Abel Fok

Following a successful Rule 21 motion striking the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action, the defendant sought costs of approximately $32,247.

The plaintiff argued the amount was excessive and emphasized his limited financial means, reliance on social assistance, and mental health challenges preventing stable employment.

The court reviewed the principle of reasonableness governing costs awards and the jurisprudence on whether a party’s impecuniosity may be considered.

The court concluded the claimed amount was excessive and determined that, in the circumstances, it was appropriate to consider the plaintiff’s financial hardship.

Exercising its discretion, the court declined to award any costs.

The plaintiff, who was acquitted of manslaughter in a judge-alone trial, sued the Attorney General for malicious prosecution.

The Attorney General had previously attempted to override the plaintiff's election for a judge-alone trial without providing reasons, which the criminal trial judge found to be an abuse of process.

The Attorney General moved to strike the civil claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to plead material facts establishing that the prosecution was continued without reasonable cause or motivated by malice, noting that overriding a trial election is a non-core element of prosecutorial discretion outside the scope of malicious prosecution.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings and an order requiring state-funded counsel under ss. 7 and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms following denial of Legal Aid funding, commonly known as a Rowbotham application.

The accused faced charges under the Highway Traffic Act for willfully failing to stop for police, which carried a possible minimum custodial sentence.

Although the Crown conceded that the accused had exhausted Legal Aid appeals and was indigent, it argued that counsel was not essential to ensure a fair trial.

The court held that the charges were regulatory in nature, the trial would be brief with discrete issues, and the accused demonstrated an ability to understand and participate in proceedings.

The court concluded that representation by counsel was not essential to a fair trial and dismissed the application.

The accused brought a Rowbotham application under ss. 7 and 24(1) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings until the Attorney General or Legal Aid Ontario funded her defence on a charge of assault causing bodily harm.

Although the accused had exhausted appeals within Legal Aid Ontario, the court found she failed to demonstrate that state-funded counsel was essential to ensure a fair trial.

The charge was relatively straightforward, the trial expected to be brief, and the accused demonstrated an ability to understand the proceedings and participate effectively.

The court emphasized that incarceration risk alone does not justify state-funded counsel and that trial judges can assist self‑represented accused to ensure fairness.

The applicant, a municipal mayor, brought an application for a declaration that his deemed pecuniary interest under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act was so remote or insignificant that he was exempt from the duty to refrain from participating in council matters regarding a mass transit project.

The deemed interest arose from his son's ownership of a condominium near a proposed transit station.

The court first held that the Crown was properly named as a respondent to represent the general public interest.

The court then granted the declaration, finding that a reasonable elector would not regard the potential, uncertain 'land value uplift' to the son's property as likely to influence the applicant's actions or decisions.

The applicant, the Mayor of Cambridge, brought an application for a declaration that his deemed pecuniary interest under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act was so remote or insignificant that he was exempt from the duty to refrain from participating in council matters.

The interest arose because his son co-owned a condominium near a proposed rapid transit station, which a report suggested might experience a 'land value uplift'.

The Crown, named as respondent, argued it was improperly named, but the court held it was properly joined to represent the public interest.

The court granted the declaration, finding that a reasonable elector would not regard the uncertain and indirect potential increase in the son's property value as likely to influence the applicant's decisions on the mass transit project.