CITATION: R. v. Vata, 2026 ONSC 4582
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Jannat Gardezi, for the Crown
- and -
NUEL VATA
Aswani K. Datt, for Mr. Vata
HEARD: August 4, 2026
REASONS FOR DECISION
STRIBOPOULOS J.
Introduction
[1] Mr. Vata is charged with two counts of dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death. The charges relate to the deaths of Simon Dreshaj and Klis Dreshaj, who were the occupants of a car involved in a collision at an intersection in Mississauga shortly before 10:00 p.m. on April 4, 2024.
[2] Mr. Vata applies under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude a two-minute statement he provided to Cst. Cassidy Thurston, one of the first police officers to arrive at the scene after the collision. The statement was recorded on the officer’s body-worn camera. Mr. Vata submits that, when he made the statement, he was “detained” and that the officer breached his s. 10(b) Charter right by failing to inform him of his right to retain and instruct counsel. The Crown opposes the application. It maintains that Mr. Vata was not “detained” at any point after the police arrived at the scene of the collision, including when he made the statement at issue.
[3] The Charter application was heard as part of a blended voir dire at the outset of Mr. Vata’s trial, together with the Crown’s voluntariness application. During submissions, defence counsel essentially conceded that nothing about the circumstances in which the statement was made called into question its voluntariness. I agree.
[4] At the time, viewed objectively, Mr. Vata was not a suspect. It is therefore unsurprising that Cst. Thurston did not administer the common law caution. In the circumstances, she was not required to do so: see R. v. Tessier, 2022 SCC 35, [2022] 2 S.C.R. 660, at paras. 36–38, 54, and 89. Nor was there anything about the circumstances that would call into question the voluntariness of Mr. Vata's statement. In short, there were no threats or promises, nothing oppressive about the circumstances, and no police trickery in obtaining the statement: see R. v. Beaver, 2022 SCC 54, [2022] 3 S.C.R. 718, at para. 48; R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 12; and R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 47–71. Accordingly, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Vata's statement was voluntary.
[5] The admissibility of Mr. Vata’s statement to Cst. Thurston therefore turns solely on the outcome of his Charter application, which raises two issues: first, whether he was “detained” when he made the statement; and second, if so, whether the statement should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter because it was obtained in breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right.
[6] After summarizing the relevant evidence, I set out the governing principles before applying them to the facts as I have found them.
I. The Evidence
[7] Mr. Vata did not call any evidence on the application. At the blended voir dire, however, the Crown called Constables Bostock and Thurston, the first and second police officers to arrive at the scene shortly after the collision.
[8] Each officer wore a body-worn camera, and footage from their cameras was played during the hearing and entered as exhibits. That footage effectively placed the court in the position of an eyewitness to the relevant events, albeit one with the benefit of perfect recall. It provides the best evidence of what transpired between the police and Mr. Vata.
[9] Constable Bostock was the first emergency responder to arrive at the scene, at approximately 9:55 p.m. She immediately approached a white Audi that appeared to be wrapped around a utility pole, with two unconscious and seriously injured occupants inside. The scene was both gruesome and chaotic.
[10] Traffic continued to move through the area, and bystanders had begun to gather nearby. Constable Bostock’s initial focus was on the two unconscious men in the Audi, Simon Dreshaj and Klis Dreshaj, and on apprising her dispatcher of their condition. Several people were milling about the vehicle when she arrived, including, unbeknownst to her at that point, the driver’s twin brother, Josifi Dreshaj. Josifi was in the company of Mr. Vata. Constable Bostock later learned that the front-seat passenger, Klis Dreshaj, was Josifi’s cousin.
[11] Josifi asked whether the occupants should be removed from the vehicle, and Cst. Bostock explained why that was not advisable. When she asked the two men whether they had been in any of the vehicles involved in the collision, Mr. Vata pointed to his vehicle farther up the road. Josifi initially remained beside Cst. Bostock near the open passenger door of the white Audi. His hands were covered in blood. Constable Bostock asked him what had happened and how he was related to the occupants of the vehicle.
