R. v. McKay, 2026 ONSC 1773

COURT FILE NO.: CR-22-0025-00

DATE: 2026-03-23

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

J. Cavanagh, M. Purcell & T. Schuck, for the Crown

• and -

ARCHIE MCKAY

R. Amy & A. Anderson, for Mr. McKay

HEARD: January 29, 2026 at Kenora, Ontario

Mr. Justice J.S. Fregeau

Reasons on Parole Ineligibility Determination

INTRODUCTION

1On April 29, 2025, Archie McKay (the “defendant”) was found guilty of five counts of second-degree murder in relation to the May 2, 2019, homicides of:

1. Geraldine Chapman, 47 years of age;

2. Angel McKay, 12 years of age;

3. Karl Cutfeet, 9 years of age;

4. Hailey Chapman, 7 years of age; and

5. Shyra Chapman, 6 years of age.

2Section 235(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (the “Criminal Code”) stipulates that any person who commits second-degree murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life. As a result, the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life for the murders of Geraldine Chapman, Angel McKay, Karl Cutfeet, Hailey Chapman and Shyra Chapman.

3Sections 745(c) and 745.4 of the Criminal Code require that a judge sentencing a person who has been convicted of second-degree murder fix the period of parole ineligibility from a minimum of ten years to a maximum of twenty-five years.

4Section 745.4 of the Criminal Code further directs that in the exercise of my discretion in determining the period of parole ineligibility, I am to consider the nature of the offence, the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the character of the defendant.

5As a result of the foregoing, the issue to be determined on this sentencing hearing is the period of incarceration, between ten and twenty-five years, which the defendant is required to serve before he is eligible for parole. The determination of that issue turns, to a very large extent, on the application of s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, R. v. Gladue, 1999 679 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, and R. v. Ipeelee 2012 SCC 13, in the egregious and tragic circumstances of this case.

6The Crown submits that the defendant should be sentenced to a maximum of 25 years’ imprisonment before he is eligible for parole. The defendant suggests that an 18-year period of parole ineligibility is appropriate.

The Nature of the Offence and the Circumstances Surrounding its Commission

7The offences and the circumstances of their commission are horrific.

8On May 2, 2019, Geraldine Chapman, Angel McKay, Karl Cutfeet, Hailey Chapman and Shyra Chapman lived at Ms. Chapman’s home, located at 854 Macheetao Road (the “home”), in the remote First Nations Community of Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug, commonly referred to as “KI”, in northwestern Ontario. Angel McKay, Karl Cutfeet, Hailey Chapman and Shyra Chapman are hereinafter referred to collectively as the “children”.

9The home was a small, dated, three-bedroom, wood-framed bungalow. A small, enclosed porch had been added on to the east side of the home, with a windowless exterior door. A doorway led from the porch into the kitchen area of the home. The porch exterior door was the only means of entering and exiting the home.

10The defendant was the “on/off” intimate partner of Ms. Chapman. The defendant resided at the home and cared for the children on an intermittent basis. The defendant and Ms. Chapman were the biological parents of Shyra Chapman. Ms. Chapman was the primary caregiver, and the de facto mother, of Angel McKay, Karl Cutfeet, and Hailey Chapman.

11It is not in issue that the defendant and Ms. Chapman were “intimate partners”, and that the defendant was in a “position of trust or authority” in relation to each of the four children, within the meaning of the relevant sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code.

12During the early morning hours of May 2, 2019, Ms. Chapman and the defendant were drinking at their residence. The children were asleep in their beds. At approximately 3:00 a.m., Ms. Chapman and the defendant got into an argument concerning the amount of alcohol the defendant was consuming from a bottle they were sharing. Ms. Chapman told the defendant to leave the home. The defendant did so, but remained close by.

13After the defendant left the home, Ms. Chapman messaged Creighton Beardy, a friend, and invited him to come to her home and drink with her. He agreed and walked over to the home. As Creighton Beardy approached the doorway to the home, he was confronted and physically assaulted by the defendant, who accused him of intending to sleep with Ms. Chapman. Creighton Beardy was able to calm the defendant down. The defendant then directed Creighton Beardy to Ms. Chapman’s bedroom window, which Creighton Beardy knocked on to let Ms. Chapman know he had arrived.

14When Ms. Chapman opened the door to let Creighton Beardy into her home, the defendant also tried to enter the home. Ms. Chapman “straight-armed” the defendant and again told him to leave, which he did.

15However, the defendant, again, remained in the immediate vicinity of the home. Between 3:13 a.m. and 4:40 a.m., the defendant sent seven unanswered text messages to Ms. Chapman. At 4:48 a.m., a security camera on a store across the road from the home captured a flash at the east side of the home. Flames are soon visible from a rapidly escalating fire in the porch area of the home.

16At approximately 5:00 a.m., police were advised of a fire at the home. The police detachment was located approximately 350 metres from the home. Police immediately attended the scene to find the home fully engulfed in flames. Police attempted to enter the burning home to rescue Ms. Chapman and the children. However, due to the smoke and the incredible heat of the fire, and despite the very best efforts of police, they were unable to do so.

17The fire engulfed the entire home very quickly. Creighton Beardy escaped through Ms. Chapman’s bedroom window. Ms. Chapman – heroically – was able to gather the four children and get them to her bedroom, attempting to escape the fire through her bedroom window. Tragically, Ms. Chapman and the children perished in the fire. The skeletal remains of all victims were found in what had been her bedroom.

18In my Reasons for Judgment, R. v. McKay, 2025 ONSC 2630 (“McKay”), I made the following findings:

• The defendant knew the home was dated and of wood-frame construction.

• The defendant knew that Ms. Chapman, Creighton Beardy and the children were inside the home during the early morning hours of May 2, 2019, and that the children were asleep in their beds.

• The defendant set the fire in the area of the east side porch, with the aid of an accelerant, knowing that the exterior porch door was the only exit from the home.

• The defendant walked away after setting the fire and did not return to the scene of the fire until approximately 7:20 a.m., at which time all that was left of the home was smoldering rubble in which lay the remains of Ms. Chapman and the children.

19The defendant’s whereabouts between 5:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. are unknown. When he returned to the scene of the fire at approximately 7:20 a.m., he told police that he had been at the home, that he had tried to get in and then panicked and ran to his aunt’s home to get help. At para. 426 of McKay, I found that these statements of the defendant were not true.

