Rick Leroy

D.O. was convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving a 12-year-old complainant.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and the unique circumstances of an Indigenous offender under *Gladue*.

Aggravating factors included the victim's age, the offender's position of trust, and the significant impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender's positive pre-sentence report, strong family connections, and pro-social conduct while on release.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse, ultimately imposing a six-year penitentiary sentence, along with ancillary orders.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer the proceeding from Toronto to Cornwall.

The plaintiff, a US-based corporation, had commenced the action for the cost of goods sold in Toronto, where its counsel practiced.

The defendant, based in Cornwall, argued that the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Cornwall and Tennessee, and that Toronto had no connection to the dispute other than the location of the plaintiff's counsel.

The court applied the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) and found that while the plaintiff's initial choice of venue was reasonable given its expectation of a default judgment, the defendant's proposed venue of Cornwall was significantly better.

The motion to transfer the proceeding to Cornwall was granted.

The accused, K.B., was charged with sexual assault and related collateral charges.

The Crown alleged K.B. sexually assaulted the complainant, SW, while driving her home.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant, the accused, and the accused's spouse, TL, noting inconsistencies and potential motives.

The complainant had significant mental health issues and was under the influence of medication and marijuana at the time of the alleged incident.

The court found that the evidence, taken as a whole, left a state of uncertainty, and the Crown failed to prove K.B.'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

K.B. was acquitted.

The accused, J. F.-C., was charged with multiple sexual offences against the complainant, M.P., who was 12 years old at the time of the alleged incidents in 2008.

The charges included sexual assault (s. 271), sexual exploitation (s. 151(a)), invitation (s. 152), and exposure for a sexual purpose (s. 173(2)) under the Criminal Code.

The court assessed the complainant's narrative, acknowledging inconsistencies common in adult testimony about childhood events, but found her evidence credible regarding the core allegations.

Despite the complainant's infatuation and compliance, the court determined that J. F.-C. knew M.P. could not consent.

The accused was found guilty on counts 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 12.

Jason Poirier applied to quash a search warrant, arguing that an unrecorded conversation between the Justice of the Peace and the detective prior to the warrant's re-submission compromised the judicial process.

The court found that the absence of a record of this interaction, coupled with inconsistencies between the detective's recollection and the warrant amendments, prevented a reliable review of the Justice of the Peace's fairness and impartiality.

Consequently, the Crown failed to meet its burden of establishing the warrant's validity, and the search warrant was quashed.

Sebastien Bouchard was found guilty of second-degree murder after a jury re-trial.

This ruling determined the period of parole ineligibility, which is a mandatory component of the life sentence.

The Crown sought 15 years, while the defence sought 10 years.

The court considered the character of the offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and jury recommendations, as mandated by section 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The court also considered the impact of new evidence and the offender's rehabilitation efforts since the first trial.

Ultimately, the court maintained the previous determination of 15 years parole ineligibility, finding that the new facts were not sufficient to derogate from the original reasoning.

Malcolm Valade, charged with serious Criminal Code offences including attempted murder and firearm offenses, applied for a bail review after being detained by a Justice of the Peace.

He sought release based on a material change in circumstances, presenting a new release plan that included his spouse Christine Valade as an additional surety, independent employment outside the family business (which was the source of the dispute), and a more intensive mental health treatment program.

The court found that the new plan constituted a material and relevant change in circumstances, addressing the deficiencies identified in the initial bail hearing.

The court concluded that detention was no longer necessary on any of the three grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code, and granted Valade's release on specific terms and conditions.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a motion challenging the validity of a DNA warrant issued under s. 487.05 of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued that after excising certain impugned statements from the Information to Obtain (ITO), there were no longer reasonable grounds to believe he was a party to the offence.

The court conducted a sub-facial review and found that even with the excisions, the ITO contained sufficient information to meet the standard for issuing the warrant.

The court also allowed amplification evidence that corrected good faith omissions by the police.

Furthermore, the court held that even if a s. 8 Charter breach had occurred, the DNA evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with attempted murder after stabbing a neighbour with a kitchen knife.

The defence raised the mental disorder exemption under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, arguing the accused lacked the capacity to know his actions were wrong due to schizoaffective disorder and active psychosis.

Expert psychiatric evidence established that the accused suffered from chronic mental illness involving hallucinations and delusions, was non‑compliant with medication prior to the offence, and likely experienced auditory hallucinations at the time of the attack.

Applying the analytical framework for NCR determinations, the court accepted that the mental disorder rendered the accused incapable of rationally appreciating the moral wrongfulness of the act.

The court therefore found the accused not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and referred the matter to the Ontario Review Board for disposition.

The accused, a practicing lawyer, pled guilty to assault after a street altercation involving mutual racial slurs and spitting, during which he threw the first punch and bit off a portion of the victim's ear lobe.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence and criminal record, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court granted a conditional discharge with six months of probation, emphasizing the devastating collateral consequences the accused had already suffered to his career and the principle of parity, given that the other combatants received no criminal convictions.

In a second-degree murder prosecution, the court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of two police interviews with the accused.

The defence conceded voluntariness of the first statement but argued its prejudicial effect outweighed probative value, while challenging the voluntariness of the second statement based on inducements and oppressive interrogation tactics.

Applying the confessions rule and the principles in Oickle and Singh, the court found that the accused’s will was never overborne despite repeated assertions of the right to silence and persistent police questioning.