[12] Constable Bostock was soon joined by Cst. Thurston. She arrived at approximately 9:56 p.m., together with the first paramedics. Constable Bostock directed Josifi and Mr. Vata away from the vehicle so that the paramedics could attend to its occupants. She told Cst. Thurston that the two men were related to the occupants of the white Audi. Constable Bostock asked them to speak with Cst. Thurston and assured them that the paramedics would do their best.
[13] Constable Thurston then began speaking with Josifi and Mr. Vata. She asked whether they had been involved in the collision, whether they were okay, and what had happened. After confirming that neither man was injured, she began obtaining the particulars of those involved, including their names, dates of birth, addresses, and telephone numbers. Understandably, Josifi was concerned about the well-being of his brother and cousin, and Cst. Thurston repeatedly had to redirect his attention away from the white Audi. Josifi became increasingly distressed after a paramedic advised that the driver—his brother—had no vital signs.
[14] A more senior officer arrived at the scene within a few minutes. When advised by Cst. Bostock that Josifi and Mr. Vata had been involved in the collision and were witnesses, he directed that they be separated from the immediate scene. Constable Bostock returned to where the two men were standing near Cst. Thurston and told them, “I need you over here,” once again directing them away from the white Audi.
[15] Constable Bostock then questioned Josifi about the collision, including who had occupied each vehicle, where the vehicles had been positioned, and the circumstances leading up to the collision. Constable Thurston remained with Cst. Bostock as the two officers attempted to piece together what had occurred. Mr. Vata stood nearby throughout the exchange and periodically interjected to provide additional information.
[16] Constable Bostock asked Mr. Vata for his identification. His hands were covered in blood, so, with his agreement, she removed his wallet from his pocket, took out his driver's licence, recorded his particulars, and then returned the licence to the wallet and the wallet to his pocket. Mr. Vata then walked on his own northbound along Dixie Road toward his vehicle.
[17] Constable Thurston and Josifi followed, eventually catching up with Mr. Vata near his vehicle. His green Audi had come to rest in the middle lane. Constable Thurston radioed her dispatcher with its licence plate number. As they stood near the vehicle, traffic continued to pass in the curb lane.
[18] Josifi then attempted to walk back toward the white Audi. Constable Thurston called him back, saying, “I need to talk to you about the accident.” Josifi returned, and she added, “You’ve got to talk to me about the accident.” Constable Thurston testified that, given the condition of the occupants of the white Audi, she was attempting, in part, to distract Josifi and Mr. Vata and keep them away from the vehicle. She then questioned them about how the collision had occurred. Each responded to her questions and, at times, supplemented the other's answers to assist her in understanding what had happened.
[19] Josifi again began walking back toward the white Audi, telling Cst. Thurston that he wanted to know whether his brother was alive. Mr. Vata initially remained beside his vehicle while Cst. Thurston appeared to survey the damage to it. He then began walking along the roadway toward the white Audi, and Cst. Thurston followed him. Mr. Vata turned to face her, and she said:
Okay, if you just want to stay off the roadway, you’re going to have to be here for a little bit. Actually, what I am going to do is I am going to take a statement with you. So, let’s stand right over here, and I am just going to take a statement from you. Okay?
[20] Constable Thurston then directed Mr. Vata onto the boulevard adjacent to the roadway so that they could speak safely away from traffic. The time was 10:07 p.m. Once there, she told him:
So, obviously with incidents like this we have to interview everybody on scene. I understand that you have already told me what happened, but I am going to get an interview, just especially due to the injuries. Okay? So, what I am going to do is I am going to explain who I am, why I am here, that I am conducting an interview with you; you are the driver, correct?
[21] Mr. Vata confirmed that he was the driver. Josifi had by then returned and was standing beside him. Constable Thurston continued, saying:
And then you just explain to me what happened. Try to give me as much detail. Where you were coming from. What lane you were driving in, so on and so forth, okay?
[22] Josifi interjected, “In the middle lane.” Constable Thurston responded, “I am just going to get him to explain the story,” and asked Josifi “to just give me one sec.” Josifi then stepped away and appeared to be on his phone. Constable Thurston asked Mr. Vata to step back a short distance, apparently so that he would be clearly captured on her body-worn camera. He did so.
