William James Webber

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual interference, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant argued that his trial counsel failed to adequately advise him on the decision to testify, specifically regarding the principles in W. (D.) and how his testimony could raise a reasonable doubt even if not fully believed.

The Superior Court of Justice admitted fresh evidence and found that the appellant was deprived of the information necessary to make an informed choice about testifying.

The court concluded this compromised trial fairness and the reliability of the verdict, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Abigail Morris, appealed her conviction for sexual interference (sexual assault conviction stayed under Kienapple principle) involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The appeal challenged whether voluntariness requires subjective consent of the accused, the admissibility of prior sexual communications (Seaboyer application), reliance on myths and stereotypes, and the use of context evidence to infer voluntariness.

The court dismissed the appeal, rejecting the appellant's premise that voluntariness equates to subjective consent of the accused.

It found no error in admitting the prior sexual communications, nor in the trial judge's determination of voluntariness, which was based on the complainant's testimony and the appellant's own statements, not on myths or stereotypes.

The accused, Mitchell Jones, faced multiple charges including mischief, forcible entry, sexual assault, and voyeurism.

The trial focused heavily on credibility assessments of both the complainant and the accused, applying the principles from R. v. W. (D.).

The court acquitted the accused on most charges, finding reasonable doubt based on conflicting evidence and the complainant's contemporaneous statements.

Convictions were entered for one count of mischief (damage to vehicle) and the lesser included offence of assault (from a sexual assault charge).

The applicant sought to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that a police traffic stop was an unlawful pretext to identify him for a drug investigation, violating his ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found the stop was an arbitrary detention and an unreasonable search, and that the applicant was not informed of the true reason for detention or his right to counsel.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct, which demonstrated indifference to Charter rights and appeared systemic, outweighed society's interest in the adjudication on the merits, despite the high reliability of the evidence.

The application to exclude evidence was granted.

The accused, Rosemary Levett, was charged with administering a noxious substance (Zopiclone) to Nora Wara, intending to aggrieve or annoy her, contrary to subsection 245(b) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the Zopiclone tablet was ingested by the complainant and, if so, whether the accused administered it.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the complainant's testimony.

The court found numerous inconsistencies and incongruities in the complainant's narrative, including conflicting statements about her motives, her actions regarding evidence preservation, and her general credibility.

The court was not confident in the complainant's sincerity and found that the Crown had not displaced the presumption of innocence.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with arson under section 434 of the Criminal Code for intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to a hotel property on April 21, 2016.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown relied almost entirely on circumstantial evidence, including security video footage and expert fire investigation testimony.

The Crown's case rested on identifying the accused in the breezeway area where the fire originated in the hours before the fire was discovered, and the fact that the accused was found in possession of a lighter.

The court found that while there was evidence the fire was intentionally or recklessly set, the Crown failed to establish a permissible inference regarding the accused's identity as the person who set the fire.

The critical gap was the timing: the accused was last identified in the breezeway at approximately 12:52 pm, but smoke was not noticed until approximately 1:25 pm—a 33-minute gap.

The expert testimony established that the fire would likely have ignited no earlier than 1:05 pm, meaning the accused could not have been the person who set it.

The court held that any inference bridging this temporal gap would constitute impermissible speculation rather than a reasonable inference based on proven facts.

The Court held that arson under s. 434 of the Criminal Code is a general intent offence, so self-induced intoxication short of automatism is unavailable as a defence.

The trial judge’s reliance on intoxication materially affected the acquittal, so the acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of arson.

The accused, while highly intoxicated, left a pan of oil on a stove, causing a fire that destroyed his ex-girlfriend's house.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding that arson was a specific intent offence in these circumstances and that the accused's intoxication raised a reasonable doubt about his intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The majority held that arson under s. 434 is an offence requiring subjective intent or recklessness, making it akin to a specific intent offence where evidence of intoxication is relevant.

Although the trial judge erred in treating the classification of the offence as a question of fact, the error did not affect the outcome.