Colin Denis Rex Bourrier

The applicants sought judicial review of administrative decisions dismissing disciplinary charges against two police officers for lack of jurisdiction.

The hearing officers and the Ontario Civilian Police Commission found that the six-month statutory deadline under s. 83(17) of the Police Services Act for serving a notice of hearing had expired.

The applicants argued that the deadline should be paused during a review by the Complaints Director.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, holding that the administrative decision-makers reasonably interpreted the plain wording of the statute, which contained no exception for a Director's review.

The Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police applied for judicial review of a decision by the Independent Police Review Director (IPRD) finding that two OPP officers committed discreditable conduct during a sexual assault investigation.

The IPRD had concluded that assigning an officer with a perceived association to a specific detachment created a potential conflict of interest.

The Divisional Court granted the application and set aside the IPRD's decision, finding it unreasonable because the IPRD applied a subjective standard based on the complainant's perception rather than the required objective standard of a reasonable member of the community.

The moving party brought a motion to compel the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency to add internal confidential documents from a previously screened-out complaint to the record of proceeding for his current judicial review application.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that judicial review is not a de novo hearing and discovery is not available.

The court held that the administrative decision-maker is not required to produce all documents in its possession that were not put before or considered by the decision-maker in the specific case under review.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Director of the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency, which confirmed that her allegations of police misconduct were unsubstantiated.

The applicant had complained about being apprehended by an OPP officer during a welfare check and having her belongings seized.

The Divisional Court found the Director's decision reasonable, noting the officer was justified under the Mental Health Act in apprehending the applicant due to concerns for her safety during a winter storm.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and declining to address Charter arguments raised for the first time on judicial review.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Complaints Director of the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency to screen out his complaint against Toronto Police Service officers.

The Director had concluded the complaint, which included allegations of murder conspiracies and cloning, was frivolous and lacked an air of reality.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found the Director's decision was justified, intelligible, and transparent.

The court also dismissed the applicant's claims of procedural fairness breaches, noting the low threshold at the screening stage.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant filed a public complaint regarding a police officer's conduct during a traffic stop.

After the Chief of Police concluded the misconduct was not serious enough to warrant a hearing, the appellant requested a review by the Independent Police Review Director under section 71 of the Police Services Act.

The Director directed the Chief to serve a Notice of Hearing but explicitly instructed the Chief not to apply to the Board for a finding that the delay was reasonable under section 83(17), despite more than six months having passed.

The Hearing Officer dismissed the charges for noncompliance with section 83(17).

On appeal, the Ontario Civilian Police Commission upheld the dismissal, finding that section 83(17) applies to the pre-charge period including a section 71 review, and failure to obtain the Board's opinion on the reasonableness of the delay resulted in a loss of jurisdiction.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (now LECA) denying his request for a review of a police investigation into his complaints of excessive force during encampment clearings.

The applicant also moved to set aside a single judge's order quashing his judicial review application against the Toronto Police Service.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the motion judge correctly applied the 'plain and obvious' test and properly concluded that the applicant had to exhaust the statutory review process under section 71 of the Police Services Act before seeking judicial review.

The Court also dismissed the judicial review application against LECA, holding that the Director's decision to deny the late request for review was reasonable and did not breach procedural fairness.

The applicant filed a complaint regarding police conduct during encampment clearings.

After the Toronto Police Service investigated and substantiated only one minor allegation, the applicant sought judicial review of the investigation's adequacy.

The Toronto Police Service brought a motion to quash the application.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the application was bound to fail because the applicant had not exhausted the mandatory administrative review process under section 71 of the Police Services Act, which requires seeking a review by the OIPRD before applying for judicial review.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) upholding the dismissal of his complaints against seven police officers.

The complaints alleged police misconduct related to investigations of conflicts arising from a family law dispute, including recording an incorrect witness name, failing to meet disclosure obligations, and failing to enforce COVID-19 protocols.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the OIPRD reasonably concluded the officers acted in good faith and within their discretion.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The public complainant sought leave to appeal a Hearing Officer's decision dismissing misconduct charges against a police officer due to noncompliance with the six-month delay provision in s. 83(17) of the Police Services Act.

