Raba v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 2015 ONSC 5893
CITATION: Raba v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 2015 ONSC 5893
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 520/14
DATE: 20151026
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Molloy, Sanderson and Sachs JJ.
BETWEEN:
TOMASZ RABA
Appellant/Plaintiff
– and –
CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD
Defendant/Respondent
Tomasz Raba, In Person
David E. Fine, for the Defendant Respondent
HEARD at Toronto: September 18, 2015
Reasons for Judgment
Sachs J.:
[1] This is an appeal from the September 24, 2014 decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (the “Board”) denying the Appellant compensation for injuries he alleged he sustained as a result of being a victim of crime. In its decision, the Board found that the Appellant had not satisfied his burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that he was a victim of a crime of violence, a necessary pre-condition for compensation under s. 5(a) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C24 (the “Act”).
[2] In his application before the Board, the Appellant claimed that P.M., the superintendent of the building in which he lives, physically assaulted him and poisoned him with ammonia. No charges were ever laid against P.M., and the private information that the Appellant brought before the Ontario Court of Justice was withdrawn at the request of the Crown for lack of a reasonable prospect of conviction.
[3] At the time of the Board’s decision, the Appellant was subject to a peace bond requiring him to stay away from P.M. This peace bond was entered into in exchange for charges against the Appellant for criminal harassment of P.M. being withdrawn.
[4] The evidence that the Board considered on the issue of whether the Appellant was a victim of a crime of violence included testimony from the Appellant, P.M., and a police witness. It also included documentary evidence of the peace bond and cell phone videos that the Appellant took of his conversations and interactions with P.M.
[5] In the end, the Board found that the Appellant’s version of events was neither credible nor reliable. In its reasons, it reviewed the considerations it took into account in coming to this conclusion. Important to its decision were the following facts:
(a) The cell phone videos submitted by the Appellant did not depict any crime being committed by P.M.
(b) The medical reports submitted by the Appellant indicated that he suffered from a chronic degenerative condition prior to the incident dates.
(c) The Appellant denied being the subject of a peace bond when he clearly was the subject of such a bond.
(d) The police witness supported P.M.’s version that he had been the subject of harassment by the Appellant.
[6] At paragraph 31 of his factum, the Appellant indicates that he is seeking the following orders on this appeal – an order expunging his “false arrest” for criminal harassment of P.M., an “order dismissing the learned board members [sic] Order in its entirety” and an order awarding him compensation for his injuries. In his Amended Notice of Appeal, he requests a number of other orders, including orders for declarations such as “the learned board members acted in bad faith, making up fictitious evidence, redacting evidence and dismissing the appellants CICB application” and that the “Police witness, P.M. and Crown conspired to pervert and obstruct justice.”
[7] Pursuant to s. 23 of the Act, an appeal lies to the Divisional Court from a decision of the Board on a question of law.
[8] The Board’s finding that the Appellant had not satisfied his onus of proving that he was a victim of a crime of violence was a factual finding that turned on its assessments of credibility and was available to it on the evidence that it heard. It does not raise a question of law. In the course of his submissions, the Appellant made a number of allegations against the Board, the police witness, P.M., and the Crown who withdrew the charge against P.M. that did not form part of any admissible record before us. Essentially, the Appellant sought to have us re-try his case by presenting his version of events through his oral submissions. As the court repeatedly explained to the Appellant, our function is not to re-try the factual issues that were before the Board. Our jurisdiction is confined to questions of law.
[9] The Appellant submits that the Board exhibited a reasonable apprehension of bias in coming to its decision and that it suffered from a conflict of interest. In support of his argument, he cites verbatim passages of the Board’s decision, the fact that the Board relied on P.M.’s testimony and accepted the evidence of the police witness in relation to the alleged criminal acts and the Appellant’s lack of cooperation with the police.
[10] There is a strong presumption that administrative decision-makers are impartial. In order to rebut that presumption, the burden is on the party alleging bias to establish actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Appellant has provided no basis for a finding of actual bias. With respect to reasonable apprehension of bias, the test does not turn on the Appellant’s subjective perception of the Board’s conduct, but rather on:
[W]hat an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly? (Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 46).
[11] Viewing the record in this case realistically and practically, there is no basis on which an informed person, who thought the matter through, could conclude that there was a concern that the Board either consciously or unconsciously did not decide the Appellant’s matter fairly.
[12] The Appellant also argued that the Board’s decision infringed his right to life, liberty and security of the person pursuant to s. 7 of the Charter. In Flora v. Ontario Health Insurance Plan, 2008 ONCA 538, at para. 108, the Ontario Court of Appeal found the following:
Where […] the government elects to provide a financial benefit that is not otherwise required by law, legislative limitations on the scope of the financial benefit do not violate s.7.
[13] Further, in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84, at para. 81, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada found that s. 7 speaks to the right not to be deprived of life, liberty and security of the person; it does not place “a positive obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life, liberty or security of the person.”
[14] With respect to the Appellant’s request that this court “expunge” his “false arrest” for criminal harassment, we agree with the Respondent that our jurisdiction in this matter is grounded in s. 23 of the Act, which empowers us to hear appeals from the Board’s decisions. The request to “expunge” his arrest for criminal harassment is unrelated to the Board’s decision. The Appellant’s requests for declaratory relief in his Amended Notice of Appeal are requests that are either unsupported by the record before us or beyond our jurisdiction to grant.
[15] For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. As the Board is not seeking costs from the Appellant, there will be no order as to costs.
SACHS J.
MOLLOY J.
SANDERSON J.
Released: 20151026
CITATION: Raba v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 2015 ONSC 5893
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 520/14
DATE: 20151026
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Molloy, Sanderson and Sachs JJ.
BETWEEN:
TOMASZ RABA
Appellant/Plaintiff
– and –
CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD
Defendant/Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SACHS J.
Released: 20151026