WARNING
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT
AND IS SUBJECT TO:
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act…
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person…
(1) Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published), 118(1) (no access to records unless authorized) or 128(3) (disposal of R.C.M.P. records) or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) of this Act, or subsection 38(1) (identity not to be published), (1.12) (no subsequent disclosure), (1.14) (no subsequent disclosure by school) or (1.15) (information to be kept separate), 45(2) (destruction of records) or 46(1) (prohibition against disclosure) of the Young Offenders Act, chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
DATE: 20050914
DOCKET: C41649
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
RE:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN (Respondent) – and – J.K. (A Young Offender)
BEFORE:
GOUDGE, SIMMONS AND ARMSTRONG JJ.A.
COUNSEL:
Louis P. Strezos
for the appellant
Deborah Krick
for the respondent
HEARD:
August 10, 2005
On appeal from the conviction by Justice Douglas Maund of the Ontario Court of Justice dated February 5, 2004 and from the sentence imposed on March 29, 2004.
E N D O R S E M E N T
[1] The appellant appeals from a finding of guilt for sexual assault and from the sentence imposed of five months deferred custody and supervision plus twelve months probation.
[2] We accept the appellant’s submission that the trial judge erred by relying on a prior consistent statement made by the complainant to bolster her credibility.
[3] Near the outset of his reasons, the trial judge said:
The incident described by [the complainant] in these accounts was consistent with the evidence that she gave at trial and she emerged from her cross-examination with the essential elements of the story intact.
[4] The “accounts” to which the trial judge was referring were a handwritten letter prepared by the complainant on the day of the alleged assault and a videotaped statement made by the complainant to the police two days after the alleged assault, which was introduced as evidence at trial pursuant to s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.
[5] Read fairly, the trial judge’s comment as set out above was more than simply a narrative statement explaining the evidence that was adduced at trial; rather, it reflects the trial judge’s conclusion that the consistency between the complainant’s evidence at trial and the accounts in issue enhanced the complainant’s credibility.
[6] The complainant’s letter was introduced at trial to assist in explaining how the complainant’s allegations came to be reported. At the time of tendering the letter as an exhibit, the trial Crown confirmed that he was not asking that it be accepted for the truth of its contents and, on that basis, defence counsel indicated that he was content that the letter be entered as an exhibit. Neither counsel referred to the contents of the letter during the course of the trial.
[7] Viewed in this context, unless he was treating it as a factor enhancing the complainant’s credibility, there was no other reason for the trial judge to refer to the contents of the complainant’s letter and to its consistency with the complainant’s evidence at trial.
[8] It is well established that, subject to certain limited exceptions, evidence of prior consistent statements is superfluous and of no probative value: see, for example, R. v. Wood (1989), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 201 (Ont. C.A.). Here, apart from assisting in explaining how disclosure occurred, none of the exceptions apply. Accordingly, the trial judge’s use of the complainant’s letter as a prior consistent statement to bolster the complainant’s credibility was an error.
[9] We are not persuaded that this is a case in which it would be appropriate to apply the curative proviso. While it is true that, subsequently in his reasons, when he listed various factors supporting the complainant’s credibility the trial judge did not refer to the consistency of the complainant’s accounts, we cannot be satisfied that the consistency between the complainant’s letter and her trial evidence was an inconsequential consideration in the trial judge’s credibility assessment.
[10] Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the finding of guilt is set aside and a new trial is ordered. In light of the conclusion that we have reached on this ground of appeal, it is unnecessary that we deal with the other issues that were raised.
“S.T. Goudge J.A.”
“Janet Simmons J.A.”
“Robert P. Armstrong J.A.”