Julian Johnson

The accused was charged with arson under section 434 of the Criminal Code for intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to a hotel property on April 21, 2016.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown relied almost entirely on circumstantial evidence, including security video footage and expert fire investigation testimony.

The Crown's case rested on identifying the accused in the breezeway area where the fire originated in the hours before the fire was discovered, and the fact that the accused was found in possession of a lighter.

The court found that while there was evidence the fire was intentionally or recklessly set, the Crown failed to establish a permissible inference regarding the accused's identity as the person who set the fire.

The critical gap was the timing: the accused was last identified in the breezeway at approximately 12:52 pm, but smoke was not noticed until approximately 1:25 pm—a 33-minute gap.

The expert testimony established that the fire would likely have ignited no earlier than 1:05 pm, meaning the accused could not have been the person who set it.

The court held that any inference bridging this temporal gap would constitute impermissible speculation rather than a reasonable inference based on proven facts.

The defendant pleaded guilty to multiple offences including assault with a weapon, uttering threats to cause death, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, assault, and multiple breaches of recognizance and probation.

The central issue was whether the defendant was entitled to enhanced pre-sentence custody credit at a 1.5:1 ratio or limited to 1:1 credit under section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the "bail misconduct exclusion" was not engaged because the Crown did not seek to formally cancel the defendant's bail upon re-arrest, and therefore awarded enhanced credit.

The defendant was sentenced to custody followed by probation with conditions including substance abuse treatment, anger management counselling, and weapons prohibition.

Costs decision following applications under the Substitute Decisions Act concerning the care and property of an elderly mother.

The litigation involved two groups of siblings disputing issues including compensation for caregiving.

Most issues settled before the hearing, leaving only a compensation issue which was decided in the earlier merits decision.

The court determined responsibility for legal costs, including those of court-appointed counsel under s. 3 of the Substitute Decisions Act.

The court ordered that certain preparation and hearing costs of s. 3 counsel and one group of siblings be paid by the unsuccessful parties, while other costs were borne by each party individually or paid from the incapable person's property.

Two competing applications were brought by siblings regarding the guardianship and care of their 88-year-old mother, who suffers from Alzheimer's dementia.

The court appointed the daughter, who had been living with and caring for the mother, as guardian of personal care, and a trust company as guardian of property.

The primary dispute concerned the daughter's claim for $133,000 in compensation for past caregiving and $53,620 annually going forward.

The court awarded a lump sum of $25,000 for past care and $500 per month for future care management, emphasizing the mother's best interests and the equitable recognition of the daughter's contributions.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown's case relied on observations by the arresting officer of suspicious driving and parking, physical indicators of impairment, and breath test results.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand and the timing of breath samples.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the demand based on the totality of circumstances, the samples were taken as soon as practicable, and the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

Following a successful application to declare a municipal by-law invalid, the applicant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of an offer to settle, and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The respondent argued each party should bear its own costs due to the public interest nature of the case.

The court awarded costs to the applicant, finding the public interest exception did not apply.

However, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49 because the applicant's offer contained terms beyond the scope of the litigation.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs at $74,006.60, adjusting the claimed rates to 60% of substantial indemnity rates.

The applicant sought to quash a municipal by-law imposing a two‑kilometre setback for industrial wind turbines from any “property” as defined in the by-law.

The court held that the definition of “property,” which included property lines, vacant land, structures, and inhabitants “of all species,” rendered the by-law unintelligible and incapable of consistent interpretation.

Because the measuring point for the setback requirement was unclear, developers could not determine where turbines could legally be located.

The by-law was therefore invalid for vagueness and uncertainty.

The court further observed that, even if valid, the by-law could become inoperative where it conflicted with provincial renewable energy legislation and regulations.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order that reduced his spousal support obligations to $400 per month, arguing it should have been reduced to zero due to his unemployment and suspended driver's license.

The Divisional Court found the motion judge erred in ordering any support given the economic disparity and the appellant's unemployment.

The court reduced the ongoing support to zero as of November 2003, but declined to order retroactive repayment.

No costs were awarded.