20The defendant gave a statement to the police beginning at approximately 8:00 p.m. on May 2, 2019, in which he made numerous exculpatory comments to the investigating officers. In McKay, at paras. 443-444, I found that the defendant’s exculpatory statements were untrue and were intended to mislead the investigating officers to deflect suspicion from himself.

21In McKay, at para. 454, I found that the defendant, in setting the fire, meant to cause Ms. Chapman’s death or meant to cause her bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause death, and was reckless as to whether death ensued. The accused was therefore found guilty of the murder of Ms. Chapman pursuant to s. 229(a) of the Criminal Code.

22At paras. 459, 460 and 475 of McKay, I further found that the defendant had the requisite mens rea for murder in relation to each of the children pursuant to either s. 229(a)(ii) or s. 229(b) of the Criminal Code. The defendant was therefore found guilty of the murder of each of the children.

The Background and Character of the Offender

23A Pre-Sentence Report (the “PSR”) and a Gladue Report provided extensive information on the background and character of the defendant.

24The defendant is a 48-year-old Indigenous man of Oji-Cree ancestry from the First Nations community of KI. KI is located approximately 600 kilometres north of Thunder Bay. The community has an on-reserve population of approximately 1,300 and is accessible year-round by air and by ice road from January to March.

25The community members of KI are currently, and have been generationally, plagued by numerous chronic social issues unfortunately prevalent on many isolated northern First Nations communities. These issues include, but are not limited to:

• Inadequate and substandard housing

• High rates of unemployment

• Chronic poverty

• Chronic alcohol and substance abuse

• Domestic and intimate partner violence

• Elevated levels of youth suicide.

26Many, if not most, chronic social issues which challenge the residents of KI on a daily basis can be traced back to the devastating impact of colonialism and the Residential School System and/or the Day Schools on those who attended and successive generations. The sentencing reports are unclear as to whether the defendant’s family members attended residential schools. The PSR notes that the defendant believes his maternal grandparents did so.

27The defendant was the second oldest child of six children born to his parents. He lived with his parents only until he was four years old. The defendant’s mother was the primary caregiver in the home and is described as a dependable and stabilizing influence. The defendant’s father abused alcohol, was unreliable, and had difficulty maintaining employment. The defendant and his siblings were exposed to alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and generally dysfunctional behaviour while in the care of their parents. The PSR states that the defendant “seemed to minimize and provide justification for the abuse his mother endured by his father”, suggesting the normalization of domestic violence in the mind of the defendant from an early age. Of note, the defendant’s parents’ lives stabilized later in life to the extent that they provided the children with strong emotional support as they grew older.

28The defendant was raised by his maternal grandparents from four years of age. This was described as a positive, nurturing, and loving home environment. The defendant appears to have been particularly close with his maternal grandmother, whom he described as a “wise and resilient woman”.

29The defendant was sexually abused by a male cousin when he was approximately six-seven years old. The extent of this abuse is unknown, however the defendant, at age 48, “described the traumatic incident in detail” to the authors of both the PSR and Gladue Report. The defendant was also a victim of sexual abuse at the hands of the notorious Ralph Rowe, the former Anglican church minister who preyed on First Nations children in isolated northern First Nations communities in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Once again, the recounting of this abuse was traumatic for the defendant decades later.

30The defendant first consumed home brew when he was eight or nine years old, significantly when his father passed out leaving some of his "jug" available to his son. At 11 years old, the defendant began sniffing gasoline. He soon began to skip school to sniff gasoline with his friends. Incredibly, the defendant reported to the author of the Gladue Report that he was chronically sniffing gasoline for approximately "five hours almost every day" until he was 16 years old. He stopped because he began to hallucinate.

31In his later teenage years, the defendant was regularly drinking home brew. He began using marijuana when he was 16 years old and began making his own home brew at 17 years old.

32During his 20’s, the defendant continued to abuse alcohol and began the use of Oxycontin, eventually on a daily basis. He also trafficked this drug into his home community for a period of time. In his 30’s, the defendant’s substance abuse broadened to include morphine, suboxone and cocaine, the latter two taken intravenously. This was in addition to his continued heavy consumption of home brew.

33It is not clear from the sentencing reports if the defendant’s drug use continued during his relationship with Ms. Chapman. Thyra Chapman, Ms. Chapman’s oldest and only surviving child, states that it did. The defendant’s regular, heavy consumption of home brew and other alcohol continued during this period.

34The defendant attended a residential treatment centre in 1999 and remained sober for approximately five months. He attended residential treatment again in 2000 and was sober for six months.

35The defendant completed Grade 9. He has not upgraded his education as an adult and expressed no plans to do so. The defendant has worked seasonally and intermittently in KI, helping to maintain the ice road during the winter and doing construction in the summer. The defendant has also worked at various jobs in the service industry when residing in Kenora for a period of time as a younger man.

36The defendant met his first domestic partner in 1997 when he was 21 years old. They had six children between 1998 and 2009. The family moved between Sioux Lookout, Kenora, and Thunder Bay before eventually settling in KI. This relationship was turbulent and characterized by alcohol and substance abuse, domestic violence, and the involvement of child protection services. The defendant was convicted of assaulting this domestic partner in 2001 (Kenora), 2005 (Thunder Bay) and in 2010 (KI). The author of the PSR commented extensively on the defendant’s minimization of, and failure to accept responsibility for, the domestic violence in this relationship. This relationship ended in or around 2009. Tragically, the defendant’s second oldest daughter died by suicide in 2024, at the age of 21.

37The defendant’s relationship with Ms. Chapman began in or around 2010. Ms. Chapman brought three children into the relationship, and they had one child together. This relationship was also volatile, with alcohol abuse and domestic disputes occurring on a regular basis.

38In 2016, the defendant was convicted of two counts of failing to comply with the conditions of an undertaking and uttering threats to damage property. The two former convictions relate to the defendant’s attendance at the home contrary to an undertaking, following a domestic dispute. The latter offence relates to the defendant threatening to “trash” Ms. Chapman’s truck with an axe. The prior discreditable conduct of the defendant toward Ms. Chapman during this relationship is set out in detail in McKay, at paras. 210-220.

