Court File and Parties
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Between:
His Majesty the King, Respondent – and – John Geddes, Applicant
Counsel:
Allison Craig, for the Applicant
Peter Hamm, for the Respondent
Heard: May 21-24, 27, 2024, April 2, 4, August 8, 2025
Reasons for Decision on Charter Application and Reasons for Judgment
Nishikawa J.
Overview and Procedural Background
1On February 2, 2022, police received a 911 call about a stabbing at 200 Sherbourne Street. The victim, Jason Bartley, had been cut across the face with an edged object while at a unit in the building (the "Unit").
2Officers of the Toronto Police Service (TPS) and special constables from the Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC) reviewed digital video recordings (DVR) from the hallway outside the Unit and identified the suspect both entering and leaving the Unit shortly before the victim was seen coming out of the Unit with a cloth to his face. The police followed the movement of the suspect from 200 Sherbourne to 257 Sherbourne Street, where they set up outside the building to intercept him.
3The Applicant, John Geddes, was taken down and arrested by police as he walked through an outdoor walkway between the two TCHC buildings at 257 and 251 Sherbourne Street. Mr. Geddes was accompanied by a woman named Ashley and a dog, who had been with him as he moved through the buildings. A knife with blood on it was found in his pants pocket. In his backpack, police found a loaded firearm, cocaine and crack.
4The Applicant is charged with the following offences: aggravated assault; possession of a loaded, restricted firearm; possession of a restricted firearm without a licence; possession of a firearm while prohibited from doing so; possession of a prohibited device; possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking; and possession of crack cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.
5Before trial, Mr. Geddes brought an application under ss. 7, 8, 9 and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of the proceedings or, alternatively, to exclude from evidence the knife, firearm and drugs seized on his arrest. In brief, Mr. Geddes argued that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him, and that the search was illegal. He further argued that the police officers used unreasonable and excessive force in arresting him.
6On May 21, 2024, the Applicant re-elected to be tried by judge-alone. The parties then agreed to have the Charter application and trial proceed before me as a blended proceeding. The Crown called its evidence on both the application and the trial proper. The defence called no evidence on the Charter application. After submissions on the Charter application, the parties requested that I deliver a bottom-line ruling on the application before the defence would be called upon to decide whether or not to call evidence on the trial.
7On May 24, 2024, I dismissed the Applicant's Charter application with reasons to follow. On May 27, 2024, when the trial was scheduled to continue, Mr. Geddes discharged his counsel and requested an adjournment to retain new counsel. My reasons on the Charter application were delivered on August 16, 2024: R. v. Geddes, 2024 ONSC 4430.
8A lengthy delay ensued before Mr. Geddes was able to retain new counsel. Once Mr. Geddes had retained counsel, on March 16, 2025, he brought an application to stay the proceeding under ss. 7, 8 and 24(1) of the Charter (the "Second Charter Application") based on certain treatment to which he was subjected during pre-sentence custody at the Toronto South Detention Centre ("TSDC").
9The trial continued on April 2, 2025 with defence evidence on the trial proper. Mr. Geddes testified and was cross-examined.
10The Second Charter Application was scheduled to be heard on August 8, 2025. On that day, Mr. Geddes testified and was cross-examined. Other than an affidavit from a TPS officer about efforts made to obtain records from the TSDC, the Crown called no evidence on the application.
11For the reasons that follow, I find that Mr. Geddes' rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter were breached. However, I do not find the circumstances to constitute one of the clearest of cases in which a stay is warranted. Accordingly, I decline to grant a stay of proceedings.
12On the trial, the defence conceded that if the Second Charter Application were dismissed, Mr. Geddes would be found guilty of the offences charged, with the exception of Count 1, the charge for aggravated assault. For the reasons that follow, I find Mr. Geddes guilty of the offence of aggravated assault.
Issues
13The issues raised in this proceeding are as follows:
(a) Were the Applicant's rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter breached as a result of his treatment on January 13, 2025 by correctional services officers at the TSDC?
(b) If the Applicant's Charter rights were breached, should this court grant a stay of proceedings?
(c) Has the Crown demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Geddes is guilty of the offence of aggravated assault?
The Second Charter Application
The Parties' Positions
14The Applicant alleges that correctional services officers at the TSDC breached his rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter by subjecting him to degrading and humiliating treatment. Specifically, the Applicant alleges that on January 13, 2025, correctional services officers strip searched him without any regard to his privacy and then forced him to sit on a toilet for approximately 45 minutes in the presence of four to five correctional officers.
15The Crown denies any breach of the Applicant's Charter rights. The Crown takes the position that the Applicant's allegations are bald and that there is a lack of evidence to support that the incident that he alleges took place. In the alternative, the Crown submits that the search was legitimate and conducted in the ordinary course.
Evidence on the Application
The Applicant's Evidence
16Mr. Geddes testified that on January 13, 2025, he was having lunch with another inmate while locked in his cell when officers from the Institutional Crises Intervention Team ("ICIT") team came onto the range and began to enter various cells. Mr. Geddes testified that he was ordered out of his cell, patted down, and allowed to return.
17Shortly thereafter, a correctional officer ordered that Mr. Geddes and his cellmate be strip searched. Mr. Geddes testified that the officer who ordered the strip search was known among inmates as "Harry Potter" but that he believed his name to be something that sounded like "Milasovich." Mr. Geddes testified that there was no reason to believe that he was in possession of any contraband.