[23] Constable Thurston then identified herself, the date, time, and location, and asked Mr. Vata to identify himself. Once he had done so, she invited him to “explain what happened.” He proceeded to do so. Constable Thurston asked a few follow-up questions, including where they had been coming from. She summarized her understanding of his account of the collision, and Mr. Vata confirmed that her summary was accurate. She also asked whether he had been injured, to which he replied that he had not. While Mr. Vata was giving his statement, Josifi returned and stood beside him. The statement was brief, lasting less than two minutes.
[24] When the statement concluded, Cst. Thurston said, “Okay, that’s good, I appreciate that, thank you.” She asked Mr. Vata to keep Josifi comfortable while she obtained an update on his brother’s condition. She then left the two men on the boulevard and returned to the area of the white Audi, where she spoke with other emergency services personnel.
[25] Constable Thurston returned to Mr. Vata and Josifi a short time later and advised that she would update them as soon as she could. She also told them they could go and sit somewhere warm if they were cold.
II. The Governing Principles
[26] Section 10 of the Charter guarantees certain fundamental rights to every person on “arrest or detention.” That includes, under s. 10(b), the right “to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right.”
[27] The Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted “detention” purposively. It has recognized that the rights guaranteed on detention by s. 10 aim to redress “the imbalance of power between the state and the person under its control” to ensure that the individual “retains an informed and effective choice whether to speak to state authorities, consistent with the overarching principle against self-incrimination”: R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at para. 22 (italics in original); see also R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310, at para. 25; R. v. Evans, 1991 CanLII 98 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869, at pp. 886–87.
[28] To help achieve the purpose of these guarantees, the Supreme Court has defined “detention” generously as encompassing situations in which an individual has been “taken into the effective control of the state authorities”: Grant, at para. 22. More specifically, detention arises where a person is subject to compulsory restraint that deprives them of the choice to walk away: see Grant, at paras. 25, and 39. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence recognizes that detention may arise through either physical or psychological compulsion.
[29] A detention results when the police physically take control of a person: see R. v. Therens, 1985 CanLII 29 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at p. 642; R. v. Thomsen, 1988 CanLII 73 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at pp. 648–49; Grant, at para. 25. Examples include where the police take hold of a person, place them in handcuffs, or confine them in a police vehicle. Beyond physical restraint, the cases also recognize that a detention can occur through two different forms of psychological compulsion.
[30] First, a detention results when an individual complies with a police officer’s demand or direction while under a legal obligation to do so: see Grant, at para. 30; R. v. Le, 2019 SCC 34, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 692, at para. 25. The most common example is where a motorist stops their vehicle at a police officer’s direction, as required by provincial traffic legislation: see R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, 2005 SCC 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 31.
[31] Second, a detention results when an individual complies with a police officer’s demand or direction, despite being under no legal obligation to do so, if a reasonable person in all the same circumstances would conclude that they were not free to go: see Grant, at paras. 30–31; Le, at para. 25. The Supreme Court in Grant, at para. 44, supplied a non-exhaustive list of factors for courts to consider when deciding whether a person was subject to this second form of psychological detention, including the following:
(a) The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as they would reasonably be perceived by the individual: whether the police were providing general assistance; maintaining general order; making general inquiries regarding a particular occurrence; or singling out the individual for focussed investigation.
(b) The nature of the police conduct, including the language used; the use of physical contact; the place where the interaction occurred; the presence of others; and the duration of the encounter.
(c) The particular characteristics or circumstances of the individual, where relevant, including age; physical stature; minority status; level of sophistication.
[32] The analysis focuses on the state’s conduct—what the police did and said—and on how a reasonable person in the same circumstances would understand the effect of that conduct: see Grant, at para. 31; Le, at para. 27. The objective nature of the inquiry means that a police officer’s subjective intentions are not determinative: see Grant, at para. 32.
[33] Recognizing that it may sometimes prove difficult for police to assess the potentially coercive impact of their words and actions on a person with whom they are interacting, the Supreme Court observed in Grant that it is always open to the police “to inform the subject in unambiguous terms that he or she is under no obligation to answer questions and is free to go”: Grant, at para. 32.
[34] Having outlined the governing principles, I turn to apply them to the evidence adduced on the application.