39While in pre-sentence custody for the subject offences, the defendant has achieved seven Certificates of Completion in relation to:

• Substance abuse (x2)

• Goal setting

• Supportive relationships

• Looking for work

• Maintaining employment

• Changing habits

40When commenting on the character and attitude of the defendant, the author of the PSR stated the following:

The subject frequently redirected the discussion toward his own narrative, focusing on perceived injustices and personal stories he wished to emphasize. It was evident there is no part of his life for which he takes any accountability for and seemed to provide only self-serving narratives which portray him in a more favourable light. He became emotional when talking about his own sexual victimization but did not overtly show any emotion when discussing the loss of [Ms. Chapman and the children]…Throughout multiple interviews, the subject did not demonstrate empathy or concern for others, as his comments consistently centred on himself.

41Under the Assessment section of the PSR, the author stated the following:

[The defendant’s] lack of accountability, deflection of blame, and lack of regard for others stood out most during the interviews. Notably, he was unable to acknowledge any wrongdoing on his part in any area of his life…

Given the [defendant] does not accept any level of responsibility for the issues within his life nor the offences before the court, he is assessed as a high risk to reoffend.

42When the defendant spoke to the Court at the sentencing hearing, he showed no remorse or acceptance of responsibility for the horrific deaths of his intimate partner and the children.

Impact on the Family and Community

43R. v. Wesley, 2025 ONCA 51, was a conviction and sentence appeal in the tragic case of an 18-year-old Indigenous man who shot and killed his father and best friend at a family home on Cat Lake First Nation in northwestern Ontario.

44In granting the sentence appeal and reducing the 18-year period of parole ineligibility imposed by the trial judge to 13 years, the Court of Appeal, among numerous other issues addressed, rejected the appellant's submission that the trial judge erred in taking account of the impact of the crimes on the community as an aggravating factor.

45As a result, the impact that the murders of Ms. Chapman and the children have had on the small, closely related and isolated community of KI is properly considered as a relevant factor in the determination of the period of parole ineligibility in this case.

46Eighteen Victim Impact Statements (the "VIS") were filed with the Court, four of which were courageously read by the authors in open court. Their enduring pain, anger and sense of loss were palpable, almost six years after the fire.

47As noted above, the members of this community have suffered for generations. Ms. Chapman was highly regarded and trusted by others to parent their children. The VIS clearly establish that the fire and the staggering loss of Ms. Chapman and the children have added yet another layer of permanent pain to the families of the victims, and, I suspect, to a great number of other members of this small community.

48The common elements running through the VIS include:

• Anger

• Hate

• Pain

• Sadness

• Betrayal

• Anxiety

• People struggling to cope mentally, physically, and spiritually

• Families broken by loss

49These tragic and psychologically destructive emotions have, unfortunately but understandably, led to the loss of scarce employment, the increased use of alcohol as a numbing agent, and further family dysfunction. This horrific case has had a devastating impact on the community of KI. It has, and will continue, to perpetuate the intergenerational trauma experienced by community members.

POSITIONS OF THE CROWN AND DEFENCE

The Crown

50In seeking a 25-year period of parole ineligibility, the Crown submits that it has considered the principle of proportionality, s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, and the principles established in Gladue, and clarified in Ipeelee. The Crown recognizes that the objective of the Gladue analysis is to determine the level of moral blameworthiness of the Indigenous offender before the Court in order to arrive at a proportionate sentence.

51However, the Crown submits that the murder of an Indigenous woman, the intimate partner of the defendant, together with the murder of four Indigenous children, to whom the defendant stood in a position of trust and authority, coupled with the devastating impact of these murders on the family of the victims and the entire community of KI, must result in a finding that the moral blameworthiness of the defendant is extreme and is not diminished, despite the significant Gladue factors which have shaped the defendant's life.

52The Crown submits that the circumstances of this case require that primary consideration be given to the sentencing objectives of denunciation, deterrence and separation from society. The Crown suggests that its position is clearly supported by the relevant jurisprudence and, because the victims were children and Ms. Chapman was an Indigenous female, ss. 718.01 and 718.04 of the Criminal Code.

53The Crown contends that a period of parole ineligibility of 25 years is necessary to properly address these objectives and is proportionate to the gravity of the offences and the extreme moral blameworthiness of the offender. The Crown suggests that the failure to impose a 25-year period of parole ineligibility inadequately addresses the primary sentencing objectives and discounts the lives of Ms. Chapman and the children.

54The Crown submits that the murder of a child family member, the murder of an intimate partner, and the murder of multiple family victims in a single event, each on their own, would result in an elevated period of parole ineligibility. The Crown submits that the unprecedented circumstances of this case – the murder of multiple child family members and the murder of an intimate partner in a single event, all victims being Indigenous – demand an elevated period of parole ineligibility set at the maximum of 25 years.

55The Crown submits that there are numerous aggravating factors present which inform the decision as to the appropriate period of parole ineligibility, including:

• Setting the fire at or near the only exit to an occupied home in the middle of the night, knowing children are inside asleep and knowing the fire would spread rapidly, given the age and type of structure;

• Setting the fire with the aid of an accelerant, suggesting some level of deliberation;

• Immediately leaving the scene after setting the fire, leaving the victims to die;

• The defendant’s lies and deceptive statements following the fire in an attempt to deflect blame and avoid responsibility;

• The defendant’s criminal record, including domestic violence against a previous partner and offences involving Ms. Chapman;

• The defendant’s lack of remorse and his refusal to accept any responsibility for the offences; and

• The devastating and enduring impact of the offences on the community of KI.

56The Crown further submits that the murders of the defendant’s intimate partner and four child family members, to whom he stood in a position of trust or authority, are deemed to be aggravating circumstances pursuant to ss. 718.2(a)(ii)(ii.1) and (iii) of the Criminal Code.

57The Crown notes that s. 718.201 of the Criminal Code is also engaged in this case, pursuant to which a sentencing judge shall consider the increased vulnerability of female victims and give particular attention to the circumstances of Indigenous female victims.

58The Crown does not seek to minimize the chronic and very difficult social conditions generally in KI, or the presence of significant Gladue factors which have impacted and shaped the life of the defendant. Nor is the Crown asking the Court to disregard the Gladue factors when determining the defendant’s moral blameworthiness, due to the seriousness of the offences.

