Agata Tasson

The accused was charged with two counts under s. 253(1) of the Criminal Code: operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on the accused's involvement in a motor vehicle collision with a police officer's vehicle, physical observations of impairment, and a toxicology report projecting the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the incident.

The defence challenged the reliability of the toxicology report's assumptions, particularly regarding the timing of the incident and the possibility of bolus drinking.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the essential factual underpinnings of the toxicology report beyond a reasonable doubt and that the physical evidence of impairment was insufficient to meet the threshold for conviction.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with two counts under Section 253(1) of the Criminal Code: operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The charges arose from an incident on December 23, 2010, when the accused's vehicle was found in a ditch at the intersection of Britannia and Tremaine Roads.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused pleaded not guilty.

The trial judge found that the accused was in care or control of the motor vehicle and was impaired by alcohol at the time of arrest.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, and sought exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The central issue was whether the police provided the accused with a reasonable opportunity to consult with his counsel of choice.

The court found that the officer told the accused the breath samples would be taken regardless of whether his chosen lawyer called back, and that the accused had no choice but to speak to duty counsel.

The court found this constituted a serious breach of section 10(b) of the Charter and excluded the blood-alcohol readings, resulting in an acquittal.