Christopher Paul Presswood

The defendant was charged with impaired driving (over 80).

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results taken more than two hours after driving to establish the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving.

The court found that the police breached the defendant's Charter rights by failing to comply with the "as soon as practicable" requirement under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was arrested at 3:57 a.m., the breath demand was made at 3:59 a.m., but the breath samples were not taken until 6:14 a.m. and 6:31 a.m., resulting in a 90-minute unexplained delay.

The court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault and the resulting sentence imposed after a domestic altercation in which the complainant alleged that the appellant choked her during an argument.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the test in R. v. W.(D.), misapprehended inconsistencies in the evidence, improperly rejected the defence of de minimis non curat lex, demonstrated bias during trial, and erred by imposing restitution.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, reasonably assessed credibility, and correctly rejected the de minimis defence given the seriousness of choking during a domestic dispute.

Allegations of judicial bias were rejected as unfounded.

While the custodial sentence and probation were upheld, the stand‑alone restitution order was set aside as unnecessary because restitution had already been imposed as a probation condition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused applied to exclude the results of a breath analysis on Charter grounds.

The court found violations of section 10(b) of the Charter in two respects: (1) the arresting officer failed to advise the accused of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest, instead delaying seven minutes to conduct other investigative steps; and (2) the breath technician failed to provide the accused with a second opportunity to consult counsel after the accused expressed mistrust of the duty counsel he had consulted.

The court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing systemic problems within the Peel Regional Police regarding compliance with the immediacy requirement of section 10(b).

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, operation while impaired by alcohol, and operation with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg/100 mL.

The trial involved a Charter application regarding the seizure of blood samples obtained for medical purposes.

The court found that continuity of the blood samples was established and that no Charter breach occurred.

However, the court determined that the Crown failed to prove the "no bolus drinking" assumption underlying the toxicologist's read-back opinions, rendering those opinions inadmissible.

The accused was acquitted of the impaired and over-80 charges but convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm based on evidence of excessive speeding on a residential street, loss of control, and collision with a tree.

A ruling on the voluntariness of a statement made by an accused charged with sexual offences against a child.

The accused was interviewed by police for approximately three hours following his arrest.

The Crown sought to admit the entire statement at trial, while the defence argued that portions of the statement were involuntary due to police inducements and the use of coercive interrogation techniques.

The court found that the initial portion of the statement was voluntary but excluded statements made after the police officer presented the accused with a stark choice between admitting to a one-time mistake or being investigated as a serial predator, which constituted a quid pro quo inducement that overbore the accused's will.

On a summary conviction appeal from an excess blood alcohol conviction, the appellant argued that police breached s. 10(a) of the Charter by failing to promptly advise him of the reason for detention, and that the breath tests were not taken as soon as practicable under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the ASD demand, read within minutes of the stop, adequately informed the appellant of the true grounds for his detention and therefore satisfied the informational requirement of s. 10(a).

The court also held that a 12-minute additional delay between the first and second breath tests, caused by the breath technician performing another breath test in a separate investigation, was reasonable in the circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought a motion to stay proceedings on the basis that his right under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, impaired operation causing bodily harm, and operation with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood, all straight indictable offences.

The overall delay from the laying of charges to the scheduled trial completion was approximately 31 months.

The first trial date was adjourned due to late disclosure of a critical expert toxicology report.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while there was some actual prejudice, the institutional and Crown delay did not rise to the level of a Charter violation when considered holistically against the complexity of the case, the conduct of the defence, and society's interest in a trial on the merits.

A youth was charged with invitation to sexual touching contrary to s. 152 of the Criminal Code and committing an indecent act by exposing his genital organs to a person under the age of 16 years contrary to s. 173(2) of the Criminal Code.

The allegations arose from incidents that occurred when the complainant was between two and five years old while attending an unlicensed daycare operated by the accused's mother.

The complainant did not disclose the incidents until Grade 5, when prompted by a classroom discussion about inappropriate sexual touching.

The trial judge found the complainant's testimony credible and reliable, and rejected the accused's denials as marked by inconsistencies and implausibilities.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

He was found in the early morning hours sitting in a car on the side of the road with all four tires flat, waiting for his father to pick him up.

The Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on observations of slurred speech, disorientation, bloodshot eyes, odour of alcohol, and breath test results exceeding the legal limit.

However, the court found that the presumption of care and control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code was rebutted because the vehicle was inoperable and could not be driven.

The Crown failed to establish de facto care and control by proving a realistic risk of danger, as the vehicle was in a well-lit area, the road was not busy, and the vehicle's lights were on.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained through an approved screening device (ASD) at the roadside and subsequent Intoxilyzer testing at the police station.

The defence challenged the validity of the ASD demand on section 8 Charter grounds, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, and also challenged whether the breath tests were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c).

The court found the officer had formed the requisite reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances and that the police acted reasonably in all circumstances, including the delay occasioned by the accused's exercise of his right to counsel.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was stopped by police as he exited a licensed establishment that appeared on the Peel Police Last Drink Programme statistics.

The accused challenged the stop as an arbitrary detention violating section 9 of the Charter and challenged the video surveillance of his consultation with counsel as violating section 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found no Charter violations and convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with three counts of possession of stolen property after purchasing a dump trailer, a cargo trailer, and a skid steer from an individual known only as 'Chico'.

The accused claimed he did not know the items were stolen and believed he was getting a good deal from a man hiding assets during a divorce.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding him unreliable and noting numerous 'red flags' such as unreasonably low prices, missing VIN plates, and the accused's fraudulent registration of the trailers as home-made.

The court concluded the accused was willfully blind to the origins of the property and found him guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with three counts of possession of stolen property after purchasing a dump trailer, cargo trailer, and Bobcat skid steer from an individual known only as "Chico" between November 2011 and January 2012.

The accused admitted possession of all three items but pleaded not guilty, claiming he did not know they were stolen.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was willfully blind to the stolen nature of the property, having ignored numerous red flags including purchasing valuable commercial equipment without ownership documentation, at unreasonably low prices, from an unknown seller, and fraudulently registering the trailers as home-made vehicles.

The court found the accused guilty on all three counts.