59The Crown's position is that the offences before the Court are so extreme, and the aggravating factors so extensive, that this is the rare case where the Indigenous offender’s moral culpability is simply not diminished, regardless of significant Gladue factors. This is a case where the parole ineligibility period, because of the circumstances of the offences and the character of the defendant, including Gladue considerations, should be set at the maximum of 25 years, as it would be for a non-Indigenous offender, according to the Crown.

The Defence

60In submitting that an 18-year period of parole ineligibility is proportionate in the circumstances of this case, the defendant reminds this Court that he is being sentenced to life imprisonment and that he will not be released from custody until deemed suitable for parole. The defendant submits that his alleged high risk of re-offending, as noted in the PSR, should not be a consideration for this Court when determining the period of parole ineligibility.

61The defendant emphasizes that the proper application of Gladue and s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code requires a focused analysis on the impact of Gladue factors on the moral culpability of an Indigenous offender. Only after having done so, is a court in an informed position to correctly apply the fundamental principle of sentencing – that a sentence must be proportionate to both the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of this particular Indigenous offender.

62The defendant submits that he witnessed alcohol abuse and domestic violence throughout his formative years, both within his own home and in the community of KI at large. He was twice a victim of sexual abuse, first by a male relative at the tender age of six-seven years, and second, when only 10 or 11 years old at the hands of Ralph Rowe, a predatory symbol of colonialism. The defendant submits that not only did these factors directly impact him, but they did so against a community backdrop of chronic poverty, substandard housing, and all the other social injustices suffered by the Indigenous members of his community, all completely beyond the control of a young Indigenous man.

63The defendant submits that his background as an Indigenous person is not merely a mitigating factor. It must receive due weight in the determination of his moral culpability, which in turn is one of two components to be balanced in determining a proportionate sentence, according to the defendant.

64The defendant submits that alcohol abuse, and later polysubstance abuse, have been defining factors in his life since approximately age 10 or 11, notably shortly after being victimized by Ralph Rowe. The defendant contends that these issues directly resulted in a truncated education, extremely limited employment opportunities, poverty, dislocation, and turbulent intimate relationships.

65The defendant submits that an 18-year period of parole ineligibility does not diminish the lives of the victims, as suggested by the Crown. The defendant further submits that parity is a principle that this Court must consider, but need not strictly apply, as suggested by the Crown, due to defendant's background as an Indigenous person and the individualized nature of sentencing.

66The defendant submits that the imposition of an 18-year period of parole ineligibility is not a "race-based” discount. It recognizes his diminished moral blameworthiness and the principle of restraint, as required, and properly balances those factors with the gravity of the offences, resulting in a truly proportionate sentence, according to the defendant.

ANALYSIS

General Principles

67In R. v. Shropshire, 1995 47 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, the Supreme Court observed that the determination of the parole ineligibility period is a very fact sensitive process. Unusual circumstances are not required for a sentencing judge to exercise his/her discretion and to increase the period of parole ineligibility from the 10-year minimum. The Court observed, at para. 29, that in permitting a sliding scale of parole ineligibility, Parliament intended to recognize that within the offence of second-degree murder, there will be a broad range of seriousness reflecting varying degrees of moral culpability.

68In Shropshire, at para. 27, the Court stated the following:

As a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility shall be for 10 years, but this can be ousted by a determination of the trial judge that, according to the criteria enumerated in [s. 745.4], the offender should wait a longer period before having his suitability to be released into the general public assessed. To this end, an extension of the period of parole ineligibility would not be "unusual", although it may well be that, in the median number of cases, a period of 10 years might still be awarded.

69Parole ineligibility is part of sentencing. Due weight must be given to all principles and objectives of sentencing, as set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code: see R. v. McKnight (1999), 1999 3717 (ON CA), 44 O.R. (3d) 263; R. v. Arashvand, 2012 ONSC 5852, at para. 9; R. v. Keene, 2020 ONCA 635, at para. 69. This would include aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

The Statutory Provisions

Purpose and Objectives of Sentencing

70Section 718 of the Criminal Code states that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute to respect for the law by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

• Denunciation

• Deterrence

• Separation of offenders from society

• Rehabilitation

• Reparation

71Section 718.01 of the Criminal Code directs sentencing judges, when imposing a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of 18 years, to give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

72Section 718.04 of the Criminal Code provides that when a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person who is vulnerable because of personal circumstances – including because the person is Indigenous and female – the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.

The Fundamental Principle of Sentencing

73Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code stipulates that the fundamental principle of sentencing is that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

74In Ipeelee, at para. 37, the Supreme Court elaborated on the principle of proportionality:

The fundamental principle of sentencing (ie. proportionality) is intimately tied to the fundamental purpose of sentencing – the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society through the imposition of just sanctions. Whatever weight a judge may wish to accord to the various objectives and other principles listed in the Code, the resulting sentence must respect the fundamental principle of proportionality. Proportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction. First, the principle ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence. This is closely tied to the objective of denunciation. It promotes justice for victims and ensures public confidence in the justice system…[Citations omitted.] Second, the principle of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender. In this sense, the principle serves a limiting or restraining function and ensures justice for the offender. In the Canadian criminal justice system, a just sanction is one that reflects both perspectives on proportionality and does not elevate one at the expense of the other.

Aboriginal Intimate Partner

75Section 718.201 of the Criminal Code provides that a court that imposes a sentence in respect of an offence that involved the abuse of an intimate partner shall consider the increased vulnerability of female persons who are victims, giving particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal¹ female victims.

76The nature of the offences before the Court, the circumstances surrounding their commission, together with the fact that an Indigenous intimate partner and four Indigenous children were the victims of the offences, very clearly require that the determination of a proportionate period of parole ineligibility give primary consideration to the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence, as well as particular attention to the fact that one of the victims was an Indigenous female intimate partner.

Other Sentencing Principles

Aggravating Factors

77Section 718.2(a) of the Criminal Code further directs that a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender. The following circumstances of the offences before the Court are deemed to be aggravating circumstances:

1. Section 718.2(a)(ii) - evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused the offender's intimate partner or a member of the victim's or the offender's family.

