Louis P. Strezos

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Crown agreed the sentence should be reduced by 11 days for time served.

The Court of Appeal noted the trial judge failed to consider the appellant's positive steps toward rehabilitation.

Leave to appeal was granted, and the sentence was varied from six months consecutive to six months concurrent, with an 11-day reduction for time served.

The appellant appealed her sentence for a serious breach of trust.

She had no prior criminal record, had serious health issues, and made full restitution.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge failed to give proper consideration to the principle of restraint under s. 718.2(c) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served followed by six months of probation.

At the opening of a judicial review hearing, the applicant moved for leave to adduce fresh evidence and subsequently sought an adjournment to bring the new evidence before the Information and Privacy Commissioner for reconsideration.

The respondents did not oppose the adjournment.

The Divisional Court vacated a prior order to permit the motion and granted the adjournment.

The appellant appealed convictions for two sexual assaults arising from a former intimate relationship and sought to replace concurrent custodial sentences with conditional sentences.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, did not materially misapprehend the complainant's evidence, and did not subject the appellant's testimony to uneven scrutiny.

On sentence, the court held that the second assault properly engaged a trust-based aggravating consideration within the parties' prior intimate relationship and that the sentences imposed were not demonstrably unfit.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that an error in the warrant of committal overstated his sentence by five months, preventing him from seeking early parole as intended by the sentencing judge.

The Crown conceded the error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and accepted a joint submission to reduce the custodial portion of the sentence to time served.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision regarding a Legal Aid Plan policy that restricted an accused's choice of counsel to major centres.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that the issue was moot between the parties and not evasive of review.

The court noted that the motion judge's decision was based on the unique circumstances of the case and did not open the floodgates for accused persons to choose counsel outside their trial centres.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of robbery and disguise with intent relating to four bank robberies.

At trial, the judge applied similar act principles to use evidence from all counts to determine the identity of the perpetrator on each individual count.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding the acts sufficiently similar and in using linkage evidence to determine similarity.

The appellant also argued the offences were theft, not robbery, as there were no express threats of violence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the acts were sufficiently similar and that a threat of violence was implied from the circumstances of demanding money from a bank teller.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of stolen prohibited weapons and his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred by stating he was 'deemed' to have knowledge the weapons were stolen under the doctrine of recent possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge understood the inference was permissive despite using the word 'deemed'.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The trial judge erred by imposing a longer sentence on the appellant than his co-accused while purporting to apply the parity principle.

The sentence was reduced from two years to 18 months.

The respondent was convicted of sexual assault against a child and received a conditional sentence.

The trial judge refused the Crown's request for a DNA databank order and a sex offender registry order, reasoning that the respondent did not present an ongoing risk to the community.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply the 'grossly disproportionate' test required by the Criminal Code and by minimizing the public interest in registration.

The Court set aside the trial judge's refusal and made the requested orders.

The appellant, a member of the Aroland First Nation (Treaty 9), was charged with hunting moose without a licence in Treaty 3 territory.

He argued he had a constitutionally protected right to hunt there because he was married to a member of the Lac Seul First Nation (Treaty 3) and had been accepted into that community.

The justice of the peace acquitted him, but the appeal judge entered a conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, finding that the appellant was entitled to shelter under Treaty 3 rights as he was hunting in accordance with Ojibway custom and had been accepted by the Treaty 3 community to share in their harvest.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon and his sentence of 60 days intermittent and 18 months probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate and no error in the burden of proof.

However, due to a 21-month delay at the summary conviction appeal stage, the appellant's completion of probation and anger management, and changed circumstances, the court modified the sentence to time served.

The appellants were convicted of fraud over $5,000 and public mischief in relation to a scheme to defraud an insurer by falsely reporting a truck as stolen.

A co-accused was acquitted.

The appellants appealed, arguing the jury's verdicts were inconsistent and their convictions unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence against the appellants was much stronger than against the acquitted co-accused, and the convictions were reasonable based on the evidence.

The young person appealed from a finding of guilt for sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on a prior consistent statement (a handwritten letter) made by the complainant to bolster her credibility.

The court held that the letter was introduced only to explain how the allegations came to be reported, and its use to enhance credibility was an error.

The appeal was allowed, the finding of guilt was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their certiorari application regarding the validity of search warrants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in denying standing to one appellant and in dealing with the other appellant's application prematurely.

The Court held that the proper forum to determine the issues was the Provincial Court under sections 111 and 117 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, harassment, and threatening his wife.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.D. test, assessing credibility due to interpreter issues, and failing to address inconsistencies and good character evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and demonstrated no error in assessing credibility or applying the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement and sexual assault, as well as his sentence.

He argued the unlawful confinement verdict was inconsistent with a co-accused's acquittal and unreasonable, and maintained his innocence regarding the sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts were supported by the evidence and the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed her sentence of 23 months in jail and a restitution order of $7,781.29 for driving-related offences and breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the custodial sentence, noting the appellant's horrendous record of drinking and driving offences and lifetime driving bans.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part by deleting the restitution order, as the trial judge failed to consider the appellant's ability to pay.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three bank robberies, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on contaminated eyewitness identification evidence and improperly admitting out-of-court statements for the truth of their contents.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge failed to consider the impact of flawed police photo line-up procedures and improperly accepted a witness's out-of-court statement without applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the discretion exercised by the sentencing judge.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The respondent challenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code DNA warrant provisions authorizing seizure of bodily substances for forensic analysis.

The Court of Appeal held that the challenge was properly resolved under s. 8 of the Charter, and that if the regime satisfied s. 8 scrutiny it could not be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 on the self-incrimination theory advanced.

The court found the statutory scheme contained substantial judicial and privacy safeguards, upheld the ex parte warrant structure, and rejected the lower court's attempt to read in a notice requirement.

Fresh evidence concerning updated DNA technology undermined the basis for striking down the hair-sample provision, which was reinstated.

The cross-appeal was dismissed and the declaratory application was dismissed.