Rick Leroy

In a historical sexual abuse prosecution involving allegations by a stepchild against a stepfather over many years, the court conducted a detailed credibility and reliability assessment of an adult complainant testifying about childhood events.

The court held that inconsistencies on chronology and other peripheral matters did not necessarily undermine central memories, but found that several evolving allegations, newly formed memories, and allegations of extensive abuse in the home were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused’s statement admitting sexual intercourse when the complainant was an adult was given little exculpatory weight, but was treated as circumstantial corroboration of an earlier transactional sexual routine in the truck.

Convictions were entered only for truck-based sexual abuse before the complainant turned sixteen and for one threat.

M.L. was charged with sexual assault and common assault.

The sexual assault allegation stemmed from an incident in 2006, early in the cohabiting relationship with the complainant, D.W. The common assault charge arose from an incident in 2016 when M.L. attempted to serve D.W. with family court documents.

The court applied the W.(D.) analysis for the sexual assault charge, considering the complainant's credibility, delayed disclosure, and potential motives to fabricate.

The court found inconsistencies and omissions in D.W.'s testimony regarding the sexual assault and the circumstances of her leaving the home, and noted the Crown did not call a potentially dispositive witness.

For the common assault, the court accepted that M.L. tugged D.W.'s hood to place papers inside, constituting an assault.

M.L. was acquitted of sexual assault but convicted of common assault.

Malcolm Valade was convicted of intentionally discharging a firearm while reckless as to life or safety, an offence carrying a four-year mandatory minimum sentence.

The defence challenged this mandatory minimum as cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter, arguing it was grossly disproportionate to a fit sentence of twenty months.

The Crown argued for its constitutionality.

The court found the mandatory minimum grossly disproportionate for the offender, infringing s. 12, and not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

Consequently, the mandatory minimum was declared of no force or effect.

The accused, Malcolm Valade, was sentenced for intentionally discharging a firearm.

The court previously found the mandatory minimum sentence of four years unconstitutional and determined a fit sentence of twenty months.

This decision addresses the calculation of enhanced credit for 192 days of pre-sentence custody under notoriously harsh conditions at the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre (OCDC) and 827 days under strict house arrest bail conditions.

The court granted enhanced credit for both quantitative and qualitative reasons, recognizing the severe impact of OCDC conditions on the accused's mental health and the punitive nature of house arrest.

Ultimately, the accused received 18 months of credit against the 20-month sentence, resulting in a final sentence of 60 days imprisonment to be served intermittently, along with three years of probation and ancillary orders.

The accused, Rosemary Levett, was charged with administering a noxious substance (Zopiclone) to Nora Wara, intending to aggrieve or annoy her, contrary to subsection 245(b) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the Zopiclone tablet was ingested by the complainant and, if so, whether the accused administered it.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the complainant's testimony.

The court found numerous inconsistencies and incongruities in the complainant's narrative, including conflicting statements about her motives, her actions regarding evidence preservation, and her general credibility.

The court was not confident in the complainant's sincerity and found that the Crown had not displaced the presumption of innocence.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused, Melissa Jeaurond, pleaded guilty to careless storage of firearms, unauthorized possession of firearms, and possession of psilocybin for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the large quantity of psilocybin and its proximity to firearms, and mitigating factors such as her first-time offender status, remorse, guilty plea, and strong community support.

The court applied credit for stringent pre-sentence bail conditions (Downes credit).

The judge imposed a period of imprisonment for the drug and firearms offences, with sentences running concurrently, and a mandatory firearms prohibition.

The court denied the Crown's request for a discretionary DNA order, balancing the public interest against the offender's privacy interests given her low risk of recidivism and lack of prior record.

J.M. was convicted after trial on twenty-four counts of domestic abuse targeting his spouse and children between 1963 and 2015.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating and mitigating factors, and comparable jurisprudence.

Despite the Crown seeking 12 years imprisonment, the court imposed a global sentence of 23 months and 27 days, to be served as a conditional sentence in the community, followed by three years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, SOIRA order, and no-contact orders.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence while acknowledging the offender's age, first-time offender status, and low risk of re-offending.

Duane Gore was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while disqualified, a subsequent offence.

The Crown sought 30-36 months imprisonment and a lifetime driving prohibition, while the defence sought 12 months.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating factors (prior record, deliberate act), and significant mitigating factors (eight years of sobriety, rehabilitation, remorse, stable employment, family support).

The court distinguished the case from others involving impaired or dangerous driving.

Acknowledging the need for denunciation and deterrence, but also the offender's rehabilitation, the court imposed a sentence of 12 months imprisonment and a mandatory three-year driving prohibition, rejecting a lifetime prohibition to support rehabilitation.

Michael Francis pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession of oxycodone.

Police found significant quantities of both drugs at his home, along with cash and other items.

Francis, who was addicted to oxycodone, claimed he was a "stash house" under duress and not involved in sales.

The Crown sought nine months imprisonment, while the defence argued Francis had already served the equivalent of nine months due to stringent bail conditions (rural curfew without a license) and his significant rehabilitation efforts.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating factors (quantity, stash house), and mitigating factors (guilty plea, first offender, addiction-driven, duress, successful rehabilitation, and restrictive bail conditions).

The judge granted a four-month credit for the bail conditions, resulting in a sentence of five months imprisonment for cocaine trafficking and one month concurrent for oxycodone possession, followed by six months probation, along with ancillary orders.

Malcolm Valade was charged with threatening death and discharge of a firearm while reckless.

He pled guilty to the firearm charge, and the threatening charge was dismissed.

This decision provides reasons on sentencing for the firearm offence.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including a toxic family relationship and the offender's mental health issues.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defence sought twelve months.

