Sarah Joyce Draper

The parties entered into an agreement of purchase and sale for residential development lands, which was later amended to increase the fixed purchase price.

The vendor sought to terminate the agreement, alleging duress, misrepresentation, and breaches regarding deposits, pre-sales, and water bills.

The vendor also moved to convert the applications into a trial or adjourn the hearing.

The court dismissed the vendor's motion and application, finding no material facts in dispute, no duress or misrepresentation, and that the purchaser had paid the deposits by crediting the cost of home renovations as orally agreed.

The court granted the purchaser's application, confirming the amended purchase price and that the purchaser was not in default.

Randy Calmusky, as executor, brought an application to determine entitlement to joint bank accounts and a Registered Income Fund (RIF) held by his deceased father, Henry Calmusky, with his twin brother, Gary Calmusky.

Randy also claimed occupation rent and other expenses against Gary for his use of estate assets.

The court applied the presumption of resulting trust from Pecore v. Pecore to both the joint accounts and the RIF beneficiary designation, finding that Gary failed to rebut the presumption that these assets belonged to Henry's estate.

Consequently, Gary was ordered to pay the proceeds of these accounts to the estate.

However, the court dismissed the claim for occupation rent against Gary, finding no unjust enrichment due to Gary's early intention to purchase the property and the estate's significant financial gain from the property's increased value.

Gary was held liable for a limited amount of other expenses related to his use of estate assets.

Following a decision on cross-applications regarding the severance of a joint tenancy and a life interest in a property, the court determined the costs.

The court found divided success between the parties.

Because the litigation was necessitated by the testator's failure to unambiguously sever the joint tenancy during his lifetime, the court ordered the Estate to pay the partial indemnity costs of both the Salga applicants and Ms. Marley, as well as the full indemnity costs of the Estate Trustee.

The Salga applicants were ordered to pay Ms. Marley's substantial indemnity costs for an unnecessary consolidation motion.

The appellant, Julie Lawrence, appealed the order of the motion judge regarding the disposition of her late father's estate.

The central issue was whether a $50,000 TD line of credit taken out prior to the deceased's marriage to the respondent (the estate trustee and second wife) was a debt of the estate or secured against the matrimonial home.

The motion judge found the estate liable for the debt.

The appellant also alleged the motion judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias and improperly refused an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the factual findings, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no improper exercise of discretion regarding the adjournment or costs award.

This case involved two applications concerning the estate of Leslie Salga, primarily disputing the ownership of the matrimonial home.

The Salga applicants (daughters of the deceased) sought a declaration that a joint tenancy between their father and his wife, Karen Marley, was severed, allowing Leslie Salga's half-interest to pass through his will to them.

Karen Marley sought a declaration of sole ownership by right of survivorship or, alternatively, an increased share due to unjust enrichment and capital improvements.

The court found that the joint tenancy was severed by a "course of dealing" between Leslie Salga and Karen Marley, evidenced by the will and a recorded conversation, establishing a tenancy in common.

Consequently, Leslie Salga's half-interest became part of his estate.

The court dismissed the Salga applicants' request to force the immediate sale of the property, upholding Karen Marley's life interest as per the will.

Karen Marley's claims for unjust enrichment and capital improvements were also dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for outstanding payments for solar panel installation work and dismissal of the defendants' counterclaim.

The defendants counterclaimed for damages due to alleged negligence and breach of contract by the plaintiffs.

The court granted partial summary judgment in favour of two individual plaintiffs (Ian Poss and Scott Oliver) for their claims, dismissing the counterclaims against them, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding their work.

However, summary judgment was denied for the corporate plaintiffs due to substantial factual conflicts and credibility issues requiring a full trial.

The court also declined to pierce the corporate veil of the defendant corporations.

The court issued an endorsement on costs and the settling of orders following a decision that declared a settlement agreement valid and stayed a fourth-party claim.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs against the third party, 1671233 Ontario Limited, in favour of the plaintiffs, defendants, and other third/fourth parties.

The court denied the plaintiffs' request for interest on the settlement funds but ordered the immediate release of the $80,000 held in trust.

The court also resolved disputes over the wording of the formal orders and the release document.