18The Applicant was removed from his cell, handcuffed, and taken to the Admission and Discharge ("A&D") Unit. At the A&D Unit, he was put through the body scanner and informed by officers that the scan showed he had something hidden on or in his person. Mr. Geddes was then taken to a holding cell and ordered to strip naked. Mr. Geddes testified that a strip search was conducted in the presence of four or five correctional officers and in front of a wall of windows in plain view of the entire A&D Unit. Mr. Geddes testified that during the strip search, other officers walked back and forth to see what was going on. The search revealed no contraband.
19Mr. Geddes testified that he was then told to sit on the toilet in the holding cell to have a bowel movement while four to five officers watched. While the Applicant was sitting on the toilet with his boxers around his ankles, surrounded by correctional officers, the officer who had initiated the strip search called him degrading names and attempted to make the Applicant provide information about rogue correctional officers. The officer threatened that if Mr. Geddes told his lawyer about the treatment he received, he would fabricate information that the Applicant was a "snitch."
20Mr. Geddes testified that he asked for privacy and objected to being made to sit on the toilet in the presence of the officers but they told him to "stop crying like a bitch" and that a "fat guy" like him "should be able to squeeze something out." Mr. Geddes testified that during the entire time he was on the toilet, there were at least four officers present and one officer was holding his arm to prevent him from flushing the toilet. Mr. Geddes was eventually given a hospital gown.
21After sitting on the toilet for approximately 45 minutes without a bowel movement, Mr. Geddes was moved to a dry cell where he spent the night. The Applicant testified that the following morning, he was allowed to return to his cell after he had a bowel movement which revealed no contraband. He testified that when he was taken back to his cell, he felt further degraded because he was paraded in a "dress" which I understand to refer to the hospital gown.
22Mr. Geddes testified that the day after he was in the dry cell, he completed an inmate statement form ("ISF") describing what happened and how wrong it was. Mr. Geddes testified that he believed he was entitled to a second scan before being strip searched and made to sit on the toilet. That night, he slept with the completed ISF because he did not want to give it to someone who would not deal with it properly. Mr. Geddes testified that the following morning, his cell was searched and "Officer Milasovich" took the ISF and said he was snitching. Mr. Geddes testified that the officer took a photo of the ISF and told him that he would show it to everyone. He never heard about the ISF again. Mr. Geddes does not allege that the search of his cell on that day was in breach of his s. 8 Charter rights.
23Mr. Geddes testified that after the incident, he secluded himself for days and refused to eat or shower. He stated that he felt as though he had been sexually assaulted or abused, and that it brought back trauma from when he had been bullied as a child. He felt betrayed because he had tried to behave and stay out of trouble in jail. Mr. Geddes testified that he continues to have nightmares about the incident and that when he sees people gathered, he has a feeling that something bad might happen to him. Mr. Geddes testified that he would shake and sweat when he saw "Officer Milasovich" on the range.
24The medical records obtained from the TSDC show that Mr. Geddes refused to eat for at least three days following January 13, 2025, and that he informed medical staff that he was upset with the correctional officers' treatment of him.
25On cross-examination, the Crown put to Mr. Geddes that the incident that he described never took place. Mr. Geddes maintained that it happened and that he later heard that "Officer Milasovich" was no longer working at TSDC.
26The Crown cross-examined Mr. Geddes about his knowledge of the applicable policies and why he believed he was entitled to a second scan. The cross-examination otherwise focused on details that Mr. Geddes testified to in examination chief but had not included in his affidavit in support of the application. For example, in his affidavit, Mr. Geddes did not mention that he had completed an ISF regarding the incident. Mr. Geddes maintained that he completed an ISF and that "Officer Milasovich" took it. He testified that he did not file another complaint because officers were aware of what had happened to him and asked him about it and, in any event, he felt it would be futile.
27On re-examination, Mr. Geddes clarified that his main complaint was not that he did not get a second scan but that he was put on the toilet with four to five officers watching him. He explained that being "put on the shitter" is a term in jail culture that is equivalent with treating an inmate with disrespect, as if to undermine their manhood.
The Crown's Evidence
28The Crown adduced no evidence on the application other than the affidavit of Detective Constable Rebecca Gaudreau of the TPS detailing the efforts made to obtain information and documentation from the TSDC relating to the incident that Mr. Geddes alleged. DC Gaudreau deposed that after making inquiries, she learned that no video of the interaction between Mr. Geddes and correctional officers existed. If CCTV video had existed, it was subject to a 60-day retention period, but no request for the video had been made within that period. Although the TPS subpoenaed records from the TSDC, no records were provided. On July 30, 2025, DC Gaudreau was informed that no records pertaining to Mr. Geddes existed for January 13, 2025.
Analysis
Were the Applicant's Section 7 and 8 Rights Breached?
The Applicable Principles
29Section 7 of the Charter guarantees every person the right to life, liberty and security of the person, and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
30Section 8 of the Charter guarantees that every person be protected from unreasonable search and seizure. The starting point is that a claimant must have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Incarcerated persons have a substantially reduced level of privacy: R. v. Ritchie, 2025 ONSC 4580, at paras. 100-101.
31A search will be Charter-compliant if it is: (i) authorized by law; (ii) the law itself is reasonable; and (iii) the search is conducted in a reasonable manner. If the search does not meet one of these criteria, it will violate the Charter: R. v. Collins, 1987 CanLII 84 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; R. v. Debot, 1989 CanLII 13 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140.
