Ejona Xega

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the self-represented plaintiff's claim regarding an assault at a church drop-in centre.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the voluminous and poorly organized electronic record made it impossible to confidently resolve the significant factual disputes between the parties.

Applying Hryniak, the court issued directions for a swift summary trial to resolve the matter on the merits.

In a group of six child protection appeals, the appellant J.B. brought a motion to reconstitute the panel, seeking to replace one of the judges due to her involvement in a prior unanimous decision that had reinstated a no-access order against J.B. The appellant argued for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal denied the motion, reaffirming the strong presumption of judicial impartiality and the high burden on the party alleging bias.

The court held that a judge's prior ruling against a party on a legal issue in a different case does not create a reasonable apprehension of bias for a new case involving different legal issues, even if the parties are the same.

This appeal concerned the liability of Children's Aid Societies (CAS) and the Ontario government for damages arising from flawed hair follicle drug and alcohol test results from the Motherisk Drug Testing Laboratory (MDTL) used in child protection proceedings.

Family members (parents and siblings) of children apprehended by CASs sued for negligence, negligent investigation/supervision, intentional infliction of mental distress, bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, misfeasance in public office, and Charter breaches.

The motions judge dismissed these claims, finding that CASs and Ontario did not owe a private law duty of care to parents or family members, as their primary duty is to the child's best interests, creating an untenable conflict of interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision, affirming that the CAS's duty is solely to the child, and Ontario's duties are general public duties, not private law duties to individuals in child protection matters or related to laboratory oversight.

The court also rejected claims of bad faith and Charter breaches as being disguised negligence claims, and dismissed claims for breach of fiduciary duty and s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, finding these duties are owed to the Indigenous child, not the Indigenous parent.

The defendants brought a motion seeking an order for potentially destructive examination of a fire-damaged dishwasher to identify its precise components and manufacturers.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing the request was premature and could prejudice their ability to add parts manufacturers.

The court found insufficient evidence that destructive testing was the only way to identify the dishwasher and its parts.

It ordered the defendants to provide a list of potential parts manufacturers so the plaintiffs could notify them and invite participation in testing.

Both the defendants' motion for destructive testing and the plaintiffs' cross-motion for a further affidavit of documents and discovery plan were dismissed as premature.

The defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, breach of confidence, conspiracy, inducing breach of contract, intentional interference with economic relations, and unjust enrichment arising from the defendant allegedly sharing the plaintiff's confidential pricing information with a competing bidder.

The court dismissed the motion to strike for most claims, finding they met the low threshold of disclosing a 'germ or scintilla' of a cause of action.

However, the court struck the claim for intentional interference with economic relations, as the pleading failed to allege an unlawful act against a third party, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend.