Volga Balkova Pankou

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding contrary to s. 121 of the Highway Traffic Act on two grounds: (1) that he was deprived of the opportunity to make submissions or cross-examine regarding the officer's use of notes to refresh memory, and (2) that the Justice of the Peace erred in amending the speed stated in the certificate of offence to conform with trial evidence.

The court found that while the Justice of the Peace should have asked the appellant whether he wished to make submissions regarding the notes, this procedural error did not impact trial fairness.

The court also found that the amendment was properly granted under s. 34(4) of the Provincial Offences Act, as the appellant had received notice and was offered an adjournment.

The appeal was dismissed.

An appeal from a conviction for failing to comply with a property standards order issued pursuant to the Building Code Act.

The appellant raised four Charter grounds on appeal: trial within a reasonable time (s.11(b)), disclosure and trial fairness (s.7), cruel and unusual punishment (s.12), and equality under the law (s.15).

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the delay was primarily attributable to the appellant's own requests for adjournments and irrelevant disclosure, that disclosure was adequate, that s.12 did not apply to a conviction appeal, and that the mere fact that other bylaw violations existed did not engage s.15 equality rights.

The defendant was charged with "Follow Too Closely" contrary to section 158(1) of the Highway Traffic Act on December 5, 2011.

The defendant brought a Charter application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the overall delay of 14 months was excessive for a minor provincial offence.

The court found that the defendant's rights to trial within a reasonable time were infringed, with institutional delay and Crown actions accounting for 11.5 months of the total delay.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act, challenging whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt all elements necessary for the admission of radar evidence.

The trial justice of the peace convicted the appellant based on evidence from a police officer who used a Decatur Genesis handheld radar device to measure the vehicle's speed at 117 km/h in an 80 km/h zone.

The appellant argued the officer was insufficiently qualified and had not properly followed manufacturer's testing procedures.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding the officer had received adequate training, tested the device before and after use in accordance with manufacturer's instructions, and provided sufficient evidence of the device's reliability.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle following an incident during a traffic stop.

The appellant argued that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge’s reasons were inadequate.

The summary conviction appeal court held that while the evidence could support a conviction, the trial judge’s reasons failed to explain why key factual findings were made in the face of conflicting testimony.

Because the reasons did not address credibility conflicts or explain the basis for rejecting parts of the defence evidence, they did not permit meaningful appellate review.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.