2. Section 718.2(a)(ii.1) - evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under the age of eighteen years.

3. Section 718.2(a)(iii) - evidence that the offender abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim.

78In addition to these statutorily deemed aggravating factors, I find the following to be aggravating factors in this case:

1. The defendant created a "firetrap", by setting the fire near the only exit from a dated, wood frame home, in the middle of the night, knowing children were asleep inside;

2. The defendant used an accelerant, suggesting some degree of deliberation;

3. The defendant immediately left the scene, leaving Ms. Chapman and the children to die in the fire;

4. The defendant's criminal record, including domestic violence against a previous intimate partner and offences involving Ms. Chapman;

5. The devastating impact of the offences on the families of the victims and the First Nations community of KI; and

6. The defendant's lies and deceptive statements following the fire in an attempt to evade responsibility.

79The latter aggravating factor relates to the offender's conduct after setting the fire and is properly considered as part of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence pursuant to s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code: see R. v. Ahmadi, 2025 ONCA 219, at para. 71.

80I reject the Crown’s submission that the defendant’s lack of remorse is an aggravating factor to be considered in the determination of the period of parole ineligibility. In R. v. Reeve, 2020 ONCA 381, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in principle by using the absence of remorse as an aggravating factor for which the accused should be punished. The Court agreed, finding that this error in principle was inextricably linked to the imposition of the maximum custodial term imposed by the trial judge: at para. 25.

81In Reeve, at para. 12, Fairburn J.A. directed as follows:

While a genuine expression of remorse can serve to mitigate a sentence, the opposite is not true. An offender cannot be punished for a lack of remorse. The reason is clear. Punishing an accused for failing to express remorse comes “perilously close” to punishing him or her for exercising the right to make full answer and defence: R. v. Valentini (1999), 1999 1885 (ON CA), 43 O.R. (3d) 178 (C.A.), at para. 83. Even after a guilty verdict, an accused is entitled to maintain his or her innocence and cannot be punished for maintaining that stance.

82In Reeve, at paras. 13-14, Fairburn J.A. acknowledged that the absence of remorse will sometimes be relevant in the sentencing process in exceptional circumstances where the lack of remorse may shed light on the “likelihood of future dangerousness”, as well as inform the applicability of sentencing principles involving specific deterrence and rehabilitation. However, at para. 14, Fairburn J.A. cautioned as follows:

…[T]he absence of remorse will sometimes be relevant in the sentencing process. That does not mean, though, that someone can be punished for failing to show remorse. While a lack of remorse may, in rare circumstances, inform potential future dangerousness, which can in turn inform the application of some sentencing principles, such as the suitability of emphasizing rehabilitation, it must never be used as an aggravating factor that is deserving of punishment.

83The primary sentencing objectives in this case are denunciation and deterrence. The defendant’s lack of remorse is not relevant to these objectives. I decline the Crown’s invitation to use lack of remorse as an aggravating factor in support of an enhanced period of parole ineligibility.

84There are no mitigating factors. In McKay, at para. 484, I observed that there was evidence that the defendant had consumed a "considerable quantity of vodka in the hours before the fire was set", but that there was no direct evidence as to the defendant's level of intoxication at the time the fire was set. The defendant’s level of intoxication was not put in issue at trial.

A Sampling of the Jurisprudence

85Section 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code requires this Court, when determining the appropriate period of parole ineligibility, to take into consideration the principle of parity – a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.

86Of note, counsel were unable to provide any sentencing decision approaching the almost incomprehensible circumstances of the offences before the Court. The following is a review of "similar" decisions.

87In R. v. Olsen, 1999 1541 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 218 (C.A.), a case which the Court of Appeal for Ontario described as one which "reveals the depths of human depravity", the Court upheld a 25-year period of parole ineligibility for Olsen's co-accused Podniewicz, who had been found guilty of second-degree murder in the shaking death of his six-month-old daughter. At para. 49, the Court observed that "the discretion vested in the trial judge under s. 745.4 recognizes that second-degree murders can vary both in seriousness and in moral culpability. By giving courts discretion to impose a 25-year period of parole ineligibility, Parliament has recognized that some second-degree murders are as serious and as morally culpable as a first-degree murder".

88In R. v. Sig-od, 2025 ONSC 1971, O’Marra J. was required to fix the period of parole ineligibility for a defendant found guilty by a jury of the first-degree murder of his ex-wife and guilty of the second-degree murder of his 21-year-old daughter. At para. 66, the Court observed that the offender "has not expressed any remorse, rather he sees himself as a victim". At para. 70, the Court noted that the offence had a significant impact on the family and the wider community.

89In setting the period of parole ineligibility for the second-degree murder of the offender's 21-year-old daughter at 18 years, the Court stated the following, at para. 71:

In terms of the principles and objectives of sentencing the need for denunciation and general deterrence are particularly important in setting a parole ineligibility for an offender who murders a family member. A message must be sent that murder of defenceless family members will result in a life sentence with elevated periods of parole ineligibility.

90In R. v. Jiang, 2025 ONCA 624, the Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld an 18-year period of parole ineligibility for a defendant convicted of the second-degree murder of his former girlfriend. In commenting on parole ineligibility in domestic murders, the Court stated the following, at paras. 49-52:

49Further, as the trial judge here noted, there is a very broad range for parole ineligibility in domestic murders. This sliding scale reflects the general fact that "within second degree murder there is both a range of seriousness and varying degrees of moral culpability": Shropshire, at para. 31; R. v. Wesley Guzlak, 2018 ONSC 4705, at pp. 1-2. Appellate courts have upheld or imposed parole ineligibility periods beyond 17 years in domestic murder cases: see, for example, R. v. Hindessa, 2011 ONCA 477 (18 years); R. v. Sarao (1995), 1995 260 (ON CA), 80 O.A.C. 236 (C.A.) (22 years following a guilty plea); R. v. Johnson, 2004 NSCA 91 (21 years); R. v. Purdy, 2012 BCCA 272 (19 years); R. v. Ching, 2022 ONCA 183 (21 years); R. v. Emmanuel Owusu-Ansah, 2024 ONCA 192 (22 years).

50As the above sampling of decisions demonstrates, the imposition of a period of parole ineligibility beyond 17 years for domestic murders is not new. It reflects societal repugnance for these crimes against intimate partners. As Speyer J. recently and rightly observed in R. v. Nicholas Baig, 2019 ONSC 2713, at para. 45, aff'd 2022 ONCA 692"denunciation and general deterrence are particularly important in setting the parole ineligibility period for an offender who murders a spouse or partner".