The respondent officer objected to the Independent Police Review Director participating in the leave application.

The Commission held that the Director has standing to participate in pre-hearing steps, including leave applications.

The Commission granted leave to appeal, finding that the interplay between the Director's oversight powers and the Police Services Board's obligations regarding delay raises issues of significant importance to the policing profession and the community.

The proposed intervenor, Shoal Lake #40 First Nation, brought a motion for leave to intervene as an added party or friend of the court in an action for damages brought by Iskatewizaagegan No. 39 Independent First Nation against the City of Winnipeg and the Province of Ontario.

The underlying action sought compensation for the taking of water from Shoal Lake pursuant to a 1913 Order in Council.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed intervenor had no direct interest in the plaintiff's specific claim for damages, that its participation would cause delay, and that it was free to commence its own action for compensation.

The Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed the "Student Choice Initiative" framework, which mandated an opt-out system for non-essential student ancillary fees at Ontario colleges and universities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the framework was unlawful.

For colleges, the framework conflicted with section 7 of the Ontario Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology Act, 2002, which protects student governing bodies' normal activities.

For universities, the framework interfered with their statutory self-governance and institutional autonomy, a fundamental principle implicit in their establishing Acts.

The court clarified that the Minister's action was an exercise of executive authority, not prerogative power, and must yield to conflicting legislation.

The defendants in two related class actions brought motions to compel the representative plaintiffs to answer questions refused during examinations for discovery.

The refused questions related to the plaintiffs' individual medical and employment histories, reasons for detention, and other individual experiences.

The court dismissed the defendants' motions, holding that discovery prior to a common issues trial is limited to the common issues.

The court found that the individual damages questions were not relevant to the common issues of systemic negligence or aggregate damages, which must be determined without reference to the circumstances of individual class members.

The accused brought an application seeking increased legal aid funding for defence counsel to cover the full estimated budget for a constitutional challenge.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the state has a constitutional obligation to ensure fair trials for indigent accused, the accused's right to a fair trial (not a perfect trial) was not imperiled by the shortfall of approximately $3,000 between the legal aid budget and the defence budget.

The court acknowledged the financial burden on defence counsel accepting legal aid certificates but held that absent evidence that no competent counsel would accept the certificate, the application must fail.

The applicant First Nation sought judicial review of decisions by the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation and the Minister of Finance regarding the modernization of gaming in Ontario, specifically the decisions to tender and bundle a gaming zone that included the applicant's reserve.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the impugned decisions were policy and commercial in nature and therefore not justiciable.

The court also found no bad faith, no denial of procedural fairness, and no breach of the duty to consult.

Furthermore, the court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss the application for excessive and unexplained delay that caused prejudice.

The appellant appealed from an order striking out his statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and dismissing his action.

The appellant had commenced an action claiming punitive damages, travel expenses, interest, and costs arising from the stopping, detainment, and impoundment of his vehicle by an OPP officer, asserting a breach of rights under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The motion judge struck the claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding the pleading wholly deficient and incapable of success.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the motion judge applied the correct test and that the statement of claim failed to plead material facts supporting the alleged breach or theft allegation.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims as an abuse of process and res judicata, and sought an order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to prevent the plaintiffs from starting further claims without leave.

The court dismissed the claims against all defendants except Dr. Sit and Dr. Brazel without leave to amend, finding they had been previously decided and were an abuse of process.

The court declined to make a s. 140 order, noting it lacked jurisdiction to do so on a motion.

The claims against Dr. Sit and Dr. Brazel, which related to separate allegations of battery and lack of informed consent, were struck with leave to amend.

The applicants sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision made by the Normal Farm Practices and Protection Board regarding its internal processes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that judicial review of interim orders is only available in exceptional circumstances to prevent fragmentation and piecemeal proceedings.

The court found no exceptional circumstances justifying intervention before the board's final decision.

Costs were awarded to the respondent receiver in the fixed amount of $2,000.