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A careless driving conviction was overturned and an acquittal entered because the sole eyewitness identification was too vague to survive a non-suit motion.
The appellant was convicted of careless driving contrary to s. 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.
On appeal, the sole issue was whether the Justice of the Peace erred in denying a motion for non-suit at the close of the prosecution case regarding the identification of the driver.
The Crown's case rested entirely on eyewitness testimony from the driver of the vehicle that was struck.
That witness testified he vaguely remembered the other driver and expressed uncertainty in his identification, stating "I think it's her." The Crown conceded the identification evidence was "sketchy." The court found that the identification evidence was so weak that no properly instructed trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the Justice of the Peace erred in not granting the non-suit motion.
A conviction for failing to stop at a red light was upheld based on circumstantial photographic evidence.
The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to stop at a red light contrary to section 144.18.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.
The evidence consisted solely of red light camera photographs and encoded data.
The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) no photograph showed the vehicle in the intersection during the red light; (2) the court referred to outside knowledge not in evidence; (3) the prosecutor gave evidence via submissions; and (4) there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The appellate court dismissed all grounds and upheld the conviction, finding that the circumstantial evidence from the photographs reasonably supported the inference that the vehicle entered the intersection on the red light.
The court dismissed the Crown's appeal, upholding a stay of proceedings for a careless driving charge due to unreasonable trial delay.
The Crown appealed a decision by a Justice of the Peace who granted a stay of a careless driving charge under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to delay in bringing the matter to trial.
The appeal was conducted as a review under section 136 of the Provincial Offences Act.
The court found that the delay of approximately 12-13 months from the notice of intention to appear to trial completion significantly exceeded the guidelines established in R. v. Morin.
The Crown's argument that the defence was not ready for trial because it did not request disclosure until June 24, 2014 was rejected.
The court found that the inferred prejudice from such delay outweighed any societal interest in prosecution of the highway traffic offence, and the appeal was dismissed.