The court determined that if the mandatory minimum of four years for the firearm offence is constitutional, the sentence would be four years imprisonment, as the offender qualified as a "best offender." If the mandatory minimum were not constitutional, the court would have imposed a twenty-month prison term.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of Mr. Menard on a charge under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, where the trial judge had excluded Intoxilyzer breath results under s. 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches related to a pat-down search, detention in a police cruiser for ASD testing, detention in a locked cell, and video surveillance during urination.

The Superior Court found that while Charter breaches occurred, the trial judge erred in principle and made an unreasonable conclusion regarding the impact of these violations on Mr. Menard's Charter interests.

The appellate court determined that the state conduct was minor, the impact on the accused's Charter interests was negligible (lacking a causal connection to the breath samples), and the evidence was reliable and crucial to the Crown's case.

Balancing these factors, the court concluded that excluding the Intoxilyzer results would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and the matter remitted for a new trial.

The accused was charged with driving while disqualified.

He brought a Charter application alleging that the police officer's vehicle stop constituted an arbitrary detention under s. 9, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion and used the Highway Traffic Act as a ruse.

The court found the stop was a valid exercise of police powers under s. 216(1) of the Highway Traffic Act to check for licensing and insurance, which promotes road safety.

The court concluded there was no arbitrary detention or Charter breach, and dismissed the application to exclude the identification evidence.

The accused was tried on historical sexual offence allegations said to have occurred against a child family member in the mid-to-late 1980s.

The central issue was not the complainant's sincerity but the reliability of his long-term memory, particularly given conflicting evidence about an alleged early disclosure and the surrounding family circumstances.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and held that, although the complainant appeared sincere and the accused had significant limitations, the whole of the evidence left a reasonable doubt.

The court also found that similar act or other discreditable conduct evidence had questionable probative value and could not bear significant weight.

The charges were dismissed.

Louie McDonald was found guilty of two counts of manslaughter and breach of probation after transporting three men on an undersized Sea-Doo without life jackets, resulting in two drownings.

The sentencing decision considered the broad discretion in manslaughter, the principles of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and significant Gladue factors.

Despite strong Gladue recommendations for a non-custodial sentence, the court imposed imprisonment to satisfy denunciation and general deterrence, while incorporating restorative elements into the probation order.

Historic prosecution arising from decades of alleged spousal abuse, child abuse, threats, indecent assaults, and related misconduct within a family home.

The court conducted a detailed credibility and reliability assessment in light of very long reporting delay, memory frailties, family discussions, and partial corroboration through a mixed police statement by the accused.

Applying principles governing delayed disclosure, credibility, time particularization, and sexualized force, the court convicted on most assault, threat, indecent assault, and mischief counts, but acquitted on several counts where reasonable doubt remained, including the buggery count, one belt-strapping count, the firearm-pointing count, and one assault-with-weapon count.

The accused was charged with manslaughter, criminal negligence causing death, and conspiracy to smuggle humans into the United States after his overloaded Sea-Doo capsized in the St. Lawrence River, resulting in the drowning deaths of two Indian nationals.

The court acquitted the accused of the conspiracy charge, finding insufficient evidence that he knew or was wilfully blind to the human smuggling operation, as he likely believed he was transporting marijuana.

However, the court found the accused guilty of two counts of criminal act manslaughter and breach of probation, concluding that operating an overloaded vessel without life jackets or proper training constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent person.

In a pre-trial application, the accused challenged the admissibility of several statements and the validity of a search warrant for hospital records following a fatal Sea-Doo accident.

The court ruled that the accused's initial statement to a police officer and a subsequent statement to a paramedic were admissible, finding no Charter breaches or reasonable expectation of privacy.

However, a later statement to a police corporal was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter because the police failed to inform the accused of a new conspiracy charge and denied him a second opportunity to consult counsel, breaching his s. 10(a) and (b) rights.

The court upheld the search warrant for the accused's hospital records, finding sufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain even after excising the excluded statement.

The Crown applied to admit into evidence the out-of-court statements of an absconding witness and the maximum capacity limits section of a Sea-Doo owner/operator manual for the truth of their contents.

The charges involved criminal negligence causing death and human smuggling after a Sea-Doo capsized, resulting in two drownings.

The court dismissed the application to admit the witness statements, finding that while necessity was met due to the witness's unavailability, threshold reliability was not established because the inability to cross-examine the witness resulted in significant prejudice to the accused.

The court also dismissed the application to admit the manual, ruling it was hearsay and lacked evidence of reliability.

The accused, Brian Caskenette, president of the Cornwall Minor Hockey Association (CMHA), was charged with fraud over $5,000 for personal use of a CMHA Visa card and cash advances.

He also brought a Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to missing financial records.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding no actual prejudice as other evidence provided similar information.

The court found the accused guilty of fraud over $5,000, concluding he knowingly and dishonestly deprived the CMHA of $12,831 through undeclared personal purchases and cash advances, and that his assertions of reimbursement were not credible or recorded.

This was a family law costs decision following a parenting trial in which the applicant was largely successful.

The court considered costs consequences flowing from a rule compliant offer to settle under Rule 18, the treatment of trial management conference time under Rule 24(10), and whether the respondent's litigation conduct justified full indemnity costs under Rule 24(8).

The court held the applicant was wholly successful on the central issues, allowed one-half of the trial management conference time, and found the final order was as favourable as the offer to settle.

Although the court declined to make an explicit bad faith finding, it held the respondent had disregarded mounting indications undermining his position and fixed costs at $45,000 inclusive of HST, plus costs of the costs submissions.