51Parliament and the Supreme Court have signaled that exemplary sentences are required. They are in keeping with Criminal Code provisions, such as s. 718.2(a)(ii) which establishes that intimate partner violence stands as an aggravating factor at sentencing. They also follow the instructions by appellate courts that sentences for domestic violence must shift upwards. As this court explained in R. v. Cunningham, 2023 ONCA 36, at para. 52:

Thus, the intention of Parliament clearly supports enhanced penalties for perpetrators of domestic violence and denunciation and deterrence as the primary sentencing objectives. It also supports changes in sentencing ranges to reflect societal awareness and knowledge of the damage to society, as well as victims, caused by domestic violence.

52This recommended upward shift is in keeping with the following instructions from Friesen, at para. 108:

Courts can and sometimes need to depart from prior precedents and sentencing ranges in order to impose a proportionate sentence. Sentencing ranges are not "straitjackets" but are instead "historical portraits" (Lacasse, at para. 57). Accordingly, as this Court recognized in Lacasse, sentences can and should depart from prior sentencing ranges when Parliament raises the maximum sentence for an offence and when society's understanding of the severity of the harm arising from that offence increases.

91In R. v. Kyle Sparks MacKinnon, 2019 ONSC 3436, MacDonnell J. fixed the parole ineligibility period at 22 years for an offender convicted of two counts of second-degree murder arising from the same event. In doing so, he reviewed the relevant jurisprudence, at para. 67:

An examination of the cases in which concurrent periods of parole ineligibility have been imposed for multiple second degree murders subsequent to the enactment of s. 745.51 reveals a range of ineligibility of between 18 and 25 years: see R. v. Bains, 2015 BCSC 2145 (18 years); R. v. Rushton, 2016 NSSC 313 (18 years); R. v. McLeod, 2018 MBQB 73 (18 years); R. v. Marki, 2018 ONSC 5106 (20 years); R. v. Salehi, 2019 BCSC 698 (20 years); R. v. Kionke, 2018 MBQB 71 (20 years); R. v. Sharpe 2017 MBQB (22 years); R. v. Koopmans, 2015 BCSC 2120 (22 years); R. v. Klaus, 2018 ABQB 97 (25 years); R. v. Ramsurrun, 2017 QCCS 5791 (25 years). That range is markedly higher than the range that a single count of second-degree murder would normally attract, but a higher range is consistent with the fact that the offender caused more than one death.

92In R. v. Salah, Parrish, McDowell, 2015 ONCA 23, the Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld a 23-year period of parole ineligibility in the case of an offender who set fire to an occupied townhouse in the middle of the night, killing two children. The Court expressly noted that the offender showed no remorse.

93In R. v. Berry, 2025 BCCA 14, the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld a 22-year period of parole ineligibility for an offender convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree murder in the brutal killing of his two daughters, ages six and four years, in their beds on Christmas Day 2017. The sentencing judge concluded that the offender's motivation in murdering his children was to keep his ex-wife from having the children once he was dead.

94In Berry, at para. 38, the Court found that "the context and the motivation for the killing was highly relevant. Parliament has codified abuse of children (s. 718.01), and abuse of an intimate partner or family member (s. 718.2(a)(ii)) as aggravating factors focusing on deterrence and denunciation".

95In addressing the principle of parity and whether the 22-year period of parole ineligibility was demonstrably unfit, the British Columbia Court of Appeal, at paras. 54-55, reviewed numerous decisions in relation to the period of parole ineligibility in murders of children and intimate partners. At para. 56, the Court expressly noted that in 2005, Parliament amended the Criminal Code to make denunciation and deterrence primary objectives when sentencing offences against children, and to make the abuse of children and intimate partner violence aggravating factors on sentencing.

96The Court upheld the 22-year period of parole ineligibility, describing it as "at the high end of the range, [but] not demonstrably unfit": at para. 59.

97My review of the authorities leads me to conclude that the gravity of the offences before the Court and the circumstances surrounding their commission – the second-degree murders of a female Indigenous intimate partner and four Indigenous children, in their homes by arson – place this case at the very upper end of the "range of seriousness" for second-degree murder. I further conclude that the defendant's degree of responsibility or moral culpability is extremely high, subject to a consideration of s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and Gladue principles.

Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and Gladue

98Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code requires a sentencing judge to take into consideration the following sentencing principle:

All available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.

99In Gladue, the Supreme Court confirmed that s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code has an important remedial purpose, directing sentencing judges to undertake the process of sentencing Aboriginal offenders differently, in order to endeavour to achieve a truly fit and proper sentence in the particular case. Section 718.2(e) does not alter the fundamental duty of the sentencing judge to impose a sentence that is fit for the offence and the offender. What s. 718.2(e) does is alter the method of analysis which each sentencing judge must use in determining a fit and proportionate sentence for an Aboriginal offender: see para. 33.

100In Gladue, at para. 37, the Supreme Court explained that the logical meaning to be taken from the special reference to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders in s. 718.2(e) is that sentencing judges should pay particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders because those circumstances are unique, and different from those of non-Aboriginal offenders. At para. 41, the Court confirmed that the general principle of restraint expressed in s. 718.2(e) is remedial. At para. 82, the Court further confirmed that “there is no discretion as to whether to consider the unique circumstances of the Aboriginal offender; the only discretion concerns the determination of a just and appropriate sentence”.

101In Gladue, at para. 69, the Supreme Court mandated that judges sentencing Aboriginal offenders must give attention to the unique background and systemic factors which may have played a part in bringing the particular offender before the Court. In cases where such factors have played a significant role, the Court directed that sentencing judges must consider these factors in evaluating whether imprisonment would actually serve to deter and denounce crime in a sense that would be meaningful to the community of which the offender is a member.