Both statements were therefore voluntary.

However, the court held that significant portions of the first interview containing police commentary, opinion, and criticism of the accused’s exercise of the right to silence must be edited before being admitted, and the second statement was intended primarily for potential use in cross‑examination rather than for its contents.

The offender was convicted of human smuggling under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for driving illegal immigrants from Cornwall to Toronto.

The Crown sought a 15-18 month conditional sentence, while the defence sought a suspended sentence or a 6-month conditional sentence.

The court found the offender's moral blameworthiness was low, as he was duped by his brother and had no profit motive.

Emphasizing the principle of proportionality, the court imposed a 6-month conditional sentence followed by 12 months of probation.

The offender was convicted of human smuggling under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for his role as a courier transporting undocumented individuals from the US border to Toronto.

The Crown sought a 12-month custodial sentence, while the defence sought a 15-month conditional sentence.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of the organized nature of the scheme and the exploitation of his brother against mitigating factors including a positive pre-sentence report, financial desperation, and lack of related criminal record.

The court concluded that a 15-month conditional sentence, followed by two years of probation, would adequately address denunciation and deterrence.

The accused, charged with attempted murder, brought a motion to exclude a statement made to police.

Due to a technical error, the audio of the video-recorded interview was mostly unrecorded, and the interviewing officer's notes were sparse.

The court found the statement was voluntary and that the recording failure did not breach the accused's Charter rights.

However, the court excluded the audio component because its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, while allowing the silent video and the officer's testimony regarding the gist of the interview.

The accused was charged with offences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for his role in transporting individuals who had been smuggled across the US-Canada border into Cornwall.

The accused claimed he was merely doing a favour for his brother and was unaware of the illegal nature of the enterprise.

The court found that the accused's brother had informed him of the passengers' documentary deficiencies, raising a real suspicion that the accused deliberately chose to ignore.

Applying the doctrine of wilful blindness, the court concluded the accused possessed the requisite mens rea and entered convictions.

The plaintiff brought a motion to dismiss or quash a third party appeal from interlocutory orders of a Master concerning timelines and procedures for a protection motion relating to alleged trade secret documents.

The third party sought to set aside the Master’s orders and refer its protection motion to a judge.

The court held that the Master acted within jurisdiction, that the orders were procedural and interlocutory, and that the appeal was brought in the wrong forum and outside prescribed timelines.

Applying principles of court openness and the test for confidentiality orders from Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada, the court found no evidentiary basis for the requested protection.

The plaintiff’s motion was granted, the third party’s motion dismissed, and an interim without prejudice confidentiality order was issued to facilitate continued production pending determination of the protection motion.

The appellant appealed a conviction for theft under $5,000 arising from the alleged failure to deposit restaurant proceeds at a bank night deposit.

The trial judge relied heavily on testimony from witnesses who had viewed surveillance video that was later destroyed and reported that the accused did not appear at the deposit chute.

On appeal, the court held that although secondary evidence of the lost recording could be admissible, the trial judge misapprehended central aspects of the evidence, including the surveillance camera’s limited capture intervals and the assumptions underlying the Crown’s theory.

The court further found concerns regarding the probative value and prejudice of the secondary evidence and issues related to the burden of proof under the W.(D.) framework.

The cumulative effect of these errors rendered the trial unfair.

The plaintiff commenced a civil action alleging trespass, conversion, negligent investigation, and Charter breaches after OSPCA agents removed his livestock and laid charges under the OSPCA Act.

The defendants brought a refusals motion seeking to compel answers to discovery questions regarding the plaintiff’s knowledge and beliefs about the legality of OSPCA powers and investigative practices.

The court held that questions seeking the plaintiff’s personal legal opinions on contested legal issues were irrelevant where counsel had already articulated the legal positions.

The defendants’ motion was dismissed.

On the plaintiff’s cross‑motion, the court granted leave to amend pleadings and ordered production of certain OSPCA training materials, policies, tariff information, and other information relevant to alleged warrantless entries and potential Charter remedies, while dismissing requests deemed irrelevant.

The applicant brought an application for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid challenging a decision by the warden to reclassify him from medium to maximum security within the federal penitentiary system.

He argued that Correctional Service Canada failed to provide adequate disclosure of the case against him, thereby breaching procedural fairness under s. 27 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The court held that in the penitentiary context the duty of disclosure requires only that the inmate receive the gist of the case, not full particulars or disclosure of informer identities or investigative details.

The applicant had been informed of the essential allegations, including concerns about rehabilitation progress and communications intercepts linking him to contraband activity.

The court concluded that the disclosure met procedural fairness requirements and that the warden’s decision was reasonable.

The moving parties sought summary judgment dismissing a negligence, intentional tort, and Charter damages claim arising from the plaintiff’s involuntary detention for psychiatric assessment under the Mental Health Act.

The plaintiff alleged improper issuance and confirmation of a Form 1 and improper medical treatment during a brief detention at hospital.

The court held that medical malpractice claims require expert evidence establishing the applicable standard of care, breach, and causation.

The plaintiff filed no expert evidence and relied solely on allegations in the statement of claim, while the defendants filed expert reports confirming that the physicians’ conduct met the standard of care.

As no genuine issue requiring a trial was raised, summary judgment was granted dismissing the claims against the physicians and the hospital.