III. The Principles Applied
[35] On this record, there is no question that Mr. Vata was never physically detained. Constable Thurston never touched him. She did not handcuff him or place him in a police vehicle, nor did she otherwise physically impede his freedom of movement. The sole issue is whether Mr. Vata was subject to a psychological detention when he gave his statement. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that he was not.
[36] First, there are the circumstances giving rise to the interview. At the time, Cst. Thurston had no basis to suspect that Mr. Vata had committed an offence. The information available to her was that Mr. Vata had proceeded through the intersection on a green light and that the collision had been caused by a left-turning driver who first collided with the white Audi and then with Mr. Vata's vehicle. She was simply attempting to obtain Mr. Vata's account of the collision while it remained fresh in his mind. Everything she said to Mr. Vata leading up to his statement would have left a reasonable person in his position with the clear impression that he was being interviewed as a witness, not as a suspect. Nothing about the circumstances would have suggested that Mr. Vata was being singled out for focussed investigation.
[37] Second, there was nothing coercive about Constable Thurston’s conduct toward Mr. Vata. She asked open-ended questions. At no point did she challenge his account of the collision or accuse him of wrongdoing. The interview took place at the side of the road, with Josifi present for part of it. The statement itself was brief, lasting less than two minutes. Once it concluded, Cst. Thurston thanked Mr. Vata for his cooperation. Far from restricting his freedom of movement, she suggested that he and Josifi go and wait somewhere warm if they were cold. Viewed objectively, nothing about Cst. Thurston’s conduct would have left a reasonable person in Mr. Vata’s position with the impression that they were under police detention.
[38] Finally, I have considered Mr. Vata's personal characteristics, insofar as they are known on this record. Those include the fact that he was 25 years old at the time and that English is not his first language. I am not persuaded that a reasonable person in Mr. Vata's position, sharing those characteristics, would have perceived the encounter any differently.
[39] Ultimately, considering all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that Mr. Vata was detained when he made his statement to Cst. Thurston.
[40] That conclusion is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in Grant. In its decision, the Court recognized that police responding to the scene of an accident may question those present to determine what occurred without thereby effecting a detention: see Grant, at para. 37. The Court continued, at para. 38:
In the context of investigating an accident or a crime, the police, unbeknownst to them at that point in time, may find themselves asking questions of a person who is implicated in the occurrence and, consequently, is at risk of self-incrimination. This does not preclude the police from continuing to question the person in the pursuit of their investigation. Section 9 of the Charter does not require that police abstain from interacting with members of the public until they have specific grounds to connect the individual to the commission of a crime. Nor does s. 10 require that the police advise everyone at the outset of any encounter that they have no obligation to speak to them and are entitled to legal counsel.
As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in LaFrance: “not every encounter between state and citizen effects a detention … no detention is effected, and therefore s. 10(b) rights are not breached, where an individual voluntarily assists the police by, for example, freely agreeing to provide a statement”: R. v. Lafrance, 2022 SCC 32, [2022] 2 S.C.R. 393, at para. 21.
[41] Those observations are directly applicable to the circumstances of Mr. Vata's application. He was interviewed as a witness, not a suspect, in the aftermath of a serious motor vehicle collision. At the time, the police were understandably attempting to determine what had occurred. As the driver of one of the vehicles involved, memorializing his account shortly after the collision was entirely appropriate. Viewed in that context, no reasonable person in the same circumstances would have concluded that they were under police detention.
[42] For these reasons, I conclude that Mr. Vata was not detained when he spoke to Cst. Thurston. It follows that she did not breach Mr. Vata’s s. 10(b) Charter right by failing to advise him of his right to counsel before taking his statement.
Conclusion
[43] Mr. Vata’s statement to Cst. Thurston was voluntary and was not obtained in breach of his Charter rights. It is therefore admissible.
Signed: “Stribopoulos J.”
Released: August 10, 2026
CITATION: R. v. Vata, 2026 ONSC 4582
COURT FILE NO.: CRIM J(P) 651/25
DATE: 2026 08 10
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
- and –
NUEL VATA
REASONS FOR DECISION
Stribopoulos J.
Released: August 10, 2026