The plaintiffs and defendants brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement reached between the parties, including the third party 1671233 Ontario Limited (167). 167's insurer had appointed counsel who agreed to the settlement on 167's behalf, but 167 subsequently refused to sign the release and issued a fourth party claim.

The court found that a valid settlement agreement was reached by counsel with ostensible authority.

Applying the factors from Milios v. Zagas, the court exercised its discretion under Rule 49.09 to enforce the settlement, finding it clear, reasonable, and not unduly prejudicial to 167.

Consequently, 167 was ordered to execute the release and its fourth party claim was stayed.

The moving party, Men's Fire, sought to be added as a party and to vary an interlocutory injunction that prevented interference with the plaintiff's archaeological assessments on its property.

The court added Men's Fire as a party on consent but dismissed the motion to vary the injunction.

The court found no evidence of an active land claim against the property, no failure by the plaintiff to comply with legislation, and no duty on the private landowner or the municipality to consult with the moving party under the circumstances.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's dismissal of his claims regarding damages under the Line Fences Act and a dispute over the sale of certain parcels of land.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant failed to prove damages regarding the fence and that the land sale agreement excluded the disputed parcels.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal the trial costs order was refused.

Property owners brought an application seeking a declaration that they could enforce obligations under a private road maintenance agreement and compel mediation or arbitration regarding disputes about maintenance.

The respondents argued there was no privity of contract because the applicants were not parties to the same agreement.

The court held that the developer’s scheme of entering identical agreements with each purchaser, combined with an enurement clause binding successors and assigns, demonstrated an intention that the purchasers benefit from and enforce the obligations relating to road maintenance.

Alternatively, the court found the circumstances satisfied the third‑party beneficiary test articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The applicants were declared entitled to rely on the agreement and to require mediation or arbitration concerning road maintenance disputes.

Following a successful application to declare a municipal by-law invalid, the applicant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of an offer to settle, and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The respondent argued each party should bear its own costs due to the public interest nature of the case.

The court awarded costs to the applicant, finding the public interest exception did not apply.

However, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49 because the applicant's offer contained terms beyond the scope of the litigation.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs at $74,006.60, adjusting the claimed rates to 60% of substantial indemnity rates.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for an order compelling the Chief Building Official to issue a building permit for a residential dwelling.

The lot in question was created through a scheme involving the registration of sham deeds designed to evade the subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the scheme was a fraud upon the Planning Act, meaning the deeds did not convey valid title.

As the appellant was not the lawful owner of the land, she was not eligible to apply for a building permit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought to quash a municipal by-law imposing a two‑kilometre setback for industrial wind turbines from any “property” as defined in the by-law.

The court held that the definition of “property,” which included property lines, vacant land, structures, and inhabitants “of all species,” rendered the by-law unintelligible and incapable of consistent interpretation.

Because the measuring point for the setback requirement was unclear, developers could not determine where turbines could legally be located.

The by-law was therefore invalid for vagueness and uncertainty.

The court further observed that, even if valid, the by-law could become inoperative where it conflicted with provincial renewable energy legislation and regulations.

The applicant sought an order compelling the municipality to issue a building permit for a parcel created through a series of intra-family conveyances designed to circumvent the Planning Act.

The court examined whether the parcel constituted a valid lot and whether the municipality could refuse the permit under the Building Code Act on the basis of contravention of other applicable law.

The court held that the initial conveyances forming the root of title were fraudulent and constituted a deceit upon the Planning Act because the purported vendors were never owners of the land.

As a result, the deeds were invalid and could not create a valid chain of title or be cured by the 40‑year rule, Planning Act statements, or subsequent conversion to land titles.

The court concluded that the building permit application was the “fruit from the poisoned tree” and refused to grant relief.

The appellant municipality appealed a decision quashing a by-law that authorized a licence agreement for a jet boat tour operator to use a municipal dock.

The application judge had found the by-law contravened the Planning Act because the use did not conform to the Official Plan's 'Conservation' designation and was not a legal non-conforming use.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the jet boat operation was a legal non-complying use under the Official Plan, as it was lawfully established by a prior by-law before the Plan was adopted.

The Court also found the licence agreement was not an unlawful disposition of land and did not create an illegal monopoly.