32In R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, at para. 47, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that strip searches "represent a significant invasion of privacy and are often a humiliating, degrading and traumatic experience for individuals subject to them." The Court further stated as follows:
It may be useful to distinguish between strip searches immediately incidental to arrest, and searches related to safety issues in a custodial setting. We acknowledge the reality that where individuals are going to be entering the prison population, there is a greater need to ensure that they are not concealing weapons or illegal drugs on their persons prior to their entry into the prison environment. Golden, at para. 96.
33Strip searches must nonetheless be conducted with a view to ensuring that they are done sensitively and with an inmate's dignity and privacy in mind: Golden, at paras. 83, 99. In Golden, at para. 101, the Supreme Court identified a number of considerations that would provide a framework to ensure that a strip search is Charter-compliant, including the following:
- Whether the strip search is conducted at the police station;
- Whether the strip search is conducted in a manner that ensures the health and safety of all;
- Whether the strip search is authorized by a supervising officer;
- Whether the strip search is conducted by an officer of the same gender as the person being searched;
- Whether the number of officers involved in the search is no more than reasonably necessary in the circumstances;
- Whether the strip search is conducted in a private area such that no one other than the individuals engaged in the search can observe the search;
- The minimum of force necessary to conduct the strip search;
- Whether the strip search is conducted as quickly as possible and in a way that ensures that the person is not completely undressed at any one time;
- If the visual inspection reveals the presence of a weapon or evidence, whether the person being searched is given the option of removing the object themselves; and
- Whether a proper record is kept of the reasons for and the manner in which the strip search was conducted.
34The Crown did not provide any policies applicable to strip searches or other searches in provincial institutions. Regulation 778, R.R.O. 1990, under the Ministry of Correctional Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.22 (the "Regulation"), defines a strip search as follows:
"strip search" means an inspection that is not conducted as part of a medical examination or treatment,
(a) of the body after all clothing on the top or bottom half of the body, or on the entire body, has been removed and of any clothing or other personal possessions that the person was required to remove; or
(b) of the body after all clothing on the top or bottom half of the body, or on the entire body, that is ordinarily worn over underwear has been removed and of any clothing or other personal possessions that the person was required to remove;
35Subsection 24(1) of the Regulation states that a strip search is only authorized in the circumstances described in that provision and in accordance with other requirements of that section. Subsection 24(3) of the Regulation further states as follows:
An officer or manager may conduct a strip search of an inmate if the officer or manager believes on reasonable grounds that,
(a) the inmate is carrying contraband that can be hidden on or within the body;
(b) a strip search is needed to confirm the existence of contraband or recover it; and
(c) using a less intrusive search method would not be effective at locating contraband or is not operationally feasible.
36The requirements under s. 24 include that the officer conducting the strip search "shall not require the inmate's clothing to be removed for longer than necessary to conduct the search and shall not cause unnecessary embarrassment or humiliation": s. 24(16), Reg. 778.
Findings
37Unlike Ritchie, where the evidentiary record was extensive, the only evidence on the Application is Mr. Geddes' affidavit and testimony. The Crown has adduced no evidence other than DC Gaudreau's affidavit regarding her efforts to obtain records from the TSDC.
38To be clear, Mr. Geddes bears the burden of proving the alleged Charter violations on a balance of probabilities. There is no burden on the Crown to prove that alleged conduct did not occur. However, the Applicant has made serious, credible allegations about mistreatment during pre-sentence custody. In the absence of evidence to dispute Mr. Geddes' account of the incident, I have little reason not to accept his evidence.
39In fact, I find Mr. Geddes' evidence to be credible. He gave a detailed account of the incident and interaction with the correctional officers. He provided the date, time of day, a description of the location, details of the circumstances and things said to him. While he did not provide names or descriptions of the other officers involved, he described and identified "Officer Milasovich." His testimony was not undermined on cross-examination and his credibility was not impeached.
40Moreover, the medical records for Mr. Geddes from January 14 to 22, 2025 corroborate that Mr. Geddes refused to eat for at least three days and was placed on a "meal watch." Mr. Geddes stated at the time that he was upset with how correctional officers treated him.
41The Crown argues that Mr. Geddes' affidavit was insufficiently particularized to enable the Crown to obtain further information. However, Mr. Geddes provided the date, time of day and description of one of the officers whom he alleges was involved. While the Crown argues that had Mr. Geddes made a complaint regarding his alleged treatment, there would have been a record, the absence of any record is consistent with his evidence that "Officer Milasovich" took the ISF from him.
42Based on the timing of Mr. Geddes' application, which was just over two months after the incident, no CCTV recordings from the A&D Unit were available because this was after the 60-day retention period. The Crown did not allege that Mr. Geddes intentionally delayed in making a complaint or in raising the Charter breach after the retention period. He was not cross-examined as to the timing of his application. Moreover, in Mr. Geddes' mind, he had completed an ISF, although he may have suspected that "Officer Milasovich" did not submit it to his superiors.
43Having found that Mr. Geddes was searched in the manner that he described, the next question is whether the search was in breach of his Charter rights.
44The Crown argues that Mr. Geddes has failed to prove that the search was a breach of his Charter rights because he has failed to adduce evidence that a search conducted in the manner alleged is contrary to Ministry policy. The Crown submits that if what Mr. Geddes described took place, it was simply the logical progression of a search after a body scan resulted in a positive indication.
45I have difficulty with this submission. While it is the Applicant's burden to prove the Charter breach, it is unclear how Mr. Geddes is to prove that the search was contrary to Ministry policy when the Crown has not adduced that policy in evidence. In any event, I reject the Crown's position that the conduct alleged was simply the logical progression of a search after a positive indication on a body scan.
