Rick Leroy

The plaintiffs, Upper Canada District School Board and Patricia Brown, sought an interim injunction to compel the defendant, James Gilcig o/a Seaway Media, to remove two allegedly defamatory publications from the internet and prohibit future similar publications.

The publications concerned Ms. Brown's handling of swastika graffiti at a school in 2013.

The court applied the modified test for interim injunctions in defamation cases, which requires a high degree of certainty that the plaintiff will succeed at trial and that the words are manifestly defamatory and impossible to justify.

While acknowledging the potential reputational harm to the plaintiffs, the court found that the plaintiffs' evidentiary record was incomplete, specifically lacking a sworn deposition from maintenance staff regarding the timely removal of the graffiti.

Consequently, the motion for an interim injunction was dismissed, though the plaintiffs were not precluded from bringing the motion again with a more complete record.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 39.75 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the majority of the delay was institutional, totaling 25 months, which was well beyond the acceptable guidelines under the previous Morin framework.

Despite the Crown's arguments regarding complexity and mitigation efforts, and the seriousness of the human smuggling charges, the court concluded that the transitional considerations could not justify the systemic delay.

The accused's constitutional right to a trial within a reasonable time was denied.

The accused, Jamie Farrell-Cote, was sentenced for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and exposure involving a 12-year-old complainant when he was 20.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the abuse of a child and breach of trust, and mitigating factors such as the accused's youth at the time, lack of predatory behaviour, and subsequent pro-social conduct.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for child abuse offences while balancing the gravity of the offence with the offender's moral blameworthiness.

A global sentence of 30 months imprisonment was imposed, along with various corollary orders.

The accused, James Norton, was charged with two counts of assault and one count of sexual assault.

The complainant, MP, alleged two physical assaults and one instance of non-consensual anal intercourse.

The defence denied the assaults and claimed the anal intercourse was consensual.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of MP's testimony, noting inconsistencies, disingenuous statements, and the influence of her sister-in-law, K, who fabricated evidence of injuries.

The court also considered the accused's character as a "Lothario" and his deceptive conduct in relationships.

Ultimately, the court found significant reservations regarding the veracity of MP's allegations and acquitted Mr. Norton of all charges, concluding that the evidence as a whole left reasonable doubt.

The accused, Julian Justinico, was charged with sexual assault and breaking and entering to commit sexual assault against the complainant, SD.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's conduct and statements at a party prior to the assault, and DNA evidence found on the complainant's genitals.

The defence challenged the admissibility of similar act evidence and the reliability of DNA evidence for identity.

The court found the accused's prior conduct admissible as an admission and for animus/motive, and concluded that the DNA evidence, combined with other circumstantial evidence and the absence of benign explanations for transfer, established identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The plaintiff, a volunteer painter at the defendant's church, fell from an eight-foot stepladder while installing ceiling trim and suffered a severe head injury.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action.

The plaintiffs argued the defendant breached its duty of care under the Occupiers' Liability Act and relied on expert evidence suggesting the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) standards should apply.

The court found that the OHSA did not apply to volunteers and that the defendant had provided a reasonably safe environment, including a stable ladder and appropriate instructions.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the plaintiff undertook the task of his own volition and there was no evidence of what caused the fall.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

D.O. was convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving a 12-year-old complainant.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and the unique circumstances of an Indigenous offender under *Gladue*.

Aggravating factors included the victim's age, the offender's position of trust, and the significant impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender's positive pre-sentence report, strong family connections, and pro-social conduct while on release.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse, ultimately imposing a six-year penitentiary sentence, along with ancillary orders.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer the proceeding from Toronto to Cornwall.

The plaintiff, a US-based corporation, had commenced the action for the cost of goods sold in Toronto, where its counsel practiced.

The defendant, based in Cornwall, argued that the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Cornwall and Tennessee, and that Toronto had no connection to the dispute other than the location of the plaintiff's counsel.

The court applied the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) and found that while the plaintiff's initial choice of venue was reasonable given its expectation of a default judgment, the defendant's proposed venue of Cornwall was significantly better.

The motion to transfer the proceeding to Cornwall was granted.

The accused, K.B., was charged with sexual assault and related collateral charges.

The Crown alleged K.B. sexually assaulted the complainant, SW, while driving her home.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant, the accused, and the accused's spouse, TL, noting inconsistencies and potential motives.

The complainant had significant mental health issues and was under the influence of medication and marijuana at the time of the alleged incident.

The court found that the evidence, taken as a whole, left a state of uncertainty, and the Crown failed to prove K.B.'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

K.B. was acquitted.

The accused, J. F.-C., was charged with multiple sexual offences against the complainant, M.P., who was 12 years old at the time of the alleged incidents in 2008.

The charges included sexual assault (s. 271), sexual exploitation (s. 151(a)), invitation (s. 152), and exposure for a sexual purpose (s. 173(2)) under the Criminal Code.

The court assessed the complainant's narrative, acknowledging inconsistencies common in adult testimony about childhood events, but found her evidence credible regarding the core allegations.

Despite the complainant's infatuation and compliance, the court determined that J. F.-C. knew M.P. could not consent.

The accused was found guilty on counts 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 12.

