Kevin Anthony Egan

This endorsement concerns the approval of a class action settlement and class counsel fees in two consolidated proceedings (Johnson et al. v. Ontario and Sabourin v. Ontario) alleging deplorable conditions at the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre.

The court approved a settlement of $32,795,400 and class counsel fees of $9,388,207.92, finding the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, given the significant litigation risks, the protracted nature of the actions, and the desire for a certain outcome for the thousands of affected class members.

The contingency fee agreements and the requested fees were also deemed fair and reasonable.

The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a finding that the defendant was liable for damages arising from Souphin Inlakhana’s 43-day imprisonment after a judicial decision made her eligible for accelerated parole review (APR).

The plaintiffs alleged false imprisonment, negligence, misfeasance in public office, and Charter breaches (ss. 7, 9, 11(i), 12).

The defendant sought dismissal of the motion.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion, finding no Charter violation or negligence in the administrative delay of release, as the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) and Parole Board of Canada (PBC) followed statutorily mandated processes within established timeframes, despite some delays.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the defendant on this specific claim.

Donald Parker appealed a motion judge's refusal to extend his opt-out period from a class action and a related costs order.

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario moved to quash Parker's appeal, arguing the motion judge's order was interlocutory and thus appealable only to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Ontario's motion, holding that the motion judge's order was final because it effectively terminated Parker's individual civil action by denying his substantive right to opt out of the class proceeding.

The court emphasized the importance of opt-out rights as substantive rights.

The Defendant brought a summary judgment motion which was subsequently abandoned after the Plaintiff's expert report was produced.

The court was asked to determine whether to award immediate costs to the Plaintiff for the abandoned motion or to order costs payable in the cause.

The Defendant argued that the motion was reasonable at the time it was brought and that the work done by the Plaintiff would have been necessary for trial anyway.

The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant's abandonment of the motion warranted immediate cost consequences.

The court found that while costs typically follow an event, the timing and motivation for bringing the motion weighed against an immediate costs award.

Costs were fixed at $7,000, payable in the cause.

Appeal from a summary judgment dismissing a negligence action brought by the estate and family members of a deceased man who died in a motor vehicle accident.

The motion judge applied the doctrine of emergency to find that the driver, who was engaged in a drug deal, acted reasonably when he drove away while the deceased was attempting to enter the vehicle, resulting in the deceased's death.

The majority upheld the summary judgment, finding no error in the application of the emergency doctrine.

Justice Pepall dissented, arguing that the motion judge failed to properly analyze the elements of the emergency doctrine and that material inconsistencies in the evidence should have precluded summary judgment.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his battery claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant was charged with assaulting a police officer and resisting arrest following an incident on June 1, 2014, and was acquitted on February 17, 2016.

He commenced an action on June 2, 2016, two years and one day after the alleged battery.

The central issue was whether the appellant discovered his potential battery claim within the meaning of section 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002, which requires knowledge that a legal proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek remedy.

The majority held that the discoverability date was February 17, 2016 (the date of acquittal), not June 1, 2014, because the battery claim and negligent investigation claim were inextricably intertwined and it was reasonable for the appellant to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings before deciding to pursue the civil battery claim.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1) to dismiss the plaintiff's claim in battery as statute-barred.

The claim arose from an incident on June 1, 2014, where the plaintiff alleged excessive force by police during his arrest.

The plaintiff was acquitted of criminal charges on February 17, 2016, and issued a notice of action on June 2, 2016.

The court found that the tort of battery, being an intentional act with immediate harm, was discoverable on June 1, 2014.

The plaintiff's arguments that the limitation period should run from his acquittal, his release from custody, or due to his alleged incapacity were rejected.

The court distinguished battery from negligent investigation/malicious prosecution claims, where discoverability is tied to the termination of criminal proceedings.

Consequently, the battery claim was dismissed as statute-barred, having expired on June 1, 2016, while the negligent investigation claim was allowed to proceed.

The defendants and a statutory third party moved for summary judgment to dismiss a Family Law Act claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of Glen Isaac.

The court considered the doctrines of volenti non fit injuria and emergency, and the deceased being the author of his own misfortune.

The motion was granted, finding that the deceased's aggressive actions initiated the confrontation and led to his death, thus precluding the derivative claims.