46Although Mr. Geddes testified that he believed he was entitled to a second scan, he does not strongly contest that the officers might have had reasonable grounds for the strip search after the body scan led them to believe that he had something on his person. The Charter breach alleged relates to the manner in which the strip search was conducted and the subsequent steps taken by the correctional officers, including putting him on the toilet in the holding cell.
47Counsel cited few cases dealing with the issue of whether treatment of the nature alleged here during pre-sentence custody constitutes a Charter breach warranting a stay of proceedings. In R. v. Rootenberg, 2024 ONCA 493, the Court of Appeal rejected the appellant's argument that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a stay because of strip searches he was subject to during pre-sentence custody at the TSDC. The appellant had challenged the manner in which the strip searches were conducted at the TSDC, in open cubicles. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in finding that there was no Charter breach because the searches were authorized and conducted for the purpose of ensuring the inmates' safety.
48In R. v. Ritchie, 2025 ONSC 4580, Woollcombe J. found a breach of ss. 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter resulting from an incident at Maplehurst Correctional Institution during which the ICIT was deployed after a correctional officer was assaulted by an inmate. Strip searches were conducted at correctional officers' direction through the hatch of the inmates' cells. During the search, the defendant was required to remove his boxers, squat and spread his buttocks in the presence of his cell mate. His wrists were then zip-tied and he was removed from his cell and made to sit on the floor with other inmates, wearing only their boxers. He was later taken back to his cell. For 37 hours, the defendant and other inmates had only boxers and a sheet, while the temperature of the facility was turned down to 19-20 degrees Celsius. The defendant was also denied medication. After an extensive examination of the applicable policies and evidence, Woolcombe J. found no basis for the strip search, which she found to be particularly invasive.
49In my view, the manner in which the strip search was conducted and the subsequent putting of Mr. Geddes on the toilet for an extended period of time was not consistent with s. 24(16) of the Regulation which requires that the officer conducting the search "shall not require the inmate's clothing to be removed for longer than necessary to conduct the search and shall not cause unnecessary embarrassment or humiliation[.]"
50After the strip search, Mr. Geddes was forced to sit on a toilet for 45 minutes in the presence of four or five officers while his boxers were pulled down to his feet. Although Mr. Geddes testified that he was eventually provided with a hospital dressing gown, it cannot be said that his clothing was removed for no longer than necessary. The officers made no effort to ensure that the search did not cause unnecessary embarrassment and humiliation. Indeed, the circumstances were such that embarrassment and humiliation were a certainty. Mr. Geddes was naked but for his boxers, in a vulnerable position on the toilet, with one arm being held by an officer. While in this vulnerable position, he was taunted and called names.
51Needless to say, nothing in the Regulation specifically authorizes correctional officers to put an inmate on the toilet, mostly naked, in the presence of multiple correctional officers until he has a bowel movement. It would seem to me that the very purpose of a dry cell is to provide a safe, non-intrusive means of ensuring the expulsion of contraband ingested or concealed by an inmate on their person. Another less intrusive alternative is a further body scan.
52The manner in which the strip search was conducted was also contrary to a number of the considerations identified in Golden. Specifically, the strip search was not conducted in a private area with a minimum number of officers present. There is an absence of evidence to support that four or five officers were necessary to conduct the search. Mr. Geddes' evidence is that other officers also walked in and out of the area and observed him being searched. The search was not conducted as quickly as possible. Notwithstanding the reduced expectation of privacy in a custodial setting, Mr. Geddes' expectation of privacy was completely disregarded.
53The case law and regulations support that even in custodial institutions, strip searches must be conducted in a manner that protects the inmate's privacy and dignity. Forcing an inmate to sit on a toilet to have a bowel movement for an extended period of time while multiple officers observe and restrain him is deeply humiliating, degrading and traumatic. See: Golden, at para. 83. It is the antithesis of protecting an inmate's dignity and privacy. In making my finding, I need not rely on Mr. Geddes' testimony that putting an inmate on the toilet is a practice in jail culture that is intended to undermine a person's manhood. It is sufficient that the conduct that Mr. Geddes described took place.
54Based on the foregoing, and in the absence of any evidence to support that the search to which Mr. Geddes was subject was consistent with Ministry policy, I find that Mr. Geddes' right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter was breached.
55As Woollcombe J. noted in Ritchie, citing R. v. S.C., 2025 ONSC 1887 at paras. 148-150, "[l]ittle turns on the fact that this strip search breached Mr. Ritchie's s. 7 rights as well as his rights as protected under s. 8[.]" Similarly, in R. v. J.F., 2025 ONCJ 54, at para. 67, Rose J. noted that "[w]hen the constitutional standard under parallel Charter sections is engaged, it is not necessary to make findings under both, particularly where the remedy would be the same."
56In any event, I would also be satisfied that the search as conducted violated Mr. Geddes' right to security of the person under s. 7 of the Charter. Mr. Geddes' evidence of the impact of the incident on him is unchallenged. The medical records show that he was unable to eat for days after it occurred.
57Given the s. 8 breach, I have no difficulty finding that the breach of s. 7 was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Moreover, I have not been provided evidence that would support that the manner in which the search was conducted was justified.
Should a Stay be Granted?
58A stay of proceedings is the most drastic remedy a court can order in that it permanently halts a prosecution: R. v. Sandhu, 2020 ONCA 479. A stay is only appropriate "in the clearest of cases" where the prejudice to the accused's right to make full answer and defence cannot be remedied or where irreparable prejudice would be caused to the integrity of the judicial system if the prosecution were continued: R. v. O'Connor, 1995 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at p. 468. Cases warranting a stay of proceedings will be "exceptional" and "very rare.": R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309, at para. 44.