102At para. 78 of Gladue, the Supreme Court cautioned that “it was not suggesting that, as a general practice, Aboriginal offenders were to be sentenced in a manner which gives less weight to the objectives of deterrence, denunciation, and separation…[c]learly there are some serious offences and some offenders for which and for whom separation, denunciation, and deterrence are fundamentally relevant”. At para. 79, the Court directed that for serious offences for which there is no alternative to incarceration, “the length of the sentence must be considered. In some circumstances the length of the sentence of an Aboriginal offender may be less and in others the same as that of any other offender. Generally, the more violent and serious the offence the more likely it is as a practical reality that the terms of imprisonment for Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals will be close to each other or the same, even taking into account their different concepts of sentencing”.

103The analysis for sentencing Aboriginal offenders, as for all offenders, must be holistic and designed to achieve a fit sentence in the circumstances. The sentencing judge is required to take into account all of the surrounding circumstances regarding the offence, the offender, the victims, and the community, including the unique circumstances of the offender as an Aboriginal person: see Gladue, at para. 81.

104In R. v. Wells, 2000 SCC 10, the Supreme Court was tasked with considering the conditional sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code in the context of Aboriginal offenders and whether the trial judge had properly applied s. 718.2(e). In concluding that it was open to the trial judge to give primacy to the principles of denunciation and deterrence on the basis that the crime involved was a serious one, the Court reviewed Gladue and stated the following at para. 44:

Let me emphasize that s. 718.2(e) requires a different methodology for assessing a fit sentence for an aboriginal offender; it does not mandate, necessarily, a different result. Section 718.2(e) does not alter the fundamental duty of the sentencing judge to impose a sentence that is fit for the offence and the offender. Furthermore, in Gladue, as mentioned the Court stressed that the application of s. 718.2(e) does not mean that aboriginal offenders must always be sentenced in a manner which gives the greatest weight to the principles of restorative justice and less weight to goals such as deterrence, denunciation, and separation. As a result, it will generally be the case, as a practical matter, that particularly violent and serious offences will result in imprisonment for aboriginal offenders as often as for non-aboriginal offenders.

105In Ipeelee, the Supreme Court saw the need to “revisit and reaffirm” the judgment in Gladue. At para. 60, the Court clarified that:

Courts must take judicial notice of such matters as the history of colonialism, displacement, and residential schools and how that history continues to translate into lower educational attainment, lower incomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples. These matters, on their own, do not necessarily justify a different sentence for Aboriginal offenders. Rather they provide the necessary context for understanding and evaluating the case-specific information presented by counsel.

106At para. 73 of Ipeelee, the Court clarified that the systemic and background factors in relation to Aboriginal offenders that Gladue directed sentencing judges to consider may bear on the culpability of the offender, to the extent that they shed light on his or her level of moral blameworthiness. The reality is that the “constrained circumstances [of Aboriginal offenders] may diminish their moral culpability…failing to take these circumstances into account would violate the fundamental principle of sentencing – that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”.

107At para. 75 of Ipeelee, the Court emphasized that s. 718.2(e) and Gladue do not create a “race-based” discount on sentencing. What s. 718.2(e) and Gladue require is that sentencing judges pay particular attention to the unique circumstances of Aboriginal offenders in order to endeavour to achieve a truly fit and proper sentence in any particular case – the fundamental duty of a sentencing judge in every case.

108The Court in Ipeelee went on to correct what it referred to as “implementation errors” in the post-Gladue jurisprudence applying s. 718.2(e):

1. An Aboriginal offender does not have to establish a casual link between background factors and the commission of offences before being entitled to have those matters considered by the sentencing judge. To require an Aboriginal offender to do so displays an inadequate understanding of the devastating intergenerational effects of the collective experiences of Aboriginal peoples: see paras. 81-83.

2. Sentencing judges have a duty to apply s. 718.2(e) and Gladue in all cases involving an Aboriginal offender, including serious and violent offences. There is no discretion as to whether to consider the unique situation of the Aboriginal offender; the only discretion concerns the determination of a just and appropriate sentence: see paras. 84-87.

109In R. v. F.H.L., 2018 ONCA 83, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a sentence appeal in which one of the grounds of appeal was that the sentencing judge had misapplied the principles set out in s. 718.2(e) and Gladue. The Court found that the sentencing judge erred in his application of Gladue principles by requiring the casual connection between background factors and the commission of offences, as referred to above: at para. 32.

110However, the Court held that a fresh sentencing analysis on appeal did not lead to a different outcome. One of the two reasons for which the Court came to this conclusion was that, even assuming the Gladue factors carried greater weight, “the nature of the appellant’s offence cries out for deterrence and denunciation”: at paras. 37 and 50. The Court further stated at para. 51:

This court’s comments at para. 51 of [R. v. J.N., 2013 ONCA 251], a case concerning a similar set of facts, equally applies here:

This is simply one of those cases where the crimes are so heinous, and the aggravating factors were so compelling, that the appellant’s Aboriginal status should not affect the length of sentence imposed.

111In R. c. L.P., 2020 QCCA 1239, the Quebec Court of Appeal heard a Crown sentence appeal in relation to an appellant who had been sentenced to two years less a day and three years’ probation after pleading guilty to assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, and aggravated sexual assault by maiming, wounding or endangering the life of the victim. The victim suffered severe physical and psychological injuries. The appellant and the victim were Inuit common law partners and the appellant had a long history of violent domestic abuse against the victim.

112In granting the appeal and increasing the global sentence to 44 months less credit for time served, the Court found, among other errors, that the sentencing judge erred by failing to properly consider and give weight to the increased vulnerability and the particular circumstances of the Indigenous female victim who was the subject of violent spousal abuse: at para. 64.

113In a thorough analysis of sections 718 to 718.201 of the Criminal Code, in the context of s. 718.2(e), Gladue, and Ipeelee, the Court made numerous observations which I find relevant to my determination of a proportionate period of parole ineligibility in this case.

114At para. 73, the Court noted that s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code was amended in 2015, after Ipeelee, to add “harm done to victims or to the community” as a consideration in sentencing Indigenous offenders. The Court further noted that in the parliamentary debates, the Minister of Justice stated that “adding a requirement that the court also consider the harm done to victims and to the community would help to ensure there is a proper balance between the rights of offenders and those who have been victimized by offenders’ behaviour”.

115At para. 76, the Court observed that ss. 718.04 and 718.201 were added to the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code in 2019 “to further emphasize the need to give proper consideration and weight to the increased vulnerability of female victims of abuse, with particular attention to the circumstances of Indigenous female victims”.

