B. P. O’Marra

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 20 months' imprisonment for mischief, causing a disturbance, and breach of probation.

The offences occurred when the appellant made loud, anti-Muslim comments on a subway train, intimidated passengers, and refused to disembark, causing significant transit delays.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by imposing consecutive sentences without reasons and failing to consider the totality principle.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that consecutive sentences were justified as the offences involved distinct legally protected interests.

Although the failure to expressly consider totality removed appellate deference, the court found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's extensive record, the hate-motivated nature of the offences, and the significant public disruption caused.

Following a conviction for trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime arising from a controlled purchase by an undercover police officer, the accused applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment.

The police had received an anonymous tip providing a nickname and phone number allegedly linked to a drug dealer.

An undercover officer called the number and requested to purchase cocaine, after which the accused offered to sell both cocaine and heroin and arranged a meeting where the transaction occurred.

The court held that the officer’s initial phone contact constituted a legitimate investigative step within a bona fide inquiry and that the accused’s responses confirmed involvement in drug trafficking.

The applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that police conduct amounted to entrapment or an abuse of process.

Before the commencement of a sexual assault trial, the Crown sought a ruling on the qualifications of a proposed Telugu interpreter for the complainant.

The interpreter was multilingual but not accredited or conditionally accredited in Telugu and could not read or write the language.

Following a voir dire, the court considered the standards for interpreter qualification under s. 14 of the Charter and relevant jurisprudence requiring continuous, precise, impartial, competent, and contemporaneous interpretation.

The court held that while accreditation is not constitutionally required, there must be an independent and objective basis to establish competency.

In the absence of such evidence, the proposed interpreter was found not properly qualified.

The accused applied for an order requiring that an Urdu interpreter be provided at trial despite acknowledging that he spoke and understood English.

The court reviewed the constitutional right to interpretation under s. 14 of the Charter and the principles established in R. v. Tran regarding when interpreter assistance is required.

Evidence included the accused’s education and employment history in English-speaking environments and a recorded police interview demonstrating fluent English comprehension and responses.

The court found the accused had not established a real need for interpretation assistance and that the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities was not met.

The application for an interpreter at trial was therefore dismissed.

The accused brought a Garofoli application challenging the validity of a telewarrant used to search his residence for controlled substances.

The defence sought disclosure relating to a confidential informant, cross‑examination of the affiant, and exclusion of evidence seized during the search.

The court reviewed both redacted and unredacted versions of the Information to Obtain and considered whether the informant’s information was credible, compelling, and corroborated.

Although the court found the informant’s credibility to be poor and criticized the incomplete disclosure of the informant’s criminal record in the ITO, the information was sufficiently detailed and corroborated by police investigation to establish reasonable grounds.

The court concluded that the telewarrant was properly issued and the seized evidence was admissible.

The Crown applied to have the respondent designated a dangerous offender following his convictions for serious personal injury offences against an intimate partner.

The respondent had a history of horrific violence against intimate partners, including a prior conviction for attempted murder where he bound, gagged, and locked a former partner in the trunk of her car.

A forensic psychiatrist assessed the respondent as having an anti-social personality disorder and being at a high risk for violent re-offence against intimate partners.

The court found that the respondent's actions constituted a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour showing a failure to restrain himself and a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences.

The court concluded there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public, designated the respondent a dangerous offender, and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The Crown applied to have the respondent designated a dangerous offender following his convictions for serious personal injury offences against an intimate partner.

The respondent had a history of horrific violence against intimate partners, including a previous conviction for attempted murder where he bound and gagged a former girlfriend in the trunk of a car.

The court found a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his behaviour and a likelihood of causing severe psychological damage or injury to future intimate partners.

The court designated the respondent a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The accused was charged with two counts of trafficking in cocaine and two counts of possession of proceeds of crime arising from undercover drug purchases.

The defence sought a stay of proceedings based on lost evidence relating to the undercover officer’s cell phone number and related records.

The court held that although the police failed to properly record and preserve the phone number, the loss did not result in irremediable prejudice or justify a stay under the principles governing lost evidence and abuse of process.

The identification evidence, including two face‑to‑face drug transactions, a photographic lineup, and circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the apartment associated with the dealer, was sufficient to establish identity beyond a reasonable doubt despite flaws in the lineup procedure.

The applicant corporation sought relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter for the return of goods seized by the Canada Border Services Agency during attempted importation.

The Crown argued the matter should be addressed in the Federal Court because it required interpretation of the Customs Act.

The court held that both the Superior Court and Federal Court have concurrent jurisdiction over such claims but that where a federal statute establishes a comprehensive review scheme, the provincial court should decline jurisdiction.

Given the statutory review process under the Customs Act and the Federal Court’s expertise in customs matters, the court concluded the Federal Court was the preferable forum.

The application was stayed.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial for manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death.

The applicant struck a pedestrian with his vehicle and fled the scene, leaving the victim helpless on the ground.