59The test to determine whether a stay of proceedings is warranted consists of three requirements:
(i) prejudice to the accused's right to a fair trial or to the integrity of the justice system that will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial or its outcome;
(ii) no alternative remedy capable of redressing prejudice; and
(iii) where uncertainty remains after the first two steps have been taken, whether the balance of interests in favour of a stay, such as denouncing misconduct and preserving the integrity of the justice system, outweighs the interest of society and having a final determination on the merits.
Babos, at para. 32.
60The Applicant has provided no authority to support his position that a stay is an appropriate remedy for the type of Charter breaches found in this case. While there are cases in which the treatment of an accused person during presentence custody has resulted in the finding of a Charter breach, in none of those cases has the extraordinary relief of a stay been ordered. See: R. v. S.C., 2025 ONSC 1887, R. v. Charley, 2019 ONSC 6490; Ritchie. I recognize that no stay was sought in Ritchie. In S.C., at para. 220, P. Campbell J. noted that "it is more straight-forward to order a stay of criminal proceedings for a wrong committed within the investigative and procedural apparatus, by persons directly involved with the case, than for wrongs committed in custody…[.]" Further, while this by no means intended to minimize the treatment to which Mr. Geddes was subjected, the Charter breaches in those cases were more serious than in this case. In those cases, a reduction in sentence was found to be an adequate alternative remedy.
61I further note that in Rootenberg, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that even if there had been a Charter breach, it was not one of the "clearest of cases" that would warrant a stay of proceedings.
62In the circumstances of this case, I find that there is no prejudice to the Applicant's right to a fair trial or the integrity of the justice system that would result from the conduct of the trial or by its outcome. In fact, the trial has taken place and it cannot be said that the breach of Mr Geddes' Charter rights affected his ability to make full answer and defence. Moreover, there are adequate alternative remedies capable of redressing the prejudice to Mr. Geddes and for this court to adequately dissociate the justice system from the impugned state conduct, including a potential reduction in sentence.
63Accordingly, the Charter breaches at issue here do not render this case one of the rare or clearest of cases in which a stay of proceedings is warranted.
Conclusion on Charter Application
64For the foregoing reasons, the application is dismissed.
Has the Crown Proven Aggravated Assault Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?
65As noted earlier in these Reasons, the defence has conceded that if the Second Charter Application is dismissed, convictions would follow on the firearm and drug-related charges. The issue that remains is whether Mr. Geddes is guilty of the offence of aggravated assault.
66The defence submits that the Crown has not proven the offence of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt because guilt is not the only reasonable inference on the evidence. The defence argues that a reasonable inference available on the evidence is that it was Ashley, the other individual who went into the Unit with Mr. Geddes, who stabbed Mr. Bartley.
The Crown's Evidence
Jason Bartley
67Mr. Bartley is the victim of the alleged assault. On February 2, 2022, he was staying with a friend on the sixth floor of 200 Sherbourne Street. He testified that he had gone to a Unit on the second floor, where someone he knew as "School As" lived. "School As" was later identified as Michael McDermott, the resident of the Unit. On cross-examination, Mr. Bartley admitted that he had gone to the Unit to smoke crack.
68Mr. Bartley testified that while he was in the Unit, two individuals whom he knew as "Billy" and "Ashley" arrived. Mr. Bartley testified that he was sitting on a chair, "half out of it" when they came in. Billy and Ashley were on his right and someone else was on his left. Mr. Bartley testified that Billy and Ashley asked him a couple of questions. He testified that they did not like the answers he gave, and he then "got cut" above the right eye. Mr. Bartley testified that a hand came over his head and cut him but that he did not know how he got cut or who cut him.
69Mr. Bartley's evidence as to who told him that he owed money was equivocal. He testified that Billy said something to him about owing money, but then said Billy and Ashley asked him about the money he owed. On cross-examination, Mr. Bartley testified that Ashley said something about him owing money, to which he responded that he did not owe them any money. On cross-examination, Mr. Bartley denied becoming upset, raising a hand, or standing up when he denied owing money. He admitted to smoking crack cocaine that day and that it affected his memory.
70Mr. Bartley testified that at that time, he had known Billy and Ashley for approximately eight years and that they had a good relationship. He had met Billy when he was younger and described him as a "good kid."
71Mr. Bartley testified that he was cut from above the left eyebrow to past his right eyelid and that he was in a lot of pain. After the injury, Mr. Bartley went to his friend's apartment on the sixth floor. He was later taken to the hospital in an ambulance. He received approximately 20 stitches in the right eye area and has a scar. Mr. Bartley testified that there was no injury to his eyeball.
72Mr. Bartley testified that his left eye is sometimes blurry. It is unclear from the evidence whether this is related to the injury, which was mainly to his right eye. Mr. Bartley testified that although he was initially worried about getting into arguments when the injury was tender, he does not consider it a significant injury. He denied that the incident or injury have had an ongoing impact on his mental health.
73PC Andrew Harvey was tasked to obtain DNA samples from Mr. Bartley at the hospital. He took two buccal swabs and put them into sealed bags to send to Forensic Investigation Services ("FIS"). The collection process was captured on his body worn camera recording. PC Harvey also testified that the knife that was seized from Mr. Geddes was submitted to FIS so that they could obtain a DNA sample from the knife directly.