Jason Poirier applied to quash a search warrant, arguing that an unrecorded conversation between the Justice of the Peace and the detective prior to the warrant's re-submission compromised the judicial process.

The court found that the absence of a record of this interaction, coupled with inconsistencies between the detective's recollection and the warrant amendments, prevented a reliable review of the Justice of the Peace's fairness and impartiality.

Consequently, the Crown failed to meet its burden of establishing the warrant's validity, and the search warrant was quashed.

Sebastien Bouchard was found guilty of second-degree murder after a jury re-trial.

This ruling determined the period of parole ineligibility, which is a mandatory component of the life sentence.

The Crown sought 15 years, while the defence sought 10 years.

The court considered the character of the offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and jury recommendations, as mandated by section 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The court also considered the impact of new evidence and the offender's rehabilitation efforts since the first trial.

Ultimately, the court maintained the previous determination of 15 years parole ineligibility, finding that the new facts were not sufficient to derogate from the original reasoning.

Malcolm Valade, charged with serious Criminal Code offences including attempted murder and firearm offenses, applied for a bail review after being detained by a Justice of the Peace.

He sought release based on a material change in circumstances, presenting a new release plan that included his spouse Christine Valade as an additional surety, independent employment outside the family business (which was the source of the dispute), and a more intensive mental health treatment program.

The court found that the new plan constituted a material and relevant change in circumstances, addressing the deficiencies identified in the initial bail hearing.

The court concluded that detention was no longer necessary on any of the three grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code, and granted Valade's release on specific terms and conditions.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a motion challenging the validity of a DNA warrant issued under s. 487.05 of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued that after excising certain impugned statements from the Information to Obtain (ITO), there were no longer reasonable grounds to believe he was a party to the offence.

The court conducted a sub-facial review and found that even with the excisions, the ITO contained sufficient information to meet the standard for issuing the warrant.

The court also allowed amplification evidence that corrected good faith omissions by the police.

Furthermore, the court held that even if a s. 8 Charter breach had occurred, the DNA evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with attempted murder after stabbing a neighbour with a kitchen knife.

The defence raised the mental disorder exemption under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, arguing the accused lacked the capacity to know his actions were wrong due to schizoaffective disorder and active psychosis.

Expert psychiatric evidence established that the accused suffered from chronic mental illness involving hallucinations and delusions, was non‑compliant with medication prior to the offence, and likely experienced auditory hallucinations at the time of the attack.

Applying the analytical framework for NCR determinations, the court accepted that the mental disorder rendered the accused incapable of rationally appreciating the moral wrongfulness of the act.

The court therefore found the accused not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and referred the matter to the Ontario Review Board for disposition.

The accused, a practicing lawyer, pled guilty to assault after a street altercation involving mutual racial slurs and spitting, during which he threw the first punch and bit off a portion of the victim's ear lobe.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence and criminal record, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court granted a conditional discharge with six months of probation, emphasizing the devastating collateral consequences the accused had already suffered to his career and the principle of parity, given that the other combatants received no criminal convictions.

In a second-degree murder prosecution, the court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of two police interviews with the accused.

The defence conceded voluntariness of the first statement but argued its prejudicial effect outweighed probative value, while challenging the voluntariness of the second statement based on inducements and oppressive interrogation tactics.

Applying the confessions rule and the principles in Oickle and Singh, the court found that the accused’s will was never overborne despite repeated assertions of the right to silence and persistent police questioning.

Both statements were therefore voluntary.

However, the court held that significant portions of the first interview containing police commentary, opinion, and criticism of the accused’s exercise of the right to silence must be edited before being admitted, and the second statement was intended primarily for potential use in cross‑examination rather than for its contents.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to three counts of invitation to sexual touching and two counts of sexual interference involving four girls under 16.

The court emphasized denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and the totality principle, while also giving weight to the offender’s youth, traumatic background, guilty plea, and rehabilitative prospects.

A global sentence in the range of 36 months was found fit, with 18 months of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody applied.

Most counts were made concurrent, one count was consecutive, and ancillary orders including probation, DNA, SOIRA, firearms prohibition, and custodial no-contact terms were imposed, while a s. 161 order was declined.

The accused pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic cocaine after purchasing significant quantities over multiple transactions during a drug investigation.

Although the parties jointly proposed an eighteen-month sentence, the accused sought a conditional sentence based on alleged police misconduct in the execution of the search warrant and arrest, relying on Charter principles and the sentencing analysis in Nasogaluak.

The court found that denunciation and deterrence remained the dominant sentencing objectives for cocaine trafficking and that a conditional sentence would not satisfy proportionality.

Applying Cornell and Nasogaluak, the court rejected the allegation of unreasonable search, excessive force, or vandalism, and held that no state misconduct mitigated sentence.

An eighteen-month custodial sentence, followed by two years' probation and ancillary forfeiture and weapons orders, was imposed.

The offender was convicted of human smuggling under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for driving illegal immigrants from Cornwall to Toronto.

The Crown sought a 15-18 month conditional sentence, while the defence sought a suspended sentence or a 6-month conditional sentence.

The court found the offender's moral blameworthiness was low, as he was duped by his brother and had no profit motive.

Emphasizing the principle of proportionality, the court imposed a 6-month conditional sentence followed by 12 months of probation.