Ryan Amy

This decision concerns the prosecution of Archie McKay for five counts of first-degree murder following a fatal house fire in Kitchenuhkoosib Inninuwug, Ontario.

The court reviews extensive circumstantial evidence, including expert testimony, extrinsic misconduct, and ante-mortem statements, to determine whether McKay deliberately set the fire and possessed the requisite intent for murder.

The court finds McKay guilty of second-degree murder in relation to all five victims, concluding that the evidence does not establish planning and deliberation or criminal harassment necessary for first-degree murder.

The Crown applied to admit ante-mortem statements of the deceased, Geraldine Chapman, made to four individuals (Cheryl Meekis, Stewart Albany, Tom Chapman, Thyra Chapman) under the state of mind or principled exceptions to the hearsay rule in a first-degree murder trial.

The court assessed the relevance, necessity, and reliability of each set of statements.

Statements to Cheryl Meekis were ruled inadmissible due to lack of relevance and witness credibility issues.

Statements to Stewart Albany regarding fear/worry were admissible under the state of mind exception, while those alleging direct threats were inadmissible under the principled exception due to insufficient reliability.

Most statements to Tom Chapman were inadmissible, being deemed irrelevant or the witness's conclusions/biased interpretations.

Statements to Thyra Chapman regarding accusations of cheating and property damage were admissible under the principled exception, as their substantive reliability was established.

This is an application by the Crown in a first-degree murder trial to admit 'extrinsic misconduct evidence,' comprising police occurrence reports, 911 calls, and ante-mortem statements of the deceased, Geraldine Chapman, to friends and family.

The accused, Archie McKay, is charged with five counts of first-degree murder arising from a fire that killed Ms. Chapman and four children.

The Crown seeks to admit this evidence to prove the underlying offence of criminal harassment (s. 231(6) of the Criminal Code), establish the accused's state of mind (intent), and demonstrate motive and animus, which are probative of identity.

The accused argued that much of the evidence was irrelevant, lacked probative value, or was unreliable.

The court conducted an individual analysis of each piece of evidence, ruling some admissible for narrative, context, animus, motive, and to prove elements of criminal harassment, while deeming others inadmissible due to lack of relevance or probative value.

The admissibility of ante-mortem statements is subject to a further hearsay voir dire at trial.

Edward Raymond Gibbins pleaded guilty to uttering threats, confining individuals, careless use of a firearm, and discharging a firearm with recklessness.

The incident involved him confronting victims with a shotgun over a property dispute, threatening them, and firing the weapon.

The Crown sought a four-year custodial sentence, while the Defence proposed a conditional sentence.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the accused's moral culpability (including alcohol influence and lack of prior record), and mitigating/aggravating factors.

The judge emphasized denunciation and deterrence for firearm offences, ultimately imposing a custodial sentence.

The Crown applied under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code for an order permitting ten civilian witnesses from a remote First Nation community (Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug) to testify remotely via video in a first-degree murder jury trial.

The accused opposed the application, arguing that remote testimony would compromise trial fairness, particularly regarding the jury's ability to assess witness credibility and demeanour, given the seriousness of the charges and the contested issues of the fire's cause and criminal harassment.

The court granted the application in part, allowing four witnesses (William Cromarty, Alfred Beardy, Jennaya Shoomin, and Karla Cutfeet) to testify remotely due to their limited anticipated evidence or personal circumstances (age, mobility, school attendance).

However, the court denied remote testimony for six other witnesses (Bella Chapman, Solomon Begg, Thyra Chapman, Kristina Winter, Tiana Meekis, and Candace Crowe), deeming their anticipated evidence too crucial to be compromised by the limitations of video testimony.

The order for remote testimony was made conditional on various factors, including technical reliability, secure location, technical support, police presence, and proper oath administration.

The Crown applied to admit hearsay statements of a deceased witness, Sarah Jane Bluecoat, in a first-degree murder trial.

Ms. Bluecoat's statements were taken on May 2, 2019 (typed Q&A), and later adopted under oath and video-recorded on August 3, 2021, after she initially declined on July 14, 2021.

The accused opposed the admission, arguing that necessity was not met due to the Crown's failure to preserve cross-examination rights (e.g., by proceeding with a preliminary inquiry or using s. 709 of the Criminal Code) and that the statements lacked threshold reliability.

The court found that necessity was established by the witness's death, distinguishing the case from prosecutorial "neglect." The court further found that both substantive and procedural reliability were met, allowing the jury a satisfactory basis to evaluate the evidence, despite the absence of contemporaneous cross-examination.

The Crown's application was granted.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder and other related offences stemming from a series of violent, unprovoked assaults on senior citizens in their homes, fueled by methamphetamine intoxication.

Crown and defence jointly submitted a parole ineligibility period of 13 years for the murder convictions.

The judge considered whether this joint submission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, weighing the horrific nature of the crimes against the certainty gained by avoiding a lengthy trial with uncertain outcomes regarding the accused's mental state and potential for a manslaughter conviction.

The court accepted the joint submission, sentencing the accused to life imprisonment with 13 years parole ineligibility, along with concurrent sentences for the other offences.

The defendant was charged with assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and mischief under five thousand dollars arising from a domestic incident on November 29, 2017.

The defendant also faced an allegation of breaching a conditional sentence order by failing to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

At trial, the criminal charges were withdrawn in exchange for the defendant admitting the breach.

The court accepted the admission and found a breach had occurred.

Following submissions on disposition over three court dates, the parties jointly proposed that the defendant continue serving the conditional sentence with amended conditions.

The court accepted this proposal but determined it was necessary to clarify the calculation of time remaining on the conditional sentence, specifically addressing when the sentence was suspended, when suspension terminated, and whether time ran during the suspension period.

The 74-year-old accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm against his wife.

At the time of the offence, he was on full parole for the second-degree murder of his previous wife.

The Crown sought 5-7 years, while the defence sought time served.

The court found that the accused was not entitled to credit for pre-sentence custody because his incarceration was related to his parole revocation for the prior murder conviction, not the current offence.

The court sentenced the accused to two years plus one day in a penitentiary, emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and the protection of the victim.

During a trial for sexual offences, the accused applied for a stay of proceedings or a mistrial due to the late disclosure of Facebook messages and two witness statements.

The court found that the Crown and police did not deliberately withhold the evidence.

The accused was provided with the evidence as soon as the Crown became aware of it, and the defence had ample opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses on the new information.

The court dismissed the application, concluding that the accused failed to demonstrate actual prejudice to the right to make full answer and defence, and that less drastic remedies, such as an adjournment, were available but declined by the defence.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation of his 16-year-old daughter.

The complainant testified that she awoke to her father sexually assaulting her after a night of drinking.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming he was elsewhere in the house and that incriminating Facebook messages sent from his account were authored by someone else.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence as not credible, accepted the complainant's evidence, and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The accused applied under s. 520 of the Criminal Code to review a detention order following a reverse-onus bail hearing on firearm-related charges.

The accused proposed release to reside with his mother as surety, a cash deposit, strict curfew, and participation in a substance abuse treatment program.

The Crown opposed release, relying on the accused’s criminal record, outstanding arrest warrant in another province, alleged involvement in a pharmacy break and enter, and the discovery of a loaded restricted firearm while he was subject to weapons prohibitions.

The court held the accused failed to show cause why detention was not justified on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds under s. 515(10).

Concerns included risk of flight, likelihood of reoffending linked to addiction and criminal history, and the seriousness of the firearm offences.