Michael McDermott
74Mr. McDermott was the resident of the Unit and had been living there for approximately 10 years at the time. He was a friend of Mr. Bartley, whom he knew as "Bobby." He testified that Mr. Bartley called him "Mikey" or "School As."
75Mr. McDermott testified that on the night of the incident, he was in the Unit with Bobby when a friend he knew as "Ashley" came by. After being shown the video of a man, woman and dog entering the Unit, Mr. McDermott testified that Ashley came into the Unit but the man, whom he did not know, remained in the hallway area of the Unit. Mr. McDermott testified that he did not see what happened because he was in the washroom at the time. When he came out of the washroom, he saw Bobby bleeding.
76Mr. McDermott testified that he did not ask what happened to Bobby to cause him to be bleeding but gave him a cloth to wipe the blood. The video surveillance of the elevator area on the second floor shows Mr. McDermott assisting Mr. Bartley, who has a cloth to his face.
77Mr. McDermott was not cross-examined by the defence. In closing submissions, the Crown argued that Mr. McDermott was not a credible witness.
Tricia Miller
78Tricia Miller, a forensic scientist at the Centre of Forensic Sciences, was tendered as an expert witness. Ms. Miller has been employed by the CFS since 2001 and has attended multiple courses on DNA analysis, among other things. She has been qualified to give expert evidence in approximately 70 cases before the Ontario Court of Justice and the Superior Court of Justice. The defence made no submissions on the voir dire. I ruled that Ms. Miller was qualified to give expert evidence on body fluid identification and forensic DNA analysis and interpretation.
79Ms. Miller testified that blood was detected on the blade of the knife that was submitted to FIS and a DNA profile from one male was generated from the blood. The DNA profile was compared to the DNA profile for Mr. Bartley. Ms. Miller interpreted the results of the DNA profile generated from the blood detected on the knife and the swabs taken from Mr. Bartley and concluded as follows:
The STR DNA results are estimated to be greater than one trillion times more likely if STR Profile 1 originates from Jason BARTLEY than if it originates from an unknown person, unrelated to him.
80Ms. Miller testified that this meant that the DNA results are estimated to be more than one trillion times more likely from the same source than originating from an unknown person.
81On cross-examination, Ms. Miller admitted that in this case, additional testing from different areas of the blade was not done. She explained that it was not indicated by the case history, which reported only one individual bleeding. The questions put to FIS were: (i) whether there was blood on the knife; and (ii) whether a profile could be generated to identify the source of the blood. No additional testing was conducted because there was nothing in the case history that would suggest that additional testing was required.
Other Evidence
82The CCTV video recording of the hallway outside of the Unit shows Mr. Geddes and Ashley arriving at the Unit with a dog. They are at the door for less than a minute when they are let in. They exit the Unit just over two minutes later. When he exists, Mr. Geddes has a face covering. A couple minutes after that, Mr. Bartley emerges from the Unit with a large cloth to his face. Mr. McDermott follows and then helps Mr. Bartley take the elevator.
The Defence Evidence
83Mr. Geddes testified that in February 2022, he was addicted to fentanyl. He admitted that he was in various units at 200 Sherbourne Street on February 2, 2022 because he was looking to buy drugs. He was with Ashley, who he described as a friend and drug user who was popular in the area. He testified that Ashley brought him to an apartment of someone she knew but that he did not. Mr. Geddes testified that they went into the Unit and asked for drugs. Because there were no drugs there, he said they should leave.
84Mr. Geddes testified that he was in the hallway area of the Unit when he heard a "little bit of an argument" between the two guys in the Unit and Ashley, but no screaming or threatening. He testified that he had seen the two men around before and knew them as "Bobby" and "Schools." Mr. Geddes admitted that Mr. Bartley knew him as Billy. Mr. Geddes testified that they were in the Unit for two to three minutes. He denied stabbing or harming anyone in the Unit.
85On cross-examination, the Crown put to Mr. Geddes its theory that he was dealing drugs that night; that he had a gun and knife on him to protect himself; that Ashley was his "runner" finding customers and people who owed him money and helping gain entry into people's apartments, including Mr. McDermott's. Mr. Geddes admitted that he had a "huge" amount of drugs and a gun on him when he was arrested.
86On cross-examination, Mr. Geddes admitted that he was under a weapons prohibition order at the time. When asked why he was carrying a gun in public, Mr. Geddes said that he did not know but, "I guess I was crazy." He testified that there were things in his bag that he did not know were in there because he had just woken up from an overdose.
87Mr. Geddes disagreed that Mr. Bartley's DNA was found on the knife. On re-examination, Mr. Geddes testified that the blood on the knife was his, because he had used it to do drugs and cut his finger when rubbing off the residue. He testified that he used the knife after he saw Mr. Bartley.
88The evidence is that after his arrest, Mr. Geddes was taken to the hospital because he told police he had taken fentanyl. On cross-examination, Mr. Geddes maintained that he had a clear recollection of what happened that night, despite the fact that he later sought assistance from the police for having consumed fentanyl.
Analysis
The Applicable Principles
General Principles
89Before assessing the evidence, it is helpful to set out the applicable legal principles. Mr. Geddes is presumed innocent. The Crown bears the burden of proving the elements of the offence of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not sufficient to prove that the defendant is probably guilty. However, the Crown is not required to prove its case to the point of absolute certainty, which would be impossibly high.
