accused who received a 7-year sentence and the collateral consequence of deportation for the non-citizen offender.

A global sentence of 5 years was imposed, with credit for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions, resulting in an actual sentence of 4 years and 4 months.

Ancillary orders included a DNA sample, a lifetime weapon prohibition, and a non-communication order.

The three accused were charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon following an altercation outside a bar.

The victim had spilled beer on one of the accused, who then followed the victim outside and struck him over the head with a beer bottle.

The Crown alleged a second accused struck the victim with a glass, and the third accused facilitated the assault by confronting the victim.

Relying on surveillance footage and witness testimony, the court found the first accused guilty of all charges.

However, the court found the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the second accused struck the victim, and found the third accused lacked the requisite intent to be a party to the offence.

The second and third accused were acquitted.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of statements made by the self-represented accused to police during an interview.

The accused was initially arrested for offering an indignity to a dead body and consulted duty counsel.

During the interview, police received information suggesting the death was a murder and informed the accused they believed she was involved, but did not offer her a further opportunity to consult counsel.

The court found the statements were voluntary, but held that the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights were infringed because the change in jeopardy required police to provide another opportunity to consult counsel.

Statements made after the breach were excluded under s. 24(2).

During jury selection, the self-represented accused sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on pretrial publicity and racial bias.

On his own motion, the trial judge ordered that prospective jurors and sworn jurors (after completing their duties as triers) be excluded from the courtroom during the challenge for cause process.

The court held that exclusion was necessary to prevent exposure to prejudicial information, limit the impact of the accused's disruptive remarks, and effectively manage court resources.

The defendant, charged with first-degree murder, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of her s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total anticipated delay was approximately 57.5 months.

Applying the new framework from R. v. Jordan, the court assumed the 30-month presumptive ceiling was breached but found the delay was justified by a transitional exceptional circumstance.

Specifically, the court found that under the previous R. v. Morin framework, the delay would not have been considered unreasonable due to the substantial delay caused by the defence's repeated changes of counsel and strategic conduct.

The application was dismissed.

During a voir dire in a criminal trial, the court considered the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police officers responding to a 911 call at her apartment, where her husband's dead body was found.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of her Charter rights against arbitrary detention and right to counsel.

The court found that the accused was not a suspect at the time of the initial questioning, the statements were voluntary, and she was not psychologically or physically detained.

The statements were ruled admissible.

The defendant, facing a first-degree murder charge, brought a "Rowbotham" application for state-funded counsel during jury selection.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was not a bona fide effort to obtain counsel but a strategic attempt to delay or avoid trial on the merits.

The defendant had repeatedly discharged or refused counsel, including Daniel Moore, who was ready to act, by refusing to sign a funding agreement.

The court concluded her actions were a deliberate tactic to orphan herself from counsel and assert unfairness.

Sentencing for sexual assault and two counts of sexual exploitation arising from repeated intrafamilial sexual abuse by a parental figure against a young person over more than five years.

The court rejected a Kienapple argument, holding that sexual exploitation under s. 153 contains the additional guilt element of trust or authority and therefore supports separate convictions from sexual assault.

Applying the sentencing objectives in ss. 718, 718.1, 718.2 and 718.01 of the Criminal Code, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence while still accounting for the offender's lack of record, family support, and lengthy restrictive bail conditions.

A fit sentence was two years less one day imprisonment followed by one year probation, with DNA, weapons prohibition, SOIRA, and no-contact orders.

The defendant, Kyle Hazelton, was charged with criminal negligence causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident, all stemming from an incident on July 18, 2013, that resulted in the death of Scott Shannon.

The Crown alleged that Hazelton intentionally or negligently accelerated his truck while Shannon was holding onto the driver's side, causing his death, and then failed to stop.

The defence argued that the Crown's inferences were speculative and that the key witness's evidence was unreliable.

The court found the Crown's evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly regarding the reliability of witness observations, the nature of the acceleration, and Hazelton's knowledge of the accident.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference arising from admitted sexual intercourse with a complainant under 16.

The court found the complainant's evidence on non-consent insufficiently credible and reliable to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt under the W.(D.) framework.

However, the court held that the statutory defence of honest but mistaken belief in age was unavailable because the accused failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain age, having relied only on the complainant's statement that she was 18 despite multiple warning signs.

Convictions were entered on both counts.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial applications to exclude evidence under the Charter.

They alleged arbitrary detention, unreasonable search, and right to counsel violations.

The court found that the initial investigative detentions and arrests were lawful and that the examination of the accused's shoes did not violate section 8.

However, the court found a section 9 violation for both accused because the police deliberately delayed bringing them before a Justice of the Peace within 24 hours in order to obtain statements.

Consequently, the statements made at the police station were excluded under section 24(2).

The expert evidence regarding gunshot residue and footwear impressions was ruled admissible.