Shortly after, a reversing tractor-trailer ran over the victim, causing his death.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge erred in applying the test for causation, asserting the tractor-trailer was an intervening act.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's failure to remain was inherently dangerous and carried a reasonably foreseeable risk of immediate and substantial harm, establishing a legal basis for causation.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict acquitting the respondent of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

At trial, the judge excluded the breath certificate after the Crown closed its case, finding insufficient evidence that the respondent was served with a true copy, and refused to let the Crown re-open its case to clarify the officer's testimony.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that while the late objection was permissible, the trial judge erred in refusing to let the Crown re-open its case and erred in law by granting a directed verdict when there was some evidence of service.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant was arrested at gunpoint by plainclothes police officers who suspected him of trafficking heroin from his vehicle.

A warrantless search of the vehicle incident to arrest yielded a large quantity of heroin hidden in false-bottomed aerosol cans and cash.

The applicant brought a Charter application under ss. 8, 9, and 24(2) to exclude the evidence, arguing the police lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.

The court found the arrest was lawful based on the totality of the circumstances observed by the surveillance team.

Alternatively, applying the Grant framework, the court held that even if a Charter breach occurred, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) given the reliability of the evidence and society's interest in adjudicating the serious charges on their merits.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of sexual assault after forcing a masseuse to perform oral sex while he was on duty.

He appealed his conviction and 15-month custodial sentence, arguing that his police memo-book notes were unlawfully seized in violation of his Charter rights and that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in police notes, no violation of the right against self-incrimination, and no error in the trial judge's credibility findings or the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for uttering threats against a correctional officer and the 90‑day consecutive custodial sentence imposed.

The appeal alleged that the trial judge misapprehended the significance of video evidence and improperly relied on opinion evidence regarding intent.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge materially misapprehended the video evidence by treating it as directly contradicting the appellant’s account when it merely lacked audio and did not capture all interactions.

Because credibility was central and the video evidence was heavily relied upon in the reasoning process, the misapprehension constituted a reversible error.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered, while the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a probation term imposed following guilty pleas to criminal harassment, multiple counts of mischief under $5,000, breaches of recognizance, possession of a prohibited weapon, and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The sentencing judge had imposed a ten‑month conditional sentence followed by three years’ probation.

The appellant argued that the probation period should be reduced to one year and that the sentencing judge failed to properly consider mitigating factors including guilty pleas, pretrial custody, and rehabilitation prospects.

The court held that appellate intervention requires an error in principle or a demonstrably unfit sentence and found that the sentencing judge properly considered the mitigating factors and reasonably emphasized deterrence and protection of the victims.

The sentence, including the maximum probation period, was upheld.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for possession of cocaine after pleading guilty in the Ontario Court of Justice and receiving a $100 fine.

He argued that his plea should be set aside because he misunderstood the consequences, believing he would receive a conditional discharge rather than a conviction that created a criminal record affecting employment prospects.

The court reviewed the requirements for a valid guilty plea under s. 606 of the Criminal Code and the governing jurisprudence that a plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The record showed the trial judge conducted a plea comprehension inquiry confirming the accused understood the consequences and that sentencing remained within the court’s discretion.

The court held that dissatisfaction with collateral consequences, such as employment impacts, does not invalidate a properly entered guilty plea.

The client sought an order referring two solicitor accounts for assessment under the Solicitors Act and requested a sealing order over the proceeding due to solicitor-client privilege.

The court held that the earlier account had been settled and paid as a final account and therefore could only be assessed upon proof of special circumstances.

No evidence of fraud, misconduct, or special circumstances was established, and the account was not an interim account connected to a continuing retainer.

The later account was referred for assessment on consent.

The court granted a sealing order because the materials contained privileged communications and detailed legal billing records whose disclosure could reveal solicitor‑client communications.

Following earlier reasons, the court addressed clarification requests and determined costs arising from an application concerning enforcement of a settlement agreement.

The applicant succeeded in enforcing payment of £62,000 pursuant to a signed direction, which the respondent had unreasonably delayed delivering.

However, the applicant was unsuccessful on the most contentious issue concerning entitlement to funds in a jointly held Swiss bank account.

Finding divided success and excessive claimed hours in responding to a motion for directions, the court applied Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and awarded reduced partial indemnity costs.

Addendum to a previously released judgment addressing a limitations defence raised by the defendant.

The defendant argued that the action was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the combined effect of s. 24(5) of the Limitations Act, 2002 and ss. 45(1) and 50(1) of the predecessor Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990 meant the action was not statute barred.

The court relied on appellate authority interpreting the interaction of the two statutes.

The police defendants moved to strike a statement of claim brought by a self‑represented plaintiff following his conviction for assault.

The plaintiff alleged police negligence, wrongful detention, Charter violations, and malicious prosecution arising from his arrest and investigation.

The court held that the claim was an attempt to relitigate issues determined in the criminal proceedings, where the plaintiff had been convicted and his appeal dismissed.

Because a conviction establishes that the charge was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the plaintiff could not establish essential elements of malicious prosecution or lack of reasonable grounds.

The court concluded the action disclosed no reasonable cause of action and constituted an abuse of process.