90Where, as here, the Crown's case rests on circumstantial evidence, the question is whether the trier of fact could reasonably be satisfied that the accused's guilt is the only reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence: R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, at para. 55. In Villaroman, at para. 35, the Supreme Court held that "[i]n assessing circumstantial evidence, inferences consistent with innocence do not have to arise from proven facts" because such a requirement wrongly puts an obligation on an accused to prove facts. If reasonable inferences other than guilt are available, the Crown's evidence does not meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
91A gap in the evidence may result in inferences other than guilt. However, "those inferences must be reasonable given the evidence and the absence of evidence, assessed logically, and in light of human experience and common sense": Villaroman, at para. 36.
92Other plausible theories or other reasonable possibilities must be based, not on speculation, but on logic and experience applied to the evidence or the absence of evidence. The line between a plausible theory and speculation is not always easy to draw: "The basic question is whether the circumstantial evidence viewed logically and in light of human experience is reasonably capable of supporting an inference other than that the accused is guilty": Villaroman, at para. 38.
93Similarly, the Court of Appeal held, in R. v. Ali, 2021 ONCA 362, at para. 97, that "[a]n inference of guilt drawn from circumstantial evidence must be rooted in the evidence and must be the only reasonable inference available on the totality of the evidence." In determining whether the Crown has met that burden in a circumstantial evidence case, the jury may apply its logic and common sense to the totality of the evidentiary picture, including gaps in that picture, and consider whether other reasonable possibilities not only exist, but preclude a finding that an inference of guilt is the only reasonable inference available: Ali, at para. 98.
94In weighing the evidence, I must assess the credibility and reliability of the witnesses' evidence. This involves considering the internal consistency of each witness's testimony and its consistency in the context of the evidence as a whole.
95In this case, because Mr. Geddes testified in his defence, this court must follow the approach set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. W.(D.), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, in assessing the evidence. The following analysis applies:
(i) If the court believes the defendant's evidence, he must be found not guilty;
(ii) If the court does not believe the defendant's evidence, but it leaves the court with a reasonable doubt, he must be found not guilty; and
(iii) Even if the defendant's evidence does not leave the court with a reasonable doubt, the court may only find the defendant guilty if the court is persuaded that the Crown proves the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
Aggravated Assault
96Section 268(1) of the Criminal Code provides that "[e]very one commits an aggravated assault who wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers the life of the complainant."
97To prove the offence of aggravated assault, the Crown must prove each of the following essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt:
(a) Mr. Geddes applied force to Mr. Bartley;
(b) Mr. Geddes intentionally applied the force;
(c) Mr. Bartley did not consent to the force that Mr. Geddes applied;
(d) Mr. Geddes knew that Mr. Bartley did not consent to the force applied; and
(e) That the force that Mr. Geddes applied wounded, maimed, disfigured or endangered the life of Mr. Bartley.
98Although it is not necessary to prove that the accused intended to wound, maim, disfigure or endanger the life of the complainant, the Crown must demonstrate that the conduct was at least objectively likely to cause bodily harm.
Findings
99After a careful consideration of the totality of the evidence, I make the following findings.
100It is clear from the video recording of the hallway outside the Unit that morning that the stabbing occurred when Mr. Geddes and Ashley were in the Unit. Mr. Geddes, Ashley and the dog go into the Unit for a couple of minutes and then exit. A few minutes later, Mr. Bartley emerges from the Unit with a cloth to his face and Mr. McDermott following him.
101I have concerns about the reliability and credibility of Mr. Geddes' evidence. I do not accept that he has a clear recollection of the incident. Mr. Geddes testified that he had eight to ten hits of fentanyl earlier that day and that he went to the Sherbourne area because he was seeking more fentanyl. He estimated that it was probably a couple of hours since he last used. He also testified, however, that he had woken up from an overdose and did not know he had a firearm and drugs in his backpack when he headed downtown. He was too weak to put the dog on a leash. It strikes me as inconsistent that Mr. Geddes consumed the amount of fentanyl that he testified to earlier that day, woke from an overdose weak and unaware of what was in his backpack, and yet has a clear recollection of what occurred that night.
102As a result, I do not accept Mr. Geddes' evidence that he went to the Unit looking for drugs and that he remained in the hallway area of the Unit while Ashley spoke with Mr. Bartley. Moreover, Mr. Geddes' evidence that he remained in the hallway is inconsistent with Mr. Bartley's evidence that Billy and Ashley stood in front of him as he was sitting. On this point, I accept Mr. Bartley's evidence. Mr. Bartley was not a candid witness. He avoided giving any evidence that would incriminate Mr. Geddes and went out of his way to say that he still sees him as a "good kid." In my view, Mr. Bartley testified that both Billy and Ashley stood in front of him and asked him about money he owed because he had no reason to believe that this would be incriminating.
103I reject Mr. McDermott's evidence that Mr. Geddes remained in the hallway of the Unit. Mr. McDermott was not a credible witness. He was cagey and evasive. Mr. McDermott tried as much as he could to remove himself from the situation and provide as little information as possible. He remembered very few details. At first, Mr. McDermott testified that he did not recall anyone else being in the Unit other than Mr. Bartley, Ashley and himself. He then testified that there was someone else there, but did not recall if it was a man or a woman. Only upon being shown the video surveillance from the hallway outside the Unit did he admit that there was another man there. Mr. McDermott also speculated unreasonably that Mr. Bartley was bleeding because of a "bump" or fall. Finally, while Mr. Geddes testified that he knew the two men as Bobby and Schools, Mr. McDermott testified that he did not know Mr. Geddes.
