Brenda Hollingsworth

The appellant appealed a conviction under section 4(1) of the Dog Owners Liability Act (DOLA) for failing to exercise reasonable precautions to prevent her dog from biting a person.

The trial Justice of the Peace found the appellant guilty and imposed restrictions on two dogs and fines totalling $800.

The appeal court allowed the appeal in part, finding that while the conviction was supported by evidence, the trial judge erred in failing to identify which specific dog was responsible for the bite and in imposing restrictions on both dogs without evidentiary support.

The court set aside the fines and restrictions on the younger dog (Dolly), finding that only the older dog (Stella) was involved in the incident.

The appellants, a condominium corporation and its snow removal contractor, appealed a trial decision finding them negligent for a slip and fall injury.

The respondent slipped on an icy roadway that had been plowed but not salted in a timely manner.

The appeal focused on the standard of care, arguing the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence and applied an unreasonable standard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the contractor's delay in applying road salt fell below the reasonable standard of care, given the foreseeable ice formation and the contractor's problematic system for salt application.

The plaintiff brought an occupier's liability action against the Crown for injuries sustained after falling at a provincial park.

The trial proceeded on the issue of liability.

The court dismissed the action, finding the claim statute-barred due to the plaintiff's failure to provide notice within 10 days as required by the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff failed to prove she tripped on a hidden retaining wall as alleged, concluding instead that she slipped.

The court also determined that the Crown, as occupier, had acted reasonably and was not liable for an obvious risk or for injuries resulting from the plaintiff's misuse of the premises.

The Plaintiff, Wael Musa, succeeded in a slip and fall personal injury trial against the Defendants, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 255 and 6669981 Canada Inc. The court then determined the quantum of costs.

The Plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs up to the date of their Rule 49 offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, having bettered their offer.

The Defendants made no offer.

The court awarded the Plaintiff $113,000 in fees and $28,804.71 in disbursements, acknowledging that costs could exceed damages in complex trials and that counsel's billing rates and contingency fee agreements are relevant but not determinative.

This personal injury action concerned a slip and fall on an icy condominium roadway.

The plaintiff sued the condominium corporation and its snow removal contractor for negligence.

The contractor was deemed an occupier under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The central issue was whether the contractor applied road salt in a sufficiently timely manner to prevent dangerous icy conditions.

The court found the contractor negligent for failing to apply road salt concurrently with or immediately after plowing, which led to the formation of a hazardous icy surface.

The contractor's operational system, which relied on the owner personally handling all salting for numerous properties, was identified as problematic and overstretched.

The court dismissed the defendants' claim of contributory negligence against the plaintiff and found the defendants liable for the plaintiff's injuries.

The applicant, who suffered a catastrophic brain injury in a motor vehicle accident, sought court approval of a $1,450,000 settlement of her Statutory Accident Benefits (SABS) claim.

The court declined to approve the settlement, finding the evidence insufficient to establish that the proposed discount from the full value of her future care needs was in her best interests.

The court also identified deficiencies in the evidence regarding the applicant's capacity to manage property and the proposed allocation of settlement funds.

The application was adjourned to a case conference to address next steps, including procedural issues regarding corporate representation and affidavit evidence.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice in a slip-and-fall case where damages had been settled, leaving only liability at issue.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, civil jury trials in Ottawa were indefinitely suspended, causing significant delay.

The court granted the motion, finding that the indefinite delay constituted real and substantial prejudice, outweighing the defendants' right to a jury trial in the interest of timely access to justice.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a successful summary judgment motion brought by the defendants Nisco Inc. and HVL Ltd. against the plaintiffs.

Nisco had provided financing for a tow truck to Mark Pittuck, who was later seriously injured due to equipment failure.

Nisco's motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the plaintiffs' action against it.

Nisco sought costs on a full indemnity basis, citing an indemnity clause in the lease agreement and an offer to settle.

The plaintiffs argued for lower costs, emphasizing their impecuniosity and the absence of reprehensible conduct.

The court, applying Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, awarded Nisco $15,000 for the summary motion, $5,000 for costs in the actions, and $5,000 for disbursements against the main plaintiffs, and $4,000 against Sandy Tennant, considering the complexity, importance, and reasonable expectations of the losing party, as well as the plaintiffs' impecuniosity.

Nisco National Leasing, a division of HVL Ltd. ("Nisco"), brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss claims against it by Mark Pittuck and other plaintiffs.

Pittuck was injured while operating a leased tow truck, alleging Nisco's negligence for failing to remove a dangerous "side puller" or provide maintenance instructions.

The court found that the commercial lease agreement explicitly placed responsibility for inspection, acceptance, and maintenance of the tow truck solely on Pittuck, and Nisco was not a dealer or manufacturer.

The court determined that the Sale of Goods Act did not apply to the commercial lease, and the contractual terms limited Nisco's duty of care, taking precedence over any potential tort claim.

Nisco's motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the claims.

The minor plaintiff, through her litigation guardian, brought a motion for leave to discontinue the action against one of the defendants, the property lessor, after learning the slip and fall occurred inside the store.

The plaintiff also sought to dispense with service on the Children's Lawyer.

The court declined to grant the relief requested due to several deficiencies in the motion record, including inconsistent consents from other defendants, lack of position from cross-claiming defendants, failure to serve the litigation guardian, and insufficient evidence supporting the request to dispense with service on the Children's Lawyer.

The court remained seized and directed the filing of additional materials.

The defendant insurer brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction or, alternatively, that Québec was the more appropriate forum under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The action arose from an Ontario motor vehicle accident that left the plaintiff paraplegic and resulted in a substantial judgment against the insured tortfeasors, which the plaintiff sought to enforce against insurers under s. 258 of the Insurance Act.

The court applied the two‑step jurisdiction analysis and found a real and substantial connection to Ontario, including the location of the accident, residence of parties, and application of Ontario law.

The court also held that Québec was not a clearly more convenient forum and noted that transferring the matter would deprive the plaintiff of the right to a jury trial.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a civil action alleging assault, battery, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and Charter breaches arising from an incident at the Senate of Canada.

The plaintiff relied solely on reasons from a prior criminal trial in which he had been acquitted of charges related to the same incident, arguing that relitigation would constitute an abuse of process under the principles in Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79.

The court held that the defendants had not been parties to the criminal proceeding and had not had the opportunity to defend themselves or advance defences such as parliamentary privilege.

The court found that allowing the defendants to defend the civil claim would not amount to an abuse of process and that genuine issues requiring a trial remained.