116At para. 81, the Court referred to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Whitehead, 2016 SKCA 165, at para. 83, where that Court stated it was “vital that the application of s. 718.2(e) not be seen as discounting the lives or harms done to Aboriginal victims of crime, their families and their communities”.

117At para. 122, the Court noted that Gladue and Ipeelee do not, as a general practice, direct that Aboriginal offenders must always be sentenced in a manner which gives the greatest weight to the principles of restorative justice, and less weight to goals such as deterrence, denunciation, and separation. At para. 123, the Court concluded that there are some serious offences and some offenders for which and for whom the goals of deterrence, denunciation, and separation remain “fundamentally relevant”: see also Gladue, at para. 78.

The Fit and Proportionate Period of Parole Ineligibility

118Archie McKay, a 48-year-old Oji-Cree offender, has been convicted of the second-degree murder of his Indigenous intimate partner and the second-degree murders of four Indigenous children, one his biological child and three others to whom he stood in a position of trust or authority.

119The Criminal Code and applicable authorities clearly direct this Court to give primacy to the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence when determining the period of parole ineligibility. Denunciation requires an exemplary sentence. This is the means by which this Court expresses society’s repugnance and abhorrence for what the defendant has done.

120Pursuant to s. 718.2(a) of the Criminal Code, the defendant’s period of parole ineligibility is to be increased to account for any relevant aggravating circumstances relating to either the offences or the offender. As appropriately noted by the Crown, there is a constellation of serious aggravating factors in this case in relation to both the offences and the offender, which I have set out in paras. 77-78 hereof. In my view, the aggravating factors in this case bear directly on, and increase to the extreme, the moral blameworthiness of the defendant.

121There are no mitigating factors. I accept the comments of the author of the PSR as to the defendant’s character, reproduced at paras. 40-41 hereof, and the defendant’s lack of empathy toward the victims, as observations about the defendant’s character relevant to the s. 745.4 analysis which requires me to consider the character of the defendant when determining the period of parole ineligibility: see R. v. Dahr, 2012 ONCA 433, at para. 25.

122Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, a principle of sentencing, also requires me to pay particular attention to the circumstances of the defendant as an Aboriginal offender and how those circumstances may diminish the defendant’s moral blameworthiness in relation to the offences.

123As an 11-year-old child, the defendant, having already been exposed to intimate partner violence and substance abuse, and sexually abused by two individuals, began chronically sniffing gasoline for approximately five years. This was followed by lifelong polysubstance abuse set against a backdrop of chronic poverty, inadequate education, very limited employment opportunities, volatile domestic relationships, and repeated intimate partner violence.

124It cannot be reasonably argued that the background circumstances of this Indigenous offender did not play a significant role in bringing him before the Court. This conclusion, in and of itself, does not alter my fundamental duty to impose a period of parole ineligibility that is proportionate to the gravity of the offences and the degree of responsibility of the defendant. The gravity of the offences requires no further comment.

125This conclusion, however, must be considered in determining the moral blameworthiness of the defendant when applying the principle of proportionality.

126In Olsen, the Court of Appeal for Ontario, at para. 49, found that the discretion to impose a 25-year period of parole ineligibility for a single second-degree murder recognizes that some second-degree murders are as morally culpable as a first-degree murder. In Jiang, the Court of Appeal for Ontario, at para. 49, expressly recognized again that the sliding scale of parole ineligibility reflects that there are varying degrees of moral culpability within second-degree murder. Recall Berry, where the British Columbia Court of Appeal, at para. 38, noted that the “context and motivation for the killings are highly relevant”, given that Parliament has codified the abuse of children and intimate partners as aggravating factors focusing on deterrence and denunciation.

127In F.H.L., the Court of Appeal for Ontario, at para. 51, endorsed its earlier observation in J.N.:

This is simply one of those cases where the crimes are so heinous, and the aggravating factors…so compelling, that the appellant’s Aboriginal status should not affect the length of the sentence imposed.

128I have come to the conclusion that the case before this Court is also one of those cases where the crimes are so heinous, and the aggravating factors so compelling, that the defendant’s unique circumstances as an Indigenous offender do not affect the period of parole ineligibility that would otherwise be imposed.

129I have considered at length the appalling life circumstances of the defendant. I note that the remedial principle of restraint that is implicit in s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code expressly requires that it be considered in the context of, and be consistent with, the harm done to victims or to the community. As stated by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Whitehead, at para. 83:

It is vital that the application of s. 718.2(e) not be seen as discounting the lives or harm done to Aboriginal victims of crime, their families and their communities.

130The objectives of denunciation and deterrence are as fundamentally important to the First Nations community of KI as they are to the broader Canadian society. A Gladue analysis does not justify departing from a proportionate sentence – the objective of a Gladue analysis is to achieve a proportionate sentence for the individual Indigenous offender before the Court.

131The defendant’s degree of responsibility and moral blameworthiness for the horrific offences before the Court is extreme and is not diminished, despite very significant Gladue factors.

132Mr. McKay, please stand:

133You have been convicted of the second-degree murder of Geraldine Chapman. Pursuant to s. 235(1) of the Criminal Code, I sentence you to imprisonment for life. Pursuant to s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code, I order that you serve 25 years of imprisonment before you are eligible for parole.

134You have further been convicted of the second-degree murders of Angel McKay, Karl Cutfeet, Hailey Chapman, and Shyra Chapman. Pursuant to s. 235(1) of the Criminal Code, I sentence you to life imprisonment for each of those counts, concurrent to each other and concurrent to the life sentence imposed for the murder of Geraldine Chapman. Pursuant to s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code, I order that you serve 25 years of imprisonment on each of these four counts before you are eligible for parole, concurrent to each other and concurrent to the parole ineligibility period imposed for the murder of Geraldine Chapman.

ANCILLARY ORDERS

135There shall be a DNA order on each of the five counts. The defendant shall be subject to a firearms prohibition, pursuant to s. 109 of the Code, for life. Pursuant to s. 743.21(1) of the Code, the defendant shall not communicate, directly or indirectly, with any of the individuals listed on Schedule “A’, attached to the indictment.

Footnotes

1. 1The term “Aboriginal”, as it appears in statutes and jurisprudence, is only used for these direct references. Elsewhere, the preferred term of “Indigenous” is used.