104In any event, Mr. McDermott testified that he was in the washroom when the stabbing occurred. If he was in the washroom, Mr. Geddes could have moved from the hallway to the living room without Mr. McDermott observing him.
105I accept the Crown theory, which the defence did not dispute, that Mr. Geddes was a drug dealer. In my view, Mr. Geddes went to the area of 200 Sherbourne Street to sell drugs and collect money. When Mr. Geddes was arrested, he had 100.75 grams of powder cocaine and 35.73 grams of Crack cocaine in his backpack. Of that amount, certain smaller portions were wrapped in torn plastic bags. He also had a folding knife, a loaded 9 mm handgun with 11 rounds loaded in an 18 round capacity magazine with a bullet in the chamber and a large dog that could also be used to intimidate. He had the knife, gun and dog for protection. Moreover, it is not logical that Mr. Geddes went to the Unit to look for drugs when he had a large quantity of cocaine and crack in his backpack.
106In addition, Ashley was assisting Mr. Geddes that day. He described her as a drug user who was popular in the area. Mr. Geddes admitted on cross-examination that he was able to gain entry into the Unit because of Ashley.
107There were other aspects of Mr. Geddes' evidence that I found not to be credible and that were blatant attempts to undercut the evidence against him.
108As noted earlier, DNA from the blood found on the knife found in Mr. Geddes' possession was, in essence, found to be a match for the DNA sample taken form Mr. Bartley. In cross-examination, Mr. Geddes cited the language of the Biology Report that "Jason Bartley (item 1-1) cannot be excluded as the source of a male DNA profile… from blood on the blade (item 2-1) of a folding knife from the backpack of the accused" to argue that the report did not conclude that the DNA on the knife matched the sample taken from Mr. Bartley, only that he could not be excluded.
109Moreover, Mr. Geddes' testimony that he used the knife and cut his finger after seeing Mr. Bartley does not undermine the Biology Report or Ms. Miller's evidence. The fact that the knife was not tested for a second source of blood is of no consequence. That is because, even if Mr. Geddes' blood was also on the knife, this would not negate that the blood that was found and tested matched the DNA profile for Mr. Bartley. It would not explain how blood matching Mr. Bartley's DNA profile was found on Mr. Geddes' knife.
110Finally, Mr. Geddes also testified in chief that when he and Ashley were in the Unit, he heard a little argument, but in cross-examination he testified that he did not hear anything when the stabbing took place. Given the nature of the injury to Mr. Bartley and that the stabbing took place when Mr. Geddes and Ashley were in the Unit, it is unlikely that Mr. Geddes would not have heard anything, whether a movement, cry or other exclamation, when the stabbing took place.
111Applying the W.(D.) analysis, I do not believe Mr. Geddes' evidence, nor does his evidence leave me with a reasonable doubt. Despite the foregoing, I may only find Mr. Geddes guilty if I am satisfied that the Crown has proven the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. In my view, guilt is the only reasonable inference.
112While Mr. Bartley testified that he did not know how he was cut or who did it, he clearly testified that both Ashley and Mr. Geddes were standing in front of him when it occurred. Mr. Bartley was not challenged as to Mr. Geddes' location on cross-examination. He testified that they said he owed money, which he denied. It was then that he was stabbed. Mr. Bartley's evidence that the person who stabbed him was standing while he was sitting is corroborated by the location of the injury on his forehead above his eye. Although Mr. Bartley testified that Ashley was standing closer to him when he was stabbed, this does not mean that she, and not Mr. Geddes, stabbed him. It does not mean that Mr. Geddes could not have stabbed Mr. Bartley.
113I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that when Mr. Bartley denied owing money that Mr. Geddes said he owed, Mr. Geddes used the knife that he had in his possession to stab him across the face.
114I recognize that reasonable alternative inferences to guilt need not be based on proven facts; they need only be plausible based on logic and experience: Villaroman, at paras. 35-37. In my view, it would nonetheless be speculative to infer that Ashley stabbed Mr. Bartley.
115There is no evidence to suggest that anyone other than Mr. Geddes had possession of the knife that night. While Mr. Geddes testified to using the knife to do drugs, he did not testify that he ever gave the knife to Ashley. There is no evidence to suggest that Ashley ever had possession of the knife. It would not be reasonable to infer that Ashley used a knife that was in Mr. Geddes' possession to stab Mr. Bartley.
116In addition, the defence did not take issue with an inference that Mr. Geddes was a drug dealer. The defence did not suggest at any point that it was Ashley who was the drug dealer, in fact, Mr. Geddes identified her as a drug user. As a result, given that the discussion that preceded the stabbing was about money that Mr. Bartley owed, there would be no apparent motive for Ashley to stab him.
117The Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Geddes intentionally applied force to Mr. Bartley, that Mr. Bartley did not consent to the force that Mr. Geddes applied and that Mr. Geddes knew that Mr. Bartley did not consent. Given the nature of the injury to Mr. Bartley, which required a significant number of stitches and resulted in a permanent scar, I find that the force wounded or maimed Mr. Bartley. In my view, using a knife to stab someone in the eye area was objectively likely to cause bodily harm.
Conclusion on the Trial
118Accordingly, Mr. Geddes is found guilty of Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 on the indictment.
Nishikawa J.
Released: October 3, 2025
Footnotes
1In the absence of a name, the officer will be referred to as "Officer Milasovich."
2The statement regarding the officer is hearsay and cannot be relied on or the truth of its contents. No evidence was provided to confirm or dispute that the officer remained employed at the TSDC.
3In respect of federal penitentiaries, see